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 This dissertation combines institutional history and social analysis to 
provide a more nuanced depiction of the Soviet experience in the Great Patriotic 
War, a portrait which considers the experience of children, the state‟s 
expectations of children, and an exploration of the institution responsible for 
connecting child and state, the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization.  It 
argues that the state‟s expectations for children during the Great Patriotic War 
were issued primarily in order to save the floundering Young Pioneer 
organization.  Though the Pioneers were supposed to lead children in all sorts of 
tasks and behaviors – a role they had fulfilled since their inception in 1922 – the 
organization nearly collapsed under the strain of wartime conditions in the early 
years of the war.   
ix 
 
In order to resurrect its image and secure its rightful place in the vanguard 
of children, the Pioneers launched a concerted effort to reassert its leadership.  
Language, values, and models of heroism were revamped to more accurately 
reflect the war.  The internalization of these standards by children supported the 
Pioneers‟ claim to leadership. Campaigns of action were launched to allow the 
Pioneers to claim ownership of children‟s accomplishments.  To guarantee 
success, the organization drew its ideas from preexisting activities – activities 
children were already doing in 1941-42, largely on local initiative.  What had 
been conceived of and run as a prescriptive organization for two decades became 
a descriptive organization, subsuming all appropriate acts into the task of 
reestablishing the Pioneers at the forefront of Soviet childhood.  This suggests 
that children had far more agency than previously assumed, and their many roles 
complicate the typical “child-victim” normally associated with the Great Patriotic 
War and its propaganda. 
The post-Stalingrad turnaround allowed the Pioneers the opportunity to 
reassert themselves.  Becoming the vanguard, the organization established the 
foundations for a Pioneer-led heroism storied in Soviet history.  Though internal 
problems continued to dog the Pioneers for years, the foundational story was 
established in the latter years of the war.  Beginning in 1943, the organization 
began writing itself into the post-war victory narrative, alleging successful 
leadership among children and ignoring the near-catastrophe they had averted. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 On June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, nullifying a 
tenuous pact between the two nations and launching four years of death and 
destruction.  Physically, mentally, and spiritually consumed by this desperate 
struggle, the Soviet people endured unbelievable hardship. Some might surmise 
that they were hardly strangers to adversity, that any semblance of “normalcy” 
had been forever disrupted two-and-a-half decades before by the Bolsheviks‟ 
seizure of power in the October Revolution of 1917.   Clearly, Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks intended to destroy the old order in order to replace it with a new 
socialist society.  The dissolution of the Congress of Soviets and sanctioned land 
seizure by the peasantry marked the initial stages of this transformation.  From the 
beginning, the campaign to build a socialist nation was quite often accompanied 
by violence toward property and persons:  the political police, the Cheka, 
executed the royal family; church property was desecrated and priests arrested; 
the state confiscated private homes and subdivided them into communal 
apartments.  Other efforts – the attack on the Orthodox Church, changes to the 
education system, and so on – proceeded a bit more gradually, developing in 
earnest after the Civil War victory solidified the Bolsheviks‟ hold on power.  
Beginning in the late 1920s, Stalin‟s two-pronged drive to collectivize and 
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industrialize created social and physical upheaval, dramatically influencing the 
lives of millions.  Collectivization encouraged persecution of alleged kulaks and, 
ultimately, created conditions for a famine of unprecedented proportions.  
Industrialization often placed workers in unsafe, unsanitary, and ill-planned 
conditions.  Political persecution – both within the Party and without – was a 
constant feature of life, culminating (but not ending) with the Great Terror of the 
late 1930s. Millions suffered at the hands of the NKVD in prisons or penal 
colonies.   
 Even with such a history, however, the invasion of Germany in 1941 
visited remarkable levels of privation and disruption upon a Soviet population 
somewhat inured to suffering.  The reaction of the Soviet people to this hardship – 
the ability to survive, to defend themselves, to resist annihilation – is a key factor 
in the victory of the Soviet Union (and, thus, the Allies) in the Great Patriotic 
War.
1
  The military and political strategies of the Great Patriotic War have been 
and continue to be examined in detail,
2
 historians have only recently begun 
                                                 
 
1
 I choose to use the phrase “Great Patriotic War” intentionally throughout this 
dissertation.  While “World War II” is the more common term in the West, “Great Patriotic War” 
is a more precise term for the portion of the conflict involving the Soviet Union.  Not only is this 
the term used within the former Soviet Union (Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina), but it refers to 
the specific chronological boundaries of June 22, 1941, to September 2, 1945. 
 
2
 See, for example, Emelianov, Iurii Vasilevich, Tragediia Stalina, 1941-1945: cherez 
porazhenie k pobede (Moskva: IAuza, Eksmo, 2006);  Vladimir Lota, Sekretnyi front 
General‟nogo shtaba (Moskva: Molodaia Gvardiia, 2005); David E. Murphy, What Stalin Knew: 
The Enigma of Barbarossa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); David M. Glantz, Soviet 
Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 
and The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002);  
Richard Overy, Russia‟s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945 (New York, NY:  
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delving into the experiences and meaning of the people‟s war.  As Bernd 
Bonwetsch and Robert Thurston correctly note, the term “people” should not refer 
to that monolith of absolute heroism so long idealized by Soviet historians and the 
Soviet state, but to the complex and often contradictory combination of good, bad, 
and ugly that characterized ordinary people in wartime.
3
  From the quotidian to 
the heroic, the war influenced all aspects of daily life for millions of ordinary 
Soviets.  Good work has helped to begin fleshing out the wartime experiences of 
sub-groups such as women in the military, frontline soldiers, and urban 
intellectuals.
4
  This dissertation seeks to contribute to this historiography by 
                                                                                                                                     
Penguin Books, 1997), James Barros and Richard Gregor, Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler, and 
the Invasion of Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995),  John Erickson, The 
Road to Stalingrad: Stalin‟s War with Germany (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1975), and The 
Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin‟s War with Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1983). 
 
3
 Bonwetsch and Thurston, eds., The People‟s War: Responses to World War II in the 
Soviet Union (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 1-9. 
 
4
 On women, see Kazimiera J. Cottam, Women in Air War: The Eastern Front of  World 
War II (Nepean, OH: New Military Publishing, 1997);  John Erickson, “Soviet Women at War” in 
World War II and the Soviet People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet 
and East European Studies, Harrogate 1990, eds. John Garrard and Carol Garrard (New York: St. 
Martin‟s Press, 1993); Reina Pennington, Wings, Women, and War: Soviet Airwomen in World 
War II Combat (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001);  Susanne Conze and Beate 
Fiesler, “Soviet Women as Comrades-in-Arms: A Blind Spot in the History of the War” in 
Bonwetsch and Thurston, The People‟s War, 211-234.  On ordinary soldiers, see Conze and 
Fiesler;  Catherine Merridale, Ivan‟s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006);  Robert Thurston, “Cauldrons of Loyalty and Betrayal: Soviet 
Soldiers‟ Behavior, 1941 and 1945” and Mark Von Hagen, “Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the 
Eve of the German Invasion: Toward a Description of Social Psychology and Political Attitudes,” 
both in Bonwetsch and Thurston, The People‟s War, 235-258 and 187-210.  On intellectuals, see 
Bonwetsch, “War as a „Breathing Space‟: Soviet Intellectuals and the „Great Patriotic War‟”; 
Aileen G. Rambow, “The Siege of Leningrad: Wartime Literature and Ideological Change”; and 
Richard Stites, “Soviet Russian Wartime Culture: Freedom and Control, Spontaneity and 
Consciousness,” all in Bonwetsch and Thurston, The People‟s War, 137-186. 
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aiming to more fully illuminate the experiences of a heretofore neglected sector of 
the population:  children.   
 Children are often absent from the studies and narratives historians craft.  
They are invisible, perhaps, because of their seeming non-presence in political 
debate, social activism, or military action.  Children do not “make things happen” 
in the financial world, elevate “great men,” or command armies.   To ignore the 
story of children, however, is to willingly accept an incomplete picture of past 
events.  Their very ubiquity demands notice, as does their role in various aspects 
of society - the family, education, the labor force, and so on.  Building on the 
foundational work of Philippe Ariès,
5
 historians have revealed the presence and 
influence of children, of representations of children, and of the cultural construct 
of childhood in varying arenas such as consumer culture, class structures, and 
identity formation.
6
  Bringing children into the stories of history gives a fuller 
understanding of events and ideas;  the ways in which children are represented, 
                                                 
 
5
 Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert 
Baldick (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).  By “foundational,” I mean that Ariès successfully 
argued for an examination of children as a separate group in society by revealing childhood to be a 
cultural construct.  The Ariès thesis asserts that the idea of childhood, invented in the Early 
Modern period, limited the freedom of children and established the tyranny of the family.  Not all 
historians agree with his thesis  - see Lloyd deMause, The History of Childhood (New York: The 
Psychohistory Press, 1974), for the most obvious example – but all have built upon the idea that 
children deserve to be examined as an important and distinct sub-group in modern society. 
 
6
 See, for example, Sharon Stephens, ed., Children and the Politics of Culture (Princeton, 
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1995); Caroline F. Levander and Carol J. Singley, eds., The 
American Child: A Cultural Studies Reader (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003);  
Hugh Cunningham, The Children of the Poor in England: Representation of Childhood since the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996); Roger Cox, Shaping Childhood: Themes of 
Uncertainty in the History of Adult-Child Relationships (London: Routledge, 1996); Elliot West, 
Growing Up with the Country: Childhood on the Far Western Frontier (Albuquerque, NM: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1989). 
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legislated, ritualized, organized, mistreated, and so on reveal much about the adult 
society and culture with which they cohabit.  Children, too, are affected by these 
perceptions about childhood;  their point of view allows us to see events 
differently, to hear new voices. 
 The majority of projects on children have focused on the West, and, in 
particular, on the United States.  Much work remains to be done in the field of 
Russian history.  Max Okenfuss traces what he believes to be the origin of the 
idea of childhood in Russia to the seventeenth century‟s Slavic primer,7 though 
Andrew Wachtel argues that the 1852 publication of Leo Tolstoy‟s Childhood 
marks the “coherent integral model for expression and interpretation of this 
stage,” contrasting Tolstoy‟s model to the utopian vision of Chernyshevsky.8  
Aside from these studies of the idea of childhood in Russia, little has been done, 
especially on the relationship of these ideas to children themselves, to the state, or 
to material culture.
9
  Marxist and, later, Leninist ideas about children and 
childhood are, of course, essential to understanding Bolshevik attitudes, both 
ideological and practical, toward day care, education, youth organizations, the 
family, and proper upbringing (vospitanie) of the young.        
                                                 
 
7
 Max Okenfuss, The Discovery of Childhood in Russia:  The Evidence of the Slavic 
Primer (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1980). 
 
8
 Andrew Baruch Wachtel, The Battle for Childhood: Creation of a Russian Myth 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 2. 
 
9
 Two notable exceptions exist: Catriona Kelly‟s forthcoming and much-anticipated work 
on children and material culture in Russia/the Soviet Union, and David Ransel, Mothers of 
Misery:  Child Abandonment in Russia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
6 
 
 The field is almost limitless in Soviet history.  Fewer than ten English-
language monographs directly address children and/or childhood in the Soviet 
Union, though there are more that touch on issues affecting children such as 
education or women.
10
  Felicity O‟Dell and Katerina Clark investigate the uses 
and meanings of Soviet literature for children.
11
  More recent works explore 
interactions between society, state, and children.  Two scholars consider the issue 
of children‟s homes:  Alan Ball describes conditions of abandoned children and 
the state‟s efforts to deal with them in the 1920s, and Judith Harwin examines 
state-sponsored child care in the late Soviet period.
12
  Lisa Kirschenbaum focuses 
on preschool children, “trac[ing] the shifting and contested meanings of childhood 
in revolutionary Russia as well as the consequences of the child‟s status as the 
personification of the whole enterprise of cultural revolution for teachers, parents, 
and children themselves.”13  Her study of pedagogical policies for kindergarteners 
affirms the ideological importance of children‟s malleability for the Bolsheviks, 
yet demonstrates that practical resources often lagged behind theoretical concerns.   
                                                 
 
10
 See, for example, Larry Holmes, Stalin‟s School: Moscow‟s Model School No. 25, 
1931-1937  (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), and The Kremlin and the 
Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet Russia, 1917-1931 (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana 
University Press, 1991); Wendy Z. Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family 
Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).   
 
11
 Felicity O‟Dell, Socialisation Through Children‟s Literature: the Soviet Example 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978);  Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as 
Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
 
12
 Alan Ball, And Now My Soul Is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 
1918-1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Judith Harwin, Children of the 
Russian State, 1917-1995 (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1996).  Harwin‟s book focuses primarily 
on the Gorbachev-Yeltsin years despite the book‟s title. 
 
13
Lisa Kirschenbaum, Small Comrades: Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 
1917-1932 (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001), 2. 
7 
 
  Soviet youth have been considered in greater depth and breadth.  
Beginning with Ralph T. Fisher‟s landmark study of the Communist Youth 
League, or Komsomol, many scholars have examined the relationship of youth to 
twentieth-century events in the Soviet Union.
14
  The term “youth” introduces a 
somewhat problematic semantic issue.  The dividing line between child and youth 
is rather murky:  when exactly does childhood end and youth begin?  At what 
point does adulthood arrive?  Do these categories overlap?  Clearly, there is a 
greater expectation of independence, maturity, and physical development as age 
progresses, but these factors vary wildly from individual to individual – much less 
culture to culture and era to era – as do evolving expectations.  For the sake of 
clarity and given the centrality of the Pioneer organization to this project, this 
dissertation will use the artificial limits imposed by the Communist Party to 
designate between children and youth.  The term “youth” (molodëzh‟) will be 
those persons able to apply for membership in the Komsomol – young men and 
women ages fifteen to twenty-six.  The terms “children” or “schoolchildren” (deti 
or shkol‟niki) will be used to describe both those ten- to fourteen-year old boys 
                                                 
 
14
 Ralph T. Fisher, Pattern for Soviet Youth:  A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 
1918-1954 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).  Other monographs on Soviet youth 
include Anne E. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), and Flappers and Foxtrotters: Soviet Youth in 
the “Roaring Twenties” (Pittsburgh, PA: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1994); Albert Hughes, Political Socialization of Soviet Youth (Lewiston, 
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992); James Riordan, ed., Soviet Youth Culture (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1989); Isabel Tirado, Young Guard! The Communist Youth League, 
Petrograd, 1917-1920 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth 
Program: Regimentation and Rebellion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
8 
 
and girls able to apply for membership in the Young Pioneers and those younger 
children still of school age.
15
  Since the political organization, accompanying 
messages, and state expectations changed at age fifteen, it makes sense to adopt 
the Party‟s distinction between children and youth for the purposes of this 
dissertation. 
 Acknowledging the “importance but also the separateness of youth,”16 the 
Bolsheviks created organizations designed to disseminate party messages and to 
regulate activism among them, a sort of mass mobilization borne out of twentieth-
century modernity.
17
  The Communist Youth League, for youth ages fifteen to 
approximately twenty-six, was a group for Communist Party hopefuls, populated 
by those with proper backgrounds, suitable recommendations and connections, 
and outstanding grades and achievements.  The organization was viewed as a 
stepping stone to party candidacy, a good job or university placement, and future 
security, offering a fine combination of idealism and opportunism.  Members of 
the Komsomol were the most visible and vocal of the younger generation:  
Komsomoltsy participated in partisan warfare during the Great Patriotic War, 
Komsomoltsy tilled the Virgin Lands for Khrushchev, and Komsomoltsy manned 
                                                 
 
15
 Soviet children began school around age six.  A party organization for children ages six 
to nine, the Little Octobrists, existed, though it was largely inactive during the period of the war. 
 
16
 Peter Stearns, Growing Up: The History of Childhood in a Global Context (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2005), 58.  Stearns suggests that “the Marxist approach to children” 
demonstrated a “fervent dedication to the formation of youth groups.” 
 
17
 Claire Wallace and Raimund Alt, “Youth Cultures Under Authoritarian Regimes: The 
Case of the Swings Against the Nazis,” Youth and Society, 32, 3 (March 2001), 292. 
9 
 
huge construction projects such as the Baikal-Amur Mainline railway.  Youth, 
indeed, were targeted by the Party as a special sub-population and “organized” 
accordingly. 
But it was children, not youth, who occupied a “privileged place in the 
Soviet way of life.”18  Central to cultural transformation, the child “stood as the 
icon of the Revolution‟s future,”19 “impress[ing] all who ever go to the Soviet 
Union.”20  A popular state slogan declared children to be the only privileged class 
in the Soviet Union.  Not content to allow these icons to absorb socialist ideals by 
osmosis, the party created an organization for them as well:  the Young Pioneers.   
Who were these Young Pioneers?  The V. I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer 
Organization was the Bolshevik (later, Communist) Party‟s organization for 
children ages ten to fourteen.
21
  In 1922, after five years of experimentation and 
debate, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of the Komsomol announced the official 
installation of the Young Pioneers, a thinly-disguised communist version of the 
                                                 
 
18
 Paul Thorez, Model Children, trans. Nancy Cadet (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 
1991), 41. 
 
19
 Kirschenbaum, Small Comrades, 161. 
 
20
 Major A. S. Hooper, Through Soviet Russia: 1937 (London: Hooper, Purnell and Sons, 
Ltd., 1937), 102. 
 
21
 The provenance of the word “pioneer” should be explained.  Although the term 
“pioneer,” as used in English, usually implies some sort of relation to trailblazing or innovation, 
the term did not seem to have the same connotations in Russian.  The word pioner (пионер) was 
first used in Russia in 1705 in the letters and papers of Peter I, adopted from the seventeenth-
century German “Pionier,” which was adopted from the French “pionnier,” or infantryman.  
Though pioner was later replaced by pekhotinets in common usage, the term retained its military 
association.  Thus, the Young Pioneers were supposed to be the little foot soldiers of the 
Communist Party.  Max Vasmer, O. N. Trubachev, B. A. Larin, Etimologicheskii slovar‟ russkogo 
iazyka: v chetyrekh tomakh, Izd. 2-e, (Moskva: Progress, 1986-1987), Tom III, 264. 
10 
 
previously successful Russian Boy Scout program.
22
  The stated goals for the 
Pioneers were “to inculcate class consciousness, instincts of group formation and 
of competition, a sense of social living, an esteem for creative labor, a striving for 
knowledge, and a willingness to subordinate personal interests to those of 
society”;23  in short, the Pioneers were to learn how to live communism.  
Widely known as the “darling of the Party” or the “Boy Scouts of 
Russia,”24 the Pioneer organization functioned for almost seventy years as the 
primary link between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its children.  
The Pioneers cannot accurately be described as either darlings or Boy Scouts, and 
the goals, structures, and activities of the Pioneer organization remain largely 
unknown, obscured by such stereotypes and misnomers. Historians have generally 
neglected the story of the Pioneers and their role in the Soviet system, perhaps 
concluding that, as one scholar succinctly puts it, “as the junior counterpart of the 
Komsomol, it [the Pioneer organization] does not have a separate history.”25  
To dismiss the Pioneer organization as a sort of Kiddie-Komsomol, 
however, ignores several crucial differences between the two groups.  The 
Komsomol was never conceived as a mass organization, that is as an association 
                                                 
22
 See Julie deGraffenried, “The Origins of the V. I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer 
Organization,” (unpublished paper, The University of Texas at Austin, 1999). 
23
 V Vserossiiskii s”ezd RKSM, 11-19 oktiabria 1922 g.,  as cited in Fisher, Pattern for 
Soviet Youth, 346-348. 
24
 George S. Counts, The Challenge of Soviet Education (New York:  McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1957), 104–107. 
25
 Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program, 20. 
11 
 
that seeks to include everyone who meets eligibility requirements such as age, 
whereas the Pioneer organization, from its inception, actively recruited children of 
all backgrounds and in all areas and instituted very few obstacles to membership.  
The Komsomol represented the “best and the brightest” on their way to Party 
candidacy;  the Pioneers, on the other hand, were much more inclusive.  As a 
mass organization striving for an ever-larger membership, the Pioneers‟ goals and 
tactics differed significantly from those of the Komsomol.   
The activities of the Komsomol and Pioneers varied as well, primarily 
because of the age groups participating in them.  Teenagers and young adults 
comprised the membership of the Komsomol, whereas, the Pioneer organization 
included children between the ages of ten and fourteen – although at times in its 
history, the age range was nine to sixteen.  The “grown-up” activities of the 
Komsomol were not always appropriate for the Pioneers, so the types of programs 
often differed.  A solitary campaign, such as the liquidation of illiteracy, often 
produced widely-varying tasks for the Komsomol and Pioneer organization as 
well as the motivations for participating in them.  Multiply that one campaign by 
hundreds – for there were many such “fronts” on which to struggle – and the 
expectations and activities for Komsomoltsy and Pioneers become exponentially 
distinct. 
Finally, an entire iconography replete with symbols, ceremonies, oaths, 
and sacred sites developed under the aegis of the Pioneer organization for the 
12 
 
edification (and entertainment) of its young members, a characteristic setting the 
Pioneers completely apart from the Komsomol, which “disdained uniforms, 
salutes, and so forth, but . . . considered [them] appropriate for children.”26  
Indeed, it could be argued that a Pioneer culture emerged in the Soviet Union that 
encompassed and institutionalized Pioneer iconography.  This Pioneer culture, 
complete with newspapers, literature, music, the performing arts, and radio, even 
designated sites specific to its development, from Artek, the famous summer 
camp, to the ubiquitous Pioneer corner in each Soviet schoolroom. 
Thus, the Pioneers, a mass organization designed to appeal to a broad, 
young audience, should not be viewed as a minor-league Komsomol.  The Pioneer 
organization challenges simplistic depictions, such as “character educator,”27 
“political indoctrinator”28 or “behavior control program”;29  sometimes Pioneer 
troops were all of these of these things – sometimes none.  The multi-faceted 
Pioneer organization, above all, was an attempt to reach every child in the Soviet 
Union with the message of the Communist Party, its mass audience providing 
Party leaders the opportunity to influence and mobilize, for better or for worse, an 
impressionable yet unpredictable swath of the population, a group bounded 
neither by nationality, gender, nor socioeconomic status, seemingly omnipresent 
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within the public and private spaces in society.  Accordingly, the creation of the 
organization, its goals, methods, activities, and problems must be posed as a 
distinct set of inquiries, addressed in relation to other Party components, such as 
the Komsomol, and placed within the historical framework of the Soviet era, but 
also treated as a unique, state-sponsored, socialist children‟s organization without 
historical precedent.   
Recently, historian Laurie Bernstein wrote, “The picture that comes to 
mind when we think of Soviet youth is that of the communist scouts, the „Young 
Pioneers‟ decked out in their red neckerchiefs and impossibly neat outfits, looking 
like a cross between Hitler youth and reverent bobbysoxers.”30  The Pioneers 
might indeed be the symbol of Soviet childhood;  however, there is a dearth of 
recent work specifically discussing the organization, and in works with a broader 
scope, it usually merits merely a colorful anecdote or two.
31
  Though neglected, 
the Pioneer organization is enormously important as an intersection of state 
interests, ideology, society, and children.  As one former Pioneer official put it, 
the Pioneers were “essentially an adult organization in which children 
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participated.”32  Thus, the state‟s definition of childhood – appearance, values, 
activities, and so on – is made accessible through the programs and 
pronouncements of the Young Pioneers.  Studying internal documents of the 
Pioneer organization illuminates the party‟s attempts to define Sovietness, to 
propagandize, to direct the actions of the nation‟s children as well as the struggles 
associated with insufficient resources and staff, overwhelming circumstances, and 
a sometimes uncooperative population.  Not only does analysis of the 
organization demonstrate the shifting nature of the state‟s ideals for and 
expectations of Soviet children, but also the difficulties involved in disseminating 
and “selling” those same ideals and expectations to children. 
Apparently, this task became immeasurably more difficult in 1941.  At the 
onset of the Great Patriotic War, children ages ten to fourteen comprised an 
estimated 11.4 percent of the population, and children under nineteen, a whopping 
44.8 percent of the total population of the Soviet Union.
33
  According to 
membership reports, some 61 percent of eligible children were members of the 
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Young Pioneers.
34
  The war brought with it unprecedented challenges and 
conditions for the organization and for Soviet children, as it did for the entire 
population.  It is at this intersection of children, state, and circumstance that I pose 
the questions which frame my dissertation:  what was the war like for children?  
How did the state interact with children during the Great Patriotic War?  What did 
the state expect of children during wartime?  This study primarily focuses on 
children aged ten to fourteen – those whom the state expected to reach via the 
Young Pioneers.  Though this project does not pretend to be an exhaustive 
account of children, the state, and the Great Patriotic War, many of the 
expectations and experiences described herein can be and should be extrapolated 
to children of all ages.    
 This study joins other recent explorations into the relationship between 
children and war.
35
  Long viewed solely in the one-dimensional role of victim – 
and, indeed, children often are the greatest victims of war – scholars now agree 
                                                 
 
34
 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 7, d. 77, l. 33.  Statistics in a 1944 memo on Pioneer membership 
give comparative figures for 1939-1943.  Membership in January 1941 is listed as 13,694,560.  As 
noted above, Andreev, et.al., estimate population of children ages ten to fourteen in 1941 at 
22,325,000.   Evidently these membership figures were not widely-known, as there is obvious 
discrepancy between the organization‟s number and other accounts.  For example, Boris 
Skomorosky claims that there were ten million Pioneers, ages ten to sixteen, at the beginning of 
the war.  The Anglo-Soviet Youth Friendship Alliance estimated a membership of fifteen million.  
Skomorovsky and E. G. Morris, The Siege of Leningrad (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 
1944), 42;  Anglo-Soviet Youth Friendship Alliance, Soviet Youth Organizations: Pioneers, 
Komsomols: Sport and Culture (London: The Alliance, 1943), 3. 
 
35
 See, for example, the twenty-one essays in James Marten, ed., Children and War: A 
Historical Anthology (New York: New York University Press, 2002);  Marten, The Children‟s 
Civil War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), and Lessons of War: The 
Civil War in Children‟s Magazines (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999). 
16 
 
that “children have been and are deeply engaged in every facet of war.”36  A study 
conducted during the Second World War concluded that by the age of ten years 
old, children have a “detailed, serious, factual almost adult interest” in war.37  The 
authors found that ten-year-olds could differentiate between theatres of war and 
branches of the military, that they listened to the news and followed maps, and 
that they had been helping with war work since the age of six.
38
  Children are 
consumers in war:  they buy books, toy soldiers, guns, and tanks, and they pay for 
war-themed entertainment.
39
  Child-soldiers have fought in every modern war;  
others play at it, using sticks for guns and rocks for grenades.  And because 
children are “rarely left to interpret the causes and meanings and ramifications of 
wars completely on their own . . . children‟s experiences during wartime cannot 
be separated from larger efforts by families, governments, schools, . . to shape the 
responses and even memories of children.”40   
 Studies conducted by Russian psychologists during World War I 
demonstrated that children were interested in war, that it influenced their 
behavior, and that media could shape their perceptions of it.
41
  Russian educators 
worried that the war might have a detrimental moral influence on its young and 
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discussed methods of protecting them from its ill effects.  No such compunctions 
vexed the Party during the Great Patriotic War.  Soviet children had been in near-
constant “mobilization” mode for decades.  Military language permeated the 
entire Pioneer organization:  members were divided into troops and detachments;  
they were encouraged to struggle on various “fronts” against such enemies as 
poor hygiene and kulaks;  they wore uniforms and marched in parade formation.  
The Great Patriotic War provided both real enemies and real struggle for those 
who were Pioneers in the early 1940s.  Children were immersed in the conflict:  
school subjects revolved around the war; Pioneer troops encouraged massive war 
work; every story, poem, and photo in the children‟s press concerned the war; 
children‟s radio broadcast on only one topic – the war.  The state did not soft-
peddle this war nor did it gloss over atrocities some might consider unsuitable for 
children;  rather, the desperate conditions on the frontlines were described in great 
detail.  Heroism and national identity were defined for children based on 
anecdotal and fictional narratives about feats on the frontline and homefront.  
Even accomplishing commonplace tasks, such as getting good grades, contributed 
to the cause.
42
  This conflict – persisting in ordinary life under extraordinarily 
grim circumstances – imparted an underlying tension to the state‟s messages to 
children. 
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 According to Soviet mythology, children responded en masse – all under 
the aegis of the Young Pioneers.  The “young avengers,” acting in one accord and 
with one motivation, fulfilled and surpassed all expectations of the state, busily 
working and fighting alongside their older counterparts.
43
  For decades, the 
official historiography of the war swept aside “errors, defeats, and sheer 
stupidity”44 to focus on a story of epic heroism that bore little resemblance to the 
day-to-day experience endured by the Soviet people or to the haphazard, 
sometimes irrational, manner in which the state managed the war.  Since the 
1990s, this has been and continues to be remedied by a small, though significant, 
number of memoirs and wartime narratives from the former Soviet Union that 
contradict the standard story and bring the war down from its larger-than-life, 
monolithic heights to the personal level.  While Western scholars have long 
sought to depict the war more accurately than their Soviet counterparts were 
willing or able to, still, no history of the children‟s Great Patriotic War exists to 
countermand the Soviet myth, much less to raise important questions about 
children and war in the Soviet Union.   
 One aim of this dissertation is to provide a more accurate portrait of the 
Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, a portrait which considers the child‟s 
experience, the state‟s expectations of children, and an exploration of the 
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institution responsible for disseminating the state‟s messages to children, the 
Young Pioneers.  These descriptions are revealing and contribute greatly to our 
knowledge of the Soviet war effort.  While the initial question which guided my 
research involved the content of the state‟s expectations for children, the more 
interesting story turned out to be the motive behind the state‟s expectations for 
children during the war – the “why” helped to shed light on the “what.”   
This dissertation argues that the state‟s expectations for children during 
the Great Patriotic War were issued primarily in order to save the floundering 
Young Pioneer organization.  During the war, the Party expected that the Pioneers 
would serve as its representative and mouthpiece amongst the younger generation.  
The Pioneer organization was supposed to manage and supervise children in all 
sorts of tasks, campaigns, and ideas appropriate to the war.  This Pied-Piper-like 
role had defined the Young Pioneers since its inception in 1922;  by the end of the 
1930s, it was becoming reality, reaching large numbers of children newly-
enrolled in Soviet schools and establishing such iconic figures as Pavlik Morozov 
in Soviet lore.  In the early years of the war, however, archival documents 
indicate that the Pioneers struggled to maintain their leadership role and nearly 
collapsed under the strain of wartime conditions.  In order to resurrect its image 
and secure its rightful place in the vanguard of children, the Young Pioneer 
leadership reorganized and launched scores of campaigns designed to reassert the 
leadership of the Pioneers among children.   
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First, Pioneers revamped their language and values to more accurately 
reflect the conditions of war.  The organization was not so much reinvented as it 
was reintroduced to Soviet children as relevant and germane to their lives, 
experiences, and feelings.  The language with which the Pioneers provided 
children, via media and instruction, appears to have resonated with its intended 
audience.  By supplying models of heroism that demonstrated carefully selected 
behaviors, emotions, and speech, the Pioneer organization supplied children with 
the language needed to express their outrage, sorrow, and patriotism in prescribed 
ways.  More to the point, the use of this language and the internalization of Soviet 
values by children could support the Pioneers‟ claim to leadership among 
children.   
Second, the Pioneers needed to assert ownership of campaigns of action 
for children, sure-fire, appealing campaigns that could guarantee the revival of the 
organization‟s leading role.  Thus, the Pioneer organization drew its ideas from 
preexisting activities – the jobs, tasks, and activities that children were already 
doing in 1941-1942, largely on individual or local initiative.  The crisis in the 
organization provides a window through which to see the enterprise and 
resourcefulness of Soviet children.  What had been conceived of and run as a 
prescriptive organization for much of its twenty-year history became a descriptive 
organization, subsuming all appropriate acts into the more important task of 
reestablishing the Pioneer organization at the forefront of Soviet childhood.  
21 
 
Everything from metal collecting to schoolwork was classified as war work, and 
by claiming to initiate and direct such tasks, the Pioneers alleged leadership of all 
children‟s activities.  Yet, the adoption of preexisting acts suggests that children 
had far more agency than previously assumed as their activities formed the core 
of Pioneer promotions for the remainder of the war.  Contrary to the idea that 
totalitarian states are unresponsive or indifferent to society, the Communist Party 
drew on popular measures and motivations in order to save its children‟s 
organization, proving once again that the word “totalitarian” must be applied 
cautiously to the Soviet state.  And, the many roles children played – adopted by 
the Pioneers after late 1942 – suggest a far more complex “Soviet child” than the 
child-victim normally associated with the Great Patriotic War and its propaganda. 
The perceived crisis in the Pioneer organization as well as the response to 
it is unique among Soviet institutions and an important contribution of this 
dissertation to the historiography of the war.  It has been noted that the war and its 
immediate losses shook the Soviet leadership.  A sort of general uneasiness with 
the poor showing in the early years of the struggle against Nazi Germany plagued 
the Party and undermined its confidence.  The unifying language of patriotism 
replaced the ideological rhetoric of communism, even in Stalin‟s speeches to the 
nation.  Scholars have noted two distinct stages in the Party‟s response to the 
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war.
45
  In the first stage, from the beginning of the war until early 1943, rather 
than giving the Party a commanding role in a thus-far unsuccessful war, 
individual people and individual acts of heroism were recognized as leaders of the 
war effort.  The second stage, from 1943 until the war‟s successful conclusion, 
reflected the turning of the tide in the war after the battles of Stalingrad and 
Kursk, when “it was suddenly realized that ideological work had been neglected.  
Immediate measures were taken.”46  The Party reemerged as conductor of war 
work.  Stalin was idolized much more actively and pervasively.  Jeffrey Brooks 
describes the look of Pravda‟s post-Stalingrad shift – a flood of medals issued, 
the redesign of officer‟s uniforms, the promotion of the Stalin cult, collective 
rather than individual heroism – as the state, not the people, resumed its role as 
the source of all reward and honor.
47
  The decline and revival of the Young 
Pioneers appears to fit into these stages:  the crisis within the organization was 
identified in the fall of 1942 and the following year marked the beginning of the 
turnaround in Pioneer fortunes.  This project, though, suggests that institution-
specific motives must be taken into consideration when discussing the two stages 
of Party activity.  No other Party institution, as far as is known, felt its existence 
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threatened – the situation which dictated all subsequent actions of the Young 
Pioneers.  Stalin, for example, was never seriously in danger of losing his 
position.  His concern was far more subtle – to distance himself from failure and 
to associate himself with triumph.  Nor did the Pioneers‟ methods match those of, 
say, Brooks‟ Pravda.   Individual heroes played an important role in Pioneer lore 
throughout the war, and Stalin‟s shift in visibility was far less extreme within the 
Pioneer organization.  Though this study does not discredit the “post-Stalingrad 
turn” identified by other scholars, it does suggest that “the turn” must be applied 
with more caution and discrimination.  Among Soviet institutions in the war, the 
Young Pioneers‟ story is remarkable. 
The post-Stalingrad turnaround in military fortunes granted Stalin the 
chance to reassert his importance and authority;  simultaneously, the Pioneers 
launched a concerted effort to resurrect their own reputation and visibility.  
(Re)becoming the vanguard among Soviet children, the organization established 
the foundations for a Pioneer-led heroism storied in Soviet history.  Though 
internal problems continued to dog the Pioneers for years, the foundational story 
was established in the latter years of the Great Patriotic War. Beginning in 1943, 
the organization began writing itself into the post-war victory narrative, alleging 
uninterrupted and successful leadership among children, active duty in the war, 
and ignoring the near-catastrophe they had averted. 
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The initial chapters of this dissertation provide context for this fascinating 
story.  Chapter Two offers a brief history of the Young Pioneer organization up to 
the outbreak of war in 1941.  Chapter Three examines experiences and conditions 
common to children during the Great Patriotic War.  A growing number of 
memoirs, written by people who experienced the war as children, have been 
published in recent years.  Supplemented by archival information, these accounts 
portray the unique position of children in chaotic wartime and immensely 
complicate the simplistic portrayal of wartime childhood presented by the Soviet 
state. Grave circumstances, some caused by external forces (the German 
occupation), some caused by internal forces (state policies or evacuation efforts), 
presented extraordinary obstacles for the Pioneer organization‟s alleged 
leadership among children. Chapter Four chronicles the perceived crisis within 
the Young Pioneer organization in the early years of war.  The solution to these 
troubles and the multitude of expectations, values, and tasks piled upon Soviet 
children by the state is the subject of Chapters Five and Six, while the resurrection 
of the Young Pioneer organization and its subsequent mythologization is 
recounted in Chapter Seven. 
 In the midst of great privation and hardship, the state expected Soviet 
children to contribute all they could to the war effort.  Other nations attempted to 
shield their children from the war‟s brutality;  even Soviet propaganda for adults 
portrayed children one-dimensionally – as victims.  The messages sent to children 
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via the Young Pioneers, however, differed radically.  Rather than focusing solely 
on the victimization of children, the state empowered children by sacralizing the 
quotidian and demanding of them grown-up tasks and attitudes.  Some children 
appreciated the ability to “do something” for the motherland, and the state 
profited from their activities and labor.  The chief beneficiary of this 
empowerment, though, was its perceived leader, the Pioneer organization.  
Having struggled in the early years of the war, the organization was able, by war‟s 
end, to write itself into the state‟s carefully crafted narrative of glorious Soviet 
victory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE YOUNG PIONEERS, 1922-1941 
. . . train the masses for conscious and disciplined labour  
when they are still young . . .  
Vladimir Lenin, speech at Third Komsomol Congress, 1920 
1
 
 
 Besides a multitude of Soviet-era, authorized versions, no history of the 
Young Pioneers exists.  Considering the ubiquity and popularity of the Pioneers, 
this is rather surprising.  What follows, then, is a brief account of the first two 
decades of the organization‟s existence.  Abiding by the dictates of Party 
leadership, the Pioneer organization sought to teach and promote ideals of the 
Bolsheviks among children throughout the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.  The 
substance of these instructions changed with the political climate.  From the 
limited, retrospectively lighthearted campaigns of the NEP era to the more heavy-
handed demonstrations of the turbulent years of Stalinism, the Pioneers sought to 
prescribe particular behaviors for children.  The Pioneer organization grew 
quickly in its first two decades of existence, steadily increasing its membership.  
On the eve of war in the early 1940s, no threat to continued organizational 
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growth, influence, and activity loomed.  The Pioneers appeared to be a healthy 
children‟s organization, absorbed in the proper upbringing of Soviet children. 
 
* * * 
 
The Genesis of the Young Pioneers 
 After the Bolsheviks‟ ascension to power in October 1917, they embarked 
on a campaign of radical transformation – much of which occurred within days or 
weeks of the takeover.  In a dramatic shift in foreign policy, Russia abandoned her 
allies and sued for peace with Germany, ending her involvement in the 
“imperialist” world war;  in the arts, “proletarian,” avant-garde, experimental 
artists enjoyed a measure of government support;  in the economy, the new 
government gave official approval to peasant appropriation of rural land and 
nationalized all industries;  in education, the new Commissar of Education 
instituted polytechnical education, introducing physical labor in the curriculum, 
and abolishing grades, placement exams, and homework.  The purpose of this 
rapid transformation was clear: to, as quickly as possible, lay the foundations for a 
new socialist state, ridding Russia, once and for all, of the backward, exploitative 
bonds of autocracy, feudalism/capitalism, and religion.   
 The organization of children, however, was not one of these immediate 
priorities.  The Bolsheviks‟ decision to extend party patronage to the fourteen-
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and-under crowd occurred five years after the revolution with the creation of the 
Young Pioneers in 1922.  Further, the influence of pre-Revolutionary children‟s 
organizations, most notably the Russian Boy Scouts, is evident in the structure, 
iconography, and methods of the Pioneers.   To make sense of this, one must 
consider the context in which the organization was created. 
 In 1897, the average age in Russia was 25.16 years (74.9 million Russians 
-- 64.5 percent of the population -- were under thirty years of age), and the 
revolutionaries who made up the Russian Social Democratic Party were reflective 
of this relatively young society.
2
  The universities and seminaries seemed to 
graduate revolutionaries rather than students, so much so that in autocratic Russia, 
the two words became synonymous.
3
  Accordingly, the Bolshevik faction of the 
Russian Social Democrats declared themselves the party of youth.  V. I. Lenin 
proclaimed, “Let us leave it to the Constitutional Democrats to pick up „tired‟ old 
men of thirty, revolutionaries who „have become wiser‟ and Social-Democratic 
renegades.  We shall always be the party of the vanguard of youth!”4  Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks affirmed this stance in the wake of the October revolution, 
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creating a youth organization for teenagers and young adults (generally ages 15-
26), the Komsomol (Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi), in early 1918.
5
 
 The organization of children, however, was not immediately addressed, 
though plenty of ideas in Marxist writings supported it.  A materialist approach to 
history alone demanded that Russian material conditions be altered in order to 
create the environment for a socialist society to flourish, for “the production of 
ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the 
material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life.”6  
In addition, a children‟s organization which instilled socialist precepts in its 
members might help to propagate proper family and societal relations, such as 
equality and love of work, as well as breeding a healthy distaste for capitalism 
and its inherent evils.
7
   
 Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaia, long-time Bolshevik and wife of 
Lenin, wrote at length about Party work among children.  Responding to those 
who scoffed at organizing “babies,” Krupskaia claimed that in the old days of 
tsarist rule, “every time there was a strike you could see children marching at the 
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head of processions, slinging mud at shop foremen or factory managers.  They 
were with the workers heart and soul.”8  She suggested the formation of a Russian 
Young Workers‟ League for “all boys and girls, young men and women who live 
by the sale of their labour,” irrespective of language and religion.9  Indeed, in the 
immediate wake of the October revolution, several independent, localized groups 
for children emerged, including Petrograd‟s Trud i svet (Work and Light), Tula‟s 
Children‟s Communist Party, and the Ukrainian Young Spartacists.10  Without 
adequate support and resources from the central government, however, these 
movements faltered. 
 While Krupskaia might have been the most prolific writer on children and 
the construction of a socialist society, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin‟s words on the 
subject were considerably more influential in spurring the Party to action.  The 
essence of the Soviet approach to children, at least in its earliest stages, is found 
in a speech given by Lenin on October 2, 1920.  In it, Lenin declared that the 
Komsomol had the responsibility to “train the masses for conscious and 
disciplined labour when they are still young, from the age of twelve.”11  New 
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material conditions would create new relationships in the school, in the home, and 
in the workplace, thus transforming the entire community.  While “the generation 
which is now about fifty years old cannot count on seeing communist society. . . . 
the generation which is now fifteen years old will see communist society, and will 
itself build it” – hence the need for a generation imbued with communist ethics 
and discipline.
12
  The Party reiterated Lenin‟s remarks in April 1920, asserting 
that children represented the “communist reserve of our party” and must be 
prepared accordingly.
13
   
 In these remarks one hears the ring of confidence. Despite the wretched 
conditions spawned by years of civil war, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had safely 
secured their position – at least for the moment - as leaders of the former Russian 
empire and were looking ahead to constructing the new society.  Only in the 
relative peace and tranquility of NEP Russia, only after the Soviet state had 
solidified its hold on power by surviving and winning a horrendous civil conflict, 
and only after two wars, a famine, and a revolution had produced millions of 
abandoned children was official action taken to organize children. 
 Thus, in 1922, five years after the October revolution, the Fifth All-
Russian Congress of the Komsomol announced its intention to create an 
organization specifically for the Soviet child.  The stated goals for this new 
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children‟s group were “to inculcate class consciousness, instincts of group 
formation and of competition, a sense of social living, an esteem for creative 
labor, a striving for knowledge, and a willingness to subordinate personal interests 
to those of society”;14  in short, Soviet children were to learn how to live 
communism. 
 It is ironic, then, that this new communist children‟s organization should 
be so indebted to a club dedicated to “Faith in God.  Loyalty to the Tsar.  Help to 
Others.”15:  the Russian Boi-Skauty.  The first Russian scout troop was established 
in 1909, following the publication of Sir Robert Baden-Powell‟s Scouting for 
Boys under the title The Young Scout (Iunyi Razvedchik).  Popular among urban 
middle and upper class boys and girls, the scout movement in Russia expanded 
rapidly, aided by a well-organized central organization, an appealing program, 
and the support and patronage of Tsar Nicholas II.  Nicholas himself met with 
Baden-Powell in 1911, and, in 1914, allowed his son Aleksei to join a scout 
troop.
16
  By 1917, Russia could boast a scout membership of fifty thousand boys 
and girls, easily the most popular group for children in the country.
17
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 Though at least one scholar has recently argued that the Scouts‟ ideals 
were not nearly as conservative as usually perceived,
18
 the multitude of conflicts 
between the ideals of the scouting movement and of the communists are quite 
evident.  The scouts stood for many principles to which the communists were 
diametrically opposed:  loyalty to God and the tsar, duty to an imperialist nation, 
obedience to traditional authority figures, and contentment with one‟s place in the 
existing social system.  Russian Scout congresses merely affirmed the 
Bolsheviks‟ misgivings:  topics of discussion included the use of Boy Scouts in 
war and a comparison of the Boy Scouts to feudal knights - proof of an attempt by 
the bourgeoisie and imperialist powers to transform children into obedient, God-
fearing soldier-slaves who would defend capitalism! 
19
  
 Despite the ideological disjuncture, some Bolshevik leaders, most notably 
Krupskaia, Commissar of Enlightenment Anatoli Lunacharskii, and Commissar of 
Health Nikolai Semashko, were impressed with the success and efficiency of the 
Boy Scouts‟ organizational structure and methods as well as with its obvious 
popularity among children.  Semashko and Lunacharskii proposed that the Party 
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absorb the scout movement and rename it.
20
  This short-lived hybrid organization 
– the Young Communists, or Iuki -  produced some fascinating results.  At the age 
of ten, a Ukrainian Jewish boy, Lev Kopelev, became a scout in Kiev‟s Iuki Troop 
#3.  His female scoutmaster taught him about Baden-Powell, camping, 
gymnastics, and doing good deeds.  Kopelev denigrated other troops as “White,” 
“Zionist,” or “Yellow-blue” (Ukrainian) nationalists, claiming that only those in 
his Wolf troop were “real, honest-to-goodness scouts; we defended the weak and 
the poor and didn‟t object to the Soviet power.”21  Perhaps predictably, this 
experiment was scrapped, as the Komsomol condemned the Boy Scouts as 
militarist, politically unreliable, and disloyal, while the Iuki were deemed “a 
mechanical conglomeration of the bourgeois scouting system and communist 
phrases incapable of dealing with the physical tasks of educating proletarian 
children.”22   
 By the end of 1922, the Central Committee of the Komsomol had 
established a special commission to construct a proposal for the program, 
principles, statutes, motto, rules, and organizational basis for a communist 
children‟s group.  The commission recommended the creation of a group named 
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the Spartakan Young Pioneers (Iunye pionery imeni spartaka) and submitted a set 
of suggested protocols, customs, and organizational strategies which appear 
strikingly similar to those of the Russian Boy Scouts.
23
  Any child, particularly 
those of working class or peasant origin, could join the Spartakan Pioneers.  The 
organization was to include boys and girls ages ten to fourteen years.  A 
hierarchical chain of command extended from the Central Bureau of Young 
Pioneers, under the direction of the Komsomol‟s Central Committee, to 
provincial, regional, and local committees.  The link, comprised of eight to ten 
children, formed the smallest unit of Pioneer organization;  several links made up 
a troop, and several troops comprised a detachment, all of which centered around 
a factory, mill, or children‟s home.  Links, troops, and detachments were to be led 
by enthusiastic Komsomoltsy.  Pioneers could be distinguished by a special 
uniform which included shorts, a red triangular neckerchief, and a badge.  The 
laws of the Pioneers emphasized working-class solidarity and character values 
such as honesty, loyalty, and a healthy attitude.  A list of customs (obychai) 
dictated desirable behavior, exhorting Pioneers to refrain from drinking, smoking, 
cursing, tardiness, or spitting on the floor, and encouraging thrift, personal 
hygiene, and manual labor.  The Pioneers were endowed with a motto (challenge:  
“In the struggle for the working class, be ready!”;  reply:  “Always ready!”), 
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slogan, vow, and salute, all suspiciously resembling those of the accursed 
Scouts.
24
  The communists involved in creating the Pioneer organization worked 
hard to distance their program from that of the Scouts despite the glaring 
appropriations.  Pioneer publications made claims for the originality of the motto, 
the salute, and so on, rooting them in newly-fashioned Soviet folklore.  For 
example, Lenin is said to have engendered the phrase “Always ready!” in a 
speech, and secret police chief Feliks Dzerzhinskii receives credit for the origin of 
the Pioneers‟ distinctive red neckerchief.25 
 Nevertheless, the Pioneers made their public debut in 1924 at the Eighth 
Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), bearing their new title, the 
V. I. Lenin All-Union Young Pioneer Organization.
26
  With the weight of the new 
Soviet state behind it, the Pioneer organization became aggressively inclusive, 
instituting very few obstacles to membership and, sometimes, actively eliminating 
the competition.  Conceived as a mass organization with no racial, class, or 
gender restrictions, the Pioneers were part of the Party‟s attempt to create the new 
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Soviet man.  Theoretically, the Pioneers were open to children from all walks of 
life, though children of workers and peasants were given first priority.  Because of 
its character as a mass organization, “the suggestions to confine new members to 
certain categories, such as the children of Communists, or girls, or the children of 
agricultural laborers, were not considered expedient.”27  Any child, no matter how 
suspect his or her family origins might be, could be nominated for membership, 
and each child went through a perfunctory probationary period of one to six 
months before being initiated into the Pioneer organization.  Age seems to be the 
only restriction placed on members of the Pioneers;  its outer limits fluctuated 
between nine and sixteen, but for the most part, Pioneers were between ten and 
fourteen years of age.   
 As a result, the Pioneer organization grew exponentially during the 1920s.  
From a base membership of 4,000 in October of 1922, the Pioneer membership 
increased to approximately 2.5 million in January, 1930, an increase of about 625 
times.
28
  By 1925, three years after its adoption as a union-wide program, 15 
percent of primary school students and 23 percent of secondary students were 
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Pioneers.
29
  By 1926, approximately 9.3 percent of all children ages 10 to 14 
belonged to the Pioneer organization;  by 1930, the percentage increased to 19 
percent.
30
  As befits the first mass youth organization, this phenomenal growth far 
outstripped that of its “elder”, selective organization, the Komsomol, both in total 
membership and percentage of eligible youth in the league, despite its four year 
head start (the Komsomol was founded in 1918) and larger potential audience (the 
Komsomol included youth from fifteen to twenty-four).
31
  All social classes were 
represented in the Pioneers, with the highest percentage belonging to the working 
class, and, in attracting children of both sexes, the Pioneers could be labeled a 
success:  girls were just as likely to join the communist organization as boys.
32
 
 
The 1920s 
 Despite serious obstacles in funding and debates concerning methodology 
and resources throughout the era of NEP and the Cultural Revolution, the Young 
                                                 
29
 Narodnoe proveshchenie v RSFSR v tsifrazkh, 25, as quoted in Fitzpatrick, Social 
Mobility, 28.  The secondary figures do not include factory schools. 
30
 1926 census figures indicate 17,090,000 children between the ages of 10 and 14 in the 
Soviet Union.  Reported membership in the Pioneers was 1,586,000, as cited above in Fisher.  
Census information from Vsesoyuznaia perepis naselenia 1926, Vol. XVII (Moscow:  1930), as 
collected in Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data, (New York:  The Free 
Press, 1973), 52. 
31
 Komsomol membership was reported as 1,960,000 in 1928 and 2,897,000 in 1931.  A 
median figure between the two falls far below Pioneer membership of 3,223,000 in 1930.  
Komsomol membership figures for 1928 as compared to census figures for 1926 for age groups of 
15-19 and 20-24 (together, 30,820,000) reveal that only 6.3% of the eligible population joined the 
Komsomol, though admittedly, the Komsomol did not adhere to policies of a mass organization.  
Komsomol figures from S. E. Vavilov, ed., BSE Ezhegodnik, 1957-1969, in ibid., 169.  Census 
figures, ibid. 
32
 Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, 191. 
39 
 
Pioneer organization prescribed a number of activities designed to mold the 
values of the Soviet child.  A vast array of Pioneer responsibilities, opportunities, 
and work in ideological campaigns abounded in the twenties.  Two major debates 
of the decade, within the organization, concerned methods within the Pioneer 
detachment and the role of the Pioneers in the school.   
 Within the detachment, aside from attendance requirements, Pioneers were 
expected to participate in certain activities, according to their interests.  Some 
served as junior correspondents for the detachment‟s “wall newspaper”;  others 
exchanged letters with Pioneers in other parts of the Soviet Union or with children 
in other parts of the world.
33
   Each detachment sponsored circles to which any 
Pioneer was invited to participate, regardless of link affiliation.  One circle might 
teach sewing, another radio repair, and another the writings of Lenin, but each 
was designed, ostensibly, to maintain the interest of Pioneers as well as attract 
non-Pioneer children to the organization.
34
 Pioneers attended the circles or clubs 
sponsored by the detachment for entertainment and educational purposes.  These 
circles, while catering to the interests of the children, were supposed to serve a 
dual purpose;  hobbies or activities were to be carefully linked to social issues, as 
identified by the Party.  For example, naturalist circles‟ studies of mosquitoes and 
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germs might also “concern the natural resources and productive strength of the 
USSR and the best way to use them in order to develop the national economy . . . 
concern work, such as problems of health, e.g., fighting malaria . . . [or] concern 
work, such as questions of materialism based on the study of nature with respect 
to antireligious agitation.”35  Quite a lesson for a ten-year-old!  Whether or not 
lessons of this type actually occurred is not clear;  probably the majority of 
discussions consisted of “lighter” fare.  In addition to these detachment activities, 
the Pioneers were responsible for leading the Little Octobrists children‟s 
organization.  The Little Octobrists, formed in the late twenties, was an 
organization for children from seven to ten years old.  Older Pioneers served as 
link leaders for Octobrist groups within their factory or neighborhood, taking 
them on field trips, playing games with them, and singing songs.
36
 
 Pioneers also participated in public health, social issues, and ideological 
campaigns sponsored by the Communist Party.  In the campaign for sanitary 
living conditions, Pioneers were exhorted to “destroy five rats and ten mice 
annually” and “wage unrelenting warfare on mosquitoes, bedbugs, roaches, and 
flies”!37  Pioneers were also active in Party campaigns to liquidate illiteracy and 
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fight drunkenness.  A report to the sixteenth congress of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolshevik) claimed that the Pioneers had taught one million 
illiterates to read and delivered over five hundred thousand books to needy 
areas.
38
  At home and in their neighborhoods, Pioneers were urged to oppose 
corporal punishment, yet emphasize the importance of family ties.
39
  The Pioneer 
Commune for Orphans opened in Moscow in 1924, providing one more shelter 
for the estimated seven million children left homeless by the social disorder of 
two wars.
40
  In rural areas, Pioneers were encouraged to decorate and clean local 
schools, perform light tasks for the local peasants, and organize discussions with 
area children;  in this way, the Party hoped to gain the favor of peasants repelled 
by the anti-religious stand taken by the Komsomol and the League of the Militant 
Godless.
41
 
 A continual source of concern within the Pioneer organization involved 
the nature of activities and methods being used within Pioneer detachments.  Most 
debate revolved around the question of balancing work and play.  Not 
surprisingly, many detachments in the twenties suffered from the lack of an 
established program, and usually turned to one extreme – all serious political 
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work – or the other – only play.  Krupskaia wrote numerous articles suggesting 
that “a Young Pioneer organization, naturally, should not be run like an adult one.  
It would be bad indeed if it were a carbon copy of one.”42  Evidence suggests that 
she was responding to a genuine concern within the organization about meetings 
that were too boring or abstract.  On the other hand, in The Diary of a Communist 
Schoolboy, the main character recalls that “all that our pioneers . . . ever did was 
to march about the hall and play games.”43   Out of this discourse emerged a call 
for age-appropriate activities as well as a defense of play and games as acceptable 
methods of communist pedagogy for Pioneers. 
Krupskaia encouraged link leaders to adopt a balanced approach, related 
to children‟s interests and age, which combined games, songs, and excursions 
with socially useful tasks and political discussion.
44
  She suggested, “Instead of 
using Pioneer meetings to discuss problems of discipline, smoking, and teaching 
rules and regulations of the Pioneer movement, it is advisable rather to devote 
their meetings to the teaching of songs, games, reading aloud, etc.”45  Krupskaia 
did not advocate the exclusion of communist principles in Pioneer activities, 
rather a more age-appropriate method to teach important values such as 
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collectivism.  Games provided one method of imbuing Pioneers with a collectivist 
spirit, serving as a buffer against any influences that might denigrate the precepts 
taught in the Pioneer organization.
 46
 
Games, wrote Krupskaia, are the school of organization.
47
  Children enjoy 
games;  games develop physical abilities, mental ingenuity, and “more, they 
promote children‟s organizational capacity, self-control, endurance, ability to 
gauge the situation, and so on”;48  therefore, the use of games in Pioneer activities 
was not only acceptable, but preferable.  Not all games, however, could be 
succesfully implemented in the Pioneer program.  Bad games, according to 
Krupskaia, were those that “make children cruel and rude, fan hatred for other 
nations, affect children‟s nervous system, arouse gambling instincts and vanity.”49  
Games at the end of which one gains and another loses were not acceptable, for 
that would entail competition.  In games which promoted socialist competition, 
on the other hand, “it is to each pupil‟s enlightened self-interest to watch over his 
neighbor, encourage the other‟s good performance and behavior, and help him 
when he is in difficulty.”50  Thus, the use of socialist competition in games 
between links, detachments, sports circles, hobby circles, and so on became quite 
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popular within the Pioneer organization, foreshadowing the Stakhanovite 
movement which introduced socialist competition into the workplace during the 
early 1930s. 
 A more pressing debate for the Pioneer organization in the twenties 
concerned its relationship to schools.  From the perspective of the Commissariat 
of Enlightenment (Narkompros), this dispute is examined thoroughly in Larry E. 
Holmes‟ The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse.51  Holmes suggests that, in creating a 
Soviet education system, Narkompros went through three distinct stages of 
development, influenced by competing theories within Soviet society about what 
Soviet education should be.  From 1917 to 1921, Narkompros, influenced by the 
utopianism of revolution, instituted polytechnical education, abolished grades, 
homework, and placement exams, and introduced physical labor into the school 
curriculum.  Bending to pressures from above (namely, Lenin and other 
prominent Bolsheviks), Narkompros reevaluated its radical approach to education.  
During the NEP period, education was characterized by a return to pre-
revolutionary standards:  a traditional curriculum, reinstitution of exams and fees, 
and so on.  This was successful – for the children from formerly-privileged 
backgrounds.  Children of working-class and peasant families, however, dropped 
out or failed out of school in high numbers.  With the heightening of rhetoric 
about class warfare beginning around 1928, Narkompros reinstituted the radical 
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curriculum it first attempted immediately after the revolution.  Though working-
class and peasant student numbers increased, the needs of an industrial society 
such as the one Stalin sought to build demanded a more traditional education with 
rigorous attention to the sciences and math.  Bowing to criticism from above, 
Narkompros would reintroduce, for the second time, a more traditional education 
system. 
 The role of the Pioneers in schools was unclear at its inception in 1922.  
Detachments and brigades were purposely centered on factories or mills because 
it was thought, from a revolutionary standpoint, that teachers had a questionable 
influence on students.
52
  In fact, some even believed that a primary purpose for 
creating the Pioneers was to “capture” the teachers and the schools for the Party;  
the Pioneers could serve as the eyes, ears, and voice of the Party within the 
school.
53
  In general, the Pioneers‟ task was to “draw the school into the social 
and political life of the country, organise the self-government, help the teachers in 
every way, including the actual teaching, and contribute to the political, physical, 
and anti-religious training of the young.”54  Guidelines such as these, however, 
led to conflict between Pioneers and teachers.  Some Pioneers interpreted them to 
mean that their fellow students needed “saving” from non-Party teachers, openly 
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challenging teachers‟ authority and sometimes flouting school rules altogether.55  
In a speech to the thirteenth Party Congress in 1924, Bukharin scolded Pioneers 
for their belligerency and called them guilty of “vanguardism.”56   
 Conflict intensified during the Cultural Revolution, though the Pioneers 
seemed to gain the upper hand.  The organization was part of the movement that 
advocated the “pedagogy of the environment” and the “withering away of the 
school.”57  Some Pioneer leaders suggested that the children‟s movement should 
supersede the school entirely, as the frenzy of the first Five-Year Plan popularized 
the concept of “socially useful work” rather than formal education.58  As the 
national atmosphere combined with the increasing influence of the Pioneer 
organization within the school, membership in the organization suddenly shot up, 
perhaps because the Pioneers gained a new sense of purpose in line with Stalin‟s 
goals.
59
  Of course, some children might have been attracted to any organization 
which downplayed the importance of school!  In any case, the dispute over the 
Pioneers‟ role in schools was not resolved until early in the 1930s. 
 In the early years of Soviet history, when many were unsure what exactly 
a socialist society – or socialist child – ought to look like, the Pioneer 
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organization offered a myriad of prescriptions.  Based on the original laws and 
customs of the Pioneers, ideal children were to be ardent, yet obedient and 
mannerly, supporters of Leninism and the Party.  Children were not exempted 
from the work of the Party;  they were to keep busy.  Rarely locked into one 
particular campaign, the Pioneers were to participate in all of them through 
activities and responsibilities, within the link and without.  Indeed, some children 
remained so busy between schoolwork and Pioneer responsibilities that they 
became physically ill, though this surely did not apply to the majority of 
children.
60
  The various drives – against illiteracy, child abuse, drunkenness, and 
so on – can be considered the Party‟s efforts to push modernity upon the Russian 
empire and to define it for its children.  Modern, Soviet children were to attend 
school;  though the relationship between the Young Pioneers and the school was 
far from clear or stable, it is clear that the organization encouraged its members to 
be educated, whether that meant traditional pedagogy or non-traditional methods 
of labor education.  Even play was viewed as an educational opportunity.  
Children were to be taught the proper collective spirit and attitude toward socialist 
competition.  
 
The 1930s 
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 While the twenties had been a time of invention and experimentation for 
the Pioneer organization, the decade of the thirties brought a different sort of 
change to the organization.  Structurally, the group changed very little, but in the 
early part of the 1930s, the Pioneers experienced an abrupt shift in activities and 
authority which mirrored broader changes within Stalinist society.  In the late 
thirties, as an organization directly linked to the Party, yet drawing from the 
population at large, the Pioneers experienced the Purges from a unique 
perspective.  Throughout the decade, the Pioneers underwent a gradual 
“Stalinization,”as Comrade Stalin loomed ever larger in the lives and lore of the 
Pioneer children.   
The decade of the thirties opened with an upsurge in interest and growth 
for the Pioneer organization.  The Pioneers experienced explosive growth in the 
thirties.  Official membership in 1930 was 3,223,000;  it rose to a reported 13 
million in 1939.
61
  Among all children ages ten to fourteen in the Soviet Union, 
Pioneer membership grew from 19 percent in 1930 to 59.8 percent in 1939.
62
  
Approximately half of the Pioneers came from peasant families, one-third from 
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workers‟ families, and one-sixth from “other” origins;  of these, two-fifths were 
female and three-fifths, male.
63
 
 The organization‟s growth was perhaps based on zeal for the new state 
goals of industrialization and collectivization as well as the principles of class 
struggle that accompanied them, which allowed the relatively “new” Pioneers to 
flout traditional sources of authority.   Certainly the activities reportedly 
undertaken by Pioneers during the early 1930s reflect the flurry of activity 
surrounding the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan, including the collectivization 
drive.  A 1931 investigation in Moscow revealed that Pioneers could be 
overburdened with social and political tasks, reporting that “a Pioneer in grade IV 
has twenty-eight hours of study and thirty to thirty-two hours of social work in the 
ten-day week.”64 
Pioneers participated in a long list of activities during the early thirties.  
They collected minerals and scrap metal for use in industrialization, conducted 
campaigns against uncleanliness among workers, organized day care for children 
of workers and peasants, helped in collective farm tasks, exposed idle workers 
and kulaks, sold lottery tickets, solicited subscriptions for loans, collected money 
to build tractors, helped to bring in the harvest, conducted political agitation on 
the kolkhozi, organized children‟s collective farms, cleared litter, worked on 
construction projects, formed shock brigades for factory and farm work, gave 
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political speeches, and marched in parades.
65
  Reflecting Stalin‟s new penchant 
for rewarding overachieving workers, Tadjik Pioneer Mamlakat Nakhangova was 
awarded the Order of Lenin for picking several tons of cotton in one season.
66
  So 
visible – and disliked – were the young enthusiasts on the collective farms, that 
one contemporary rumor among peasants gleefully alleged that, in one village, 
“God sent a storm that carried away all the kolkhozniki and Pioneers.”67   
The extent to which all Pioneers participated in such activities remains a 
question;  however, the perception was that Pioneers “do anything but study.”68  
This changed suddenly in the early 1930s.  In 1931, Stalin reinstituted traditional 
educational practices and curriculum content, effectively silencing the Pioneers‟ 
call for “socially useful work” and “education of the environment” – as well as 
their enthusiastic class struggle against suspect teachers.  Building upon Sheila 
Fitzpatrick‟s argument that the social mobility created by the Cultural Revolution 
spawned a new intelligentsia (vydvizhenets) from the working class which 
yearned for traditional culture, Larry Holmes contends that Stalin‟s decision was 
based on popular opinion, concluding that “a revolutionary state must eventually 
accommodate the desires of some of its citizens and the persistence of traditional 
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values.”69  Another reason for Stalin‟s about-face is more pragmatic:  
industrialization required an educated workforce.  The skills needed to build 
socialism could not be acquired by leading a demonstration on a kolkhoz or by 
exhorting workers to stop drinking.  Thus, the state mandated a return to a 
traditional educational system. 
Inherent in traditional education was the authority of the teacher in his or 
her classroom.  During the twenties and thirties, the Pioneers challenged this 
authority, individually and collectively.  In 1932, however, the Central Committee 
decreed that the Pioneers should direct their energies toward being good students, 
cease criticism of teachers, and attend school on a regular basis.
70
  To bind the 
Pioneers even more intimately to the school, the base of Pioneer work was shifted 
from factories and farms to schools.
71
  For the rest of the organization‟s existence, 
detachment and link affiliation were headquartered and centered in the school a 
Pioneer attended;  each classroom comprised a link, each grade made up a 
detachment, and each school, a brigade.   Cooperation with teachers was 
emphasized, as well as good grades and good behavior.  The military hero 
Semyon Budyenni made a speaking tour in Russian schools, encouraging 
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Pioneers to establish good study habits and demonstrate respect for their elders.
72
  
Jointly, Narkompros and the Komsomol‟s Central Committee actually 
discouraged Pioneers from engaging in work outside the school which detracted 
from their studies.  New rules dictated that no meetings could be held after 8 
o‟clock in the evening and free days were to be used for recreational purposes.   
Rather than challenging the teachers‟ authority, Pioneers were responsible for 
helping the teacher to maintain order and discipline in the school.
73
  Even 
Krupskaia, who had helped to create the organization and its goals, now asserted 
that “the close identification of the Pioneer organization with school life and work 
is its main strength. . . . It is incorrect to assume that the movement has priority 
over the school.”74 Thus, the struggle to determine the role of the Pioneer in 
schools, which raged during the first decade of the organization‟s existence, was 
settled by 1932. 
Concomitant with the move of the Pioneers into the sphere of the school 
arose the tradition of identifying the Pioneer “hero,” a child who performed 
exemplary feats and could be held up as worthy of emulation by all Pioneers.  The 
first of these Pioneer heroes, Pavlik Morozov, is undoubtedly the most notorious.  
The story goes that Pavlik, a Pioneer in a small village in the Urals, realized that 
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his father was committing crimes against the state (either hoarding grain or 
helping kulaks, the stories vary), and turned him into the secret police as an 
enemy of the people.  Subsequently, Pavlik and his little brother were murdered 
by male relatives for “snitching.”  Instantly, propaganda about the Morozov case 
flooded the press, and film scripts, plays, books, posters, and poetry took up the 
story.  The first poem published on the Morozov case, by Mikhail Doroshin, 
concludes: 
 
Muter and muter 
Stand the woods round the boys. 
Pavlusha won‟t be going  
 To the Pioneers anymore. 
 Joyful and curly, 
 He won‟t come to school. 
 But his great glory 
 Will outlive everything. 
 “Pavlik is with us, 
 Pashka the Communist!” 
 Out in front, like a banner, 
 Friendly and merry. 
 (That‟s how  
54 
 
 Everyone should live). 
 How much  
 Every schoolchild 
 Resembles him  
 Somehow. 
 All of their shirts 
 Are abloom with red ties: 
 “Pashka! Pashka! Pashka! 
 Here! There! Everywhere!”75 
 
Pavlik‟s devotion to the Party, honesty, and courage made him a “shining 
example to all the children of the Soviet Union.”76  Thousands of letters from 
Pioneers across the country poured into Moscow, demanding that Pavlik‟s 
murderers be executed (which, in fact, they were).
77
   
There is overwhelming evidence that the entire story about Pavlik 
Morozov was fabricated by the state.  In Informer 001:  The Myth of Pavlik 
Morozov, a work which circulated in samizdat prior to its publication in the late 
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1980s, Yuri Druzhnikov points out many inconsistencies between the reality and 
the story broadcast about Morozov and his death.  For example, Pavlik was not a 
Pioneer – there was not even a Pioneer detachment in his village – nor was he the 
first child to be murdered for turning in a family member.
78
  The important point, 
according to Druzhnikov, is Stalin‟s manipulation of this story at this particular 
moment in time.  “By transforming the boy into a Pioneer, and ultimately into a 
Pioneer leader and representative of the Revolutionary organization of Young 
Leninists, the state was able to claim that his murderers were political 
terrorists.”79  Pavlik Morozov was chosen as “the one” because he was, ironically, 
in the right place at the right time.  Druzhnikov argues that the Morozov myth 
“had to appear at the time when he became necessary to the political campaign.  
And we know that he did appear precisely when he was needed:  on the eve of a 
monumental wave of mass repression.”80 
The repression Druzhnikov refers to was, of course, the Great Terror.  
While his argument appears to concur with the escalation of terror in the thirties, 
it nonetheless challenges us to question Stalin‟s reasons for bringing the Pioneers 
into the campaign against enemies of the state.  Pavlik Morozov was an example 
for children to follow, not adults;  what role would children play in the Terror?   
                                                 
78
 Ibid., 48, 134.  Other interesting facts about Pavlik alleged by Druzhnikov include:  he 
was a poor student, disliked by the village, he was never called “Pavlik” by anyone in his family 
or village, and he probably made up the story about his father because his father had left him and 
his mother for another woman. 
79
 Ibid., 51. 
80
 Ibid., 134. 
56 
 
Pionerskaia Pravda offered an immediate answer: 
 
Pavlik Morozov decided upon a great exploit – to give his life for his 
country.  He gathered together his spiritual strength and courage and acted 
against even his father after it had turned out that the latter was an enemy 
of the people. . . . For us, Pavlik Morozov will stand forever as a great 
example of civic courage.  We must unmask the enemies of Soviet state 
wherever they are and whoever they are as Pavlik Morozov unmasked 
them.
81
 
 
No child likes a snitch – or, for that matter, to be a victim of murder – but the 
state compensated for this by cloaking the mission in heroic, patriotic rhetoric.  
The state proposed that Pioneers become “unmaskers” of the enemy, an 
attractive proposition for a child – covert, a little romantic, and certainly 
important.    Those children choosing loyalty to Party over loyalty to family 
could be heroes, just like Pavlik.  Thus, while removing Pioneers from excessive 
participation in economic tasks such as industrialization and collectivization to 
the, ostensibly, confining walls of the school, the state bestowed a new task upon 
the Pioneers, even more important than the last.   
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 The Pavlik myth and its themes, the elevation of Party allegiance over 
family or community ties and the exposure of “enemies” in society, 
foreshadowed the Great Terror, which peaked in intensity in 1937-38.  As a mass 
organization, the Pioneers experienced the Terror in a way quite different from 
other segments of society.  More than any other group, the Pioneers formed a 
direct link between the Party and the population at large.  While there seem to be 
parts of the populace that led relatively normal lives during the Purges, the 
Terror fell particularly hard on members of the Party and the intelligentsia.  The 
Pioneers served as a point of contact between the affected and non-affected;  
even for those whose families would not have been necessarily hard-hit, simply 
being a member of the Pioneer organization ensured that those children would be 
a part of the Terror, whether by participation, observation, or association.  
Massive repressions of former and contemporary Pioneer leaders occurred 
during the Terror.
82
  Rhetoric of the Purges found its way into Pioneer 
detachment and link meetings.  One story tells of the thirteen-year-old daughter 
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of an NKVD operative who was required to speak at a Pioneer meeting saying 
she approved of the shooting of her parents, as they were both spies.
83
   
 Some Pioneers were more directly affected than others;  youth did not 
protect one from arrest or death during the Terror.  The decree of April 7, 1935, 
allowed children over twelve to be punished by death, and some were.  The 
fourteen-year-old Pioneer son of Georgian communist Nestor Lakoba was shot.  
When the last of the Trotskyites and oppositionists were shot in the camps in ‟38, 
“the killing extended down to twelve-year-olds.”84  In the Children‟s Plot 
“uncovered” in the town of Leninsk-Kuznetsk, the NKVD arrested 160 children, 
most of whom were between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and through severe 
interrogation, obtained confessions to espionage, terror, treason, and links with 
the Gestapo.  One ten-year-old admitted to membership in a fascist organization 
from the age of seven!
85
 
 In essence, the Pioneers could not escape the Terror, literally and 
figuratively.  And, as the decade progressed, it became more and more difficult 
for children to “escape” membership in the Pioneers.  Though theoretically a 
voluntary organization, the decision to join the Pioneers became less of a 
decision and more of an assumption.   One writer explained, “There is no 
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evading the „Pioneers‟;  literally every Soviet boy and girl must pass through this 
school of Communist discipline . . .”86  State propaganda described life outside 
the Pioneers thus: 
 
Vanya is lonesome;  there is no one to play with him, so he mopes at the 
window.  On the other side of the street he sees a group of Pioneers and 
wishes he could be with them.  Are there many children thus inactive and 
unhappy like Vanya?  Many indeed!  In order not to be so, they must 
organize. . . . Children will live happily, interestingly, fully, when they are 
organized.
87
 
 
 
Note the fact that Vanya cannot play with the Pioneers unless he becomes a 
Pioneer;  subtle peer pressure from within and without convinced many to join.  
Becoming a Pioneer did not necessitate radical political action or sincere belief in 
communist ideals:  Elena Bonner had a childhood friend who was a Pioneer, but 
also wore a chain with a cross on it, “wrapped around her slip strap.”88  Bonner 
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remembers two categories of Pioneer – active and inactive – but the implication 
remains that everyone in her grade was a member of the organization.
89
   
 Further, the canonization of Pavlik Morozov demonstrated to Soviet 
children that while one might not be able to trust one‟s biological father, a more 
significant Father deserved their respect and faith.  During the thirties, the Pioneer 
organization became a prominent advocate of the cult of Stalin.  The year 1935 
marked a turn in state propaganda which depicted Stalin as family man, caring 
father, and paternal protector.
90
  On parade in Red Square, Pioneers carried 
banners proclaiming, “Greetings to Comrade Stalin, the Pioneers‟ Best Friend!” 
and “Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for our happy life!” while Stalin posed for 
pictures with his daughter Svetlana and other children.
91
  The introduction of this 
paternal image coincided, for many Pioneers, with the arrests and deaths of their 
own parents;  the Party promised a surrogate family for these orphans: the state, 
Grandfather Lenin, and most importantly, the benevolent father, Stalin.   
 The ceremonies of the Pioneer organization also reflected this 
Stalinization process.  In the oath taken upon initiation into the group, Pioneers 
began to promise to “stand for the cause of Lenin and Stalin [my emphasis] for 
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the victory of communism.”  Likewise, the cause of Lenin and Stalin replaced the 
“cause of the working class” in the Pioneer challenge to be “Always ready!”92  
Like the rest of the Party, the Pioneer programs became swept up in enthusiasm 
for Stalin.  By the late 1930s, even Lenin‟s name would disappear from the oath 
and the charge, and Pioneers would swear to uphold Stalin‟s cause, whatever that 
entailed. 
 The children‟s book Timur and His Team (Timur i ego komanda) by 
beloved author Arkady Gaidar appeared in the Soviet Union in 1938.  The story, 
set in wartime Russia, revolves around a group of children who band together to 
“take care of business” while the men of the town are gone fighting in the war.  
They maintain order, see that younger children go to school, and most 
importantly, take care of the wives and families of soldiers, chopping wood, 
carrying water, babysitting, and so on.  Timur and His Team became an instant 
classic.  Scores of Pioneers became timurovtsy and tried to imitate the actions of 
the main character in the book.  Little did these Pioneers know that their play-
acting would soon become a reality as Germany descended on the Soviet Union. 
 War, or at least the discussion of it, was not foreign to the Pioneers.  As 
stated earlier, military language dominated the Pioneer organization.  Often the 
children were exhorted to “storm the front” or “mobilize” on behalf of a political 
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campaign.
93
  Some of the Pioneer camps ran according to a military-like system, 
organizing campers into platoons, companies, and battalions, handing out khaki 
uniforms, conducting night drills, and even surrounding the camp with barbed 
wire.
94
  Games began to take on a military character, calling for strategies and 
skills such as map-making, stealth, and marksmanship.  Some Pioneers trained 
dogs and horses for the Red Army;  others became “Friends of the Border 
Guards”, learning about the tasks involved in defending the Soviet Union‟s 
frontiers.
95
  In the late thirties, some Pioneers met orphans from the Spanish 
Republic, brought to be housed in children‟s homes in the Soviet Union. 
 Soviet children certainly were familiar with the war and Russia‟s role in it 
as well as the rise of fascism in Europe.  Several memoirists, recalling the years 
just prior to the Great Patriotic War, mention learning the song “If Tomorrow War 
Should Come” in school.  The song, from a 1938 film of the same title, asserts the 
certain victory of the Soviet nation over any future war with the fascists.  The 
refrain exhorts: “If tomorrow war should come, if tomorrow battle should 
come/Be prepared for battle today.”96  
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 And yet, the immediacy of war should not be unduly exaggerated.  
Though World War II began in the late 1930s, Pioneer attention to the war outside 
of the Soviet Union was negligible.  A perusal of Pionerskaia Pravda from early 
1941 supports this view.  The January 11
th
 issue, for example, highlights a film 
festival, discusses military exercises by students in Kishinev, Moldova, recounts 
the opening of a metereological station, and commemorates the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the death of famed pilot Sergei Utochkin.  There is no mention of 
the war.  In fact, the only related article is a small feature on the back page which 
describes an economic agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany.
97
  
February issues are similarly absent of specifics about World War II.  A February 
6
th
 article, illustrated with a map, mentions that the English were fighting the 
Italians in Eritrea.
98
  A quarter page feature entitled “International Telegraph” in 
the February 8
th
 issue peppers the reader with random war-related snippets:  the 
Battle of Malta was going on, the English had taken Benghazi, a flu epidemic 
raged in Western Europe, some military activities were going on in the Sahara 
Desert, and thousands of homeless children roamed Europe.
99
  Articles about 
sports competitions and an all-union Pioneer game, tributes to various Party 
leaders (including Kliment Voroshilov, on his 60
th
 birthday), science fiction short 
stories, and features on good scholarship were far more common and took up far 
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more space than did any detailed descriptions of the war.
100
  Thus, “war” in the 
abstract was a regular part of the Pioneer program;  the realities of actual, lived, 
contemporary war were not. 
 Following a decade of laying foundations, the thirties marked a time of 
refocusing and tremendous expansion for the Pioneer organization.  Yanked from 
their position on the “frontline” of the industrialization and collectivization drives 
of the early 1930s, the Pioneers shifted their focus to the classroom, organizing 
brigades around neighborhood or village schools.  While circle and educational 
work continued, the Pioneers were handed their first hero, Pavlik Morozov, as 
well as a charge to join the Party in vigilance against enemies of the people.  
Caught up in the Terror in a unique way, the Pioneers straddled the line between 
the Party and the rest of the population.  The Pioneers increasingly served as 
Stalin‟s cheerleaders, as living testaments to the happy life Stalinism was creating 
for the Soviet people.  By the end of the decade, with the threat of impending 
conflict, the organization exhorted children to prepare for a glorious war, though 
without exaggerated urgency.  Good conduct and school performance, in 
traditional subjects, in traditional classrooms, remained prescribed behaviors for 
Soviet children.
                                                 
100
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CHAPTER 3 
LIVING THE WAR: THE EXPERIENCE OF CHILDREN, 1941-1945 
  Death was everywhere . . . . it must be coming back for me. 
Elena Kozhina, age 10
1
 
 
 For the Soviet population, the Great Patriotic War was nothing short of 
disastrous.  Though conditions of the war varied dramatically based on location 
and proximity to the enemy, the lives of all Soviet men, women, and children 
were affected by the war to some degree.  In an effort to recreate the context in 
which the Young Pioneer organization operated, what follows describes a variety 
of wartime experiences in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945.  Rather than 
catalogue a comprehensive list of the atrocities, deprivation, and difficulties 
visited upon the Soviet population, however, it is important to briefly describe and 
discuss the conditions particularly relevant to children in order to more fully 
appreciate the environment in which the Young Pioneers conducted their work. 
 
*   *   * 
Occupied Territory 
 For the first two to three years of the war, the Germans occupied 
approximately 900,000 square miles (1,440,000 sq km) of heavily-populated 
                                                 
 
1
 Elena Fedorovna Kozhina, Through the Burning Steppe: A Wartime Memoir (New 
York: Riverhead Books, 2000), 129. 
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portions of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, Belorussia, eastern Poland, the 
Baltics, and western Russia, from south of Stavropol in the Caucasus to Leningrad 
in the north.  Soviets living in occupied territory faced what one British observer 
described as “a deliberate policy of extermination . . . devoid of the slightest trace 
of human feeling.”2  The Nazis burned hundreds of villages and executed 
suspected communists and Jews in an attempt to intimidate and pacify.  Children 
suffered and witnessed such atrocities.  Soviet people in occupied territories were 
tortured, beaten, shot, hung, buried alive, drowned, burned.
3
    
Children were certainly not spared as SS Einsatzgruppen units pursued 
and brutally decimated Jewish communities in Belorussia, Ukraine, and Russia.
4
  
By the autumn of 1941, the mobile killing units who had previously targeted male 
Jews of draft age for execution turned to the annihilation of Jewish women, 
children, and the elderly on the orders of Heinrich Himmler.
5
 Whereas Jewish 
communities in western and central Europe were rounded up and transported to 
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concentration or extermination camps, large-scale, public, mass shootings were 
far more typical on the Eastern Front.
6
  Children were among the more than 
30,000 victims massacred at Babi Yar outside Kiev September 29-30, 1941, and 
subsequent mass killings at Rovno, Krivoi Rog, and Dnepropetrovsk.  Thirteen-
year-old Jacob Lipszyc witnessed the slaughter of thousands of Jews in Mir 
(Belorussia), including his mother, brother, and sister, as commandos positioned 
at each corner of a town square opened fire on a crowd of people rounded up for 
just such a purpose.
7
  Near the end of 1941, remaining Jews – a large proportion 
of which were women and children – were rounded up and placed in ghettos, 
particularly in areas under German civil administration in western Ukraine and 
western Belorussia.  A majority of these people were killed as these ghettos were 
liquidated in the “Second Wave” actions of 1942 and 1943.  Though directed by 
the Nazis, these actions were by and large carried out by local police units, many 
of whom volunteered to ferret out and turn in Jews in hiding.
 8
  In Radomyshl, 
adult Jews were shot to death by Einsatzgruppen commandos, but Ukrainian 
police stepped in to shoot the Jewish children.
9
  The rest of the community, 
fearing German reprisals or inspired by anti-semitic feeling, ostracized them, 
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despite witnessing the beatings, starvation, and death of former neighbors.
10
  
Imagine the feelings of confusion and betrayal that children must have felt, driven 
to torture and death by adults whom they had known as fellow citizens and 
townspeople.   
By late 1942, when partisan activity began to disrupt German military 
operations, children could be targeted for abuse or death for alleged (or real) aid 
to the elusive resistance.  Even ignorance could not save some from death.  Elena 
Kozhina remembers seeing a young boy 
 
maybe thirteen or fourteen years old . . . . sleeping like a child. All the  
 more horrible was this child‟s sleep . . . his fingernails had been torn off.   
 The locals told Mama that the Germans tortured him before they shot him  
 – he was suspected of helping some underground guerrillas.  Was he  
 helping? Everybody shrugged their shoulders.  He didn‟t say anything  
 under torture (maybe because he had nothing to say), so the Germans grew 
 angry, and shot him.
11
 
 
                                                 
10
 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 76-77.  The Nazis threatened death to any people 
helping Jews in any way.  Even those known to be communicating with Jews received warnings 
from the German authorities that they were subject to execution, along with their families, if it was 
proven they were aiding Jews in any way.  This is certainly not the only factor explaining lack of 
action in opposing the Holocaust, but Berkhoff contends it is a primary explanation.  He also 
considers pervasive anti-Semitism and the “culture of denunciation” cultivated by Soviet rule to be 
important considerations. 
 
11
 Kozhina, Through the Burning Steppe, 80-81. 
69 
 
 Even when daily atrocities ceased, the possibility of death lingered.  
Kozhina fell into a deep depression, brought on by “an awareness of the horror of 
all that happened to us.”12  Imprisoned in a poultry farm-turned-prison for 
families of suspected Communists,Yuri Kirshin, ten years old in 1942, recalls, 
“Everyone – mothers and children – expected to be shot.”13  Curfews were strictly 
enforced by occupation troops.  Communication with other villages or regions 
was almost non-existent.  One had to act warily around the occupying forces.  
Arbitrarily, they might beat children, force them to run errands, demand sexual 
favors, or give out bags of candy.
14
  Girls in occupied villages attempted to avoid 
notice by wearing shapeless rags and smearing ash on their faces.
15
  Older 
children could be sent to Germany as workers, such as fourteen-year-old Olga 
Selezniova.  In a May 1942 letter she wrote, “It would be better to die than to be 
here. . . .We were sold . . . as if we were slaves.”16  Vasily Grossman, war 
correspondent attached to the Red Army, witnessed thousands of Soviet children 
walking home as the German Reich crumbled.  In one account, he wrote, “we saw 
eight hundred Soviet children walking eastwards on the road, the column 
stretching for many kilometers.  Some soldiers and officers were standing by the 
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road, peering into their faces intently and silently.  They were fathers looking for 
their children . . .”17  Tragically, liberation did not necessarily end their suffering 
and not all soldiers behaved as fathers seeking children.  Grossman noted, 
regretfully, that Soviet girls returning home were molested and raped by Red 
Army men, one girl weeping to him, “‟He was an old man, older than my 
father.‟”18  
  Those who remained lived in conditions not much better than those taken 
to Germany.  Homes could be seized and some found themselves living in 
makeshift lean-tos or in underground holes.  Kozhina lived with her mother and 
another family in what had previously been a dilapidated barn for two years on 
the Kuban steppe.
19
  Many children lived in attics, gardens, abandoned buildings, 
or forests.
20
  People improvised clothing and foot coverings, scrounging from the 
deceased or nearby birch trees.  Despite the rich agricultural land in occupied 
territory, many Soviets endured constant hunger because the Nazis 
commandeered food supplies for their own troops and horses.  The price of food 
skyrocketed:  in occupied Kharkov, for example, a cabbage cost 60-80 rubles, ten 
potatoes cost 70-80 rubles, a kilogram of butter cost 1200 rubles, and a pud of 
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grain cost over two thousand rubles.
21
  Shifting frontlines compounded the 
hardships for those in the western Soviet Union.  Caught between Hitler‟s 
advance and the Soviets‟ scorched earth policy for the first few years, then the 
Germans‟ destructive retreat and the Red Army‟s pursuit in the final years of war, 
civilians could be swept up in the noise, confusion, and devastation of artillery 
attacks, air raids, tank battles, and the clash of infantry. 
 Under such circumstances, school seemed, as one report suggested, “out 
of the question.”22  Though schooling was not completely absent, it was certainly 
dramatically disrupted and affected by the war.  Without even considering the 
difficulties of getting children to focus on studies during an occupation, practical 
obstacles prevented most schools from functioning.  School buildings went up in 
flames in some villages; in others, schools were often commandeered as 
headquarters for troops, both German and Soviet.  A 1943 state decree ended the 
requisitioning of school grounds by Soviet forces, but went largely ignored until 
the war ceased.
23
  Lack of teachers and resources also hindered attempts at 
education.  A 1943 letter from a Pioneer troop in Leningradskaia oblast‟ 
explained that partisans had formed a school of sorts for them, but that they had 
no books, no paper, no pencils, or any other school supplies.
24
  Even after 
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liberation by Soviet troops, this remained a problem.  Kozhina returned to school 
in 1944 after the Kuban steppe was retaken by the Soviets; the fifteen students in 
her one-room school had no supplies and, Kozhina notes, attempts to teach 
quickly degenerated into horseplay.  By age ten, she still had not learned to write.  
Further, the German administration in Slavic territories such as Ukraine deemed 
the natives unworthy of the reestablishment of even rudimentary education.
25
  
Kirshin, a native of Unecha (Briansk raion), recalls that schools were closed and 
other activities restricted because of the occupation.
26
  A 1943 report on occupied 
Ukraine commented on the dearth of operational schools:  in Kharkov, for 
example, only thirteen of 138 schools were open.  These, the report continues, 
were populated only by children of office workers, police, starostas, and “other 
fascist lackeys.”27  Local efforts by Germans to keep an edited version of school 
functioning were not unknown. School continued, for example, in Elista, though 
German officials replaced any books that discussed Soviet politics or history with 
magazines such as “Hitler the Liberator,” created story problems in math using 
downed Soviet aircraft, and added German to the curriculum.  Schoolchildren 
could expect their bags to be searched on a regular basis and were chastised if 
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anything smacked of Leninism.
28
  Vera and Natasha Stakhanova‟s father, a 
Russian who collaborated with the Germans, was assigned the task of organizing 
a children‟s home outside Melitopol.  She recalls that the orphans had “clean 
dormitories, food, clothes and teachers” and a mass christening sponsored by the 
German administration;  this relatively comfortable tableau, however, lasted only 
about a month, as shifting frontlines forced the family‟s flight to the west and the 
abandonment of the orphanage.
29
  Even children who managed to attend some 
sort of regular school, however, faced constant interference.  While in his native 
village of Golubichi (Chernigov raion), N. P. Dovbenko recalls that because 
schooling was so often disrupted, students were kept in the same grades for two 
consecutive years.
30
 
 Without school to occupy them and parents often preoccupied or absent, 
children had lots of free time, though not necessarily the freedom to enjoy it.  One 
fourteen-year-old in Tul‟skaia oblast‟ recounted that he spent his time cutting 
German communication cables, “[bringing] revenge as much as I could.”31  
Occasionally children served on the frontlines with the Red Army, serving as 
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informants helping to locate enemy headquarters.
32
  Some children joined or aided 
partisan bands, serving as couriers, stealing weapons, and damaging Nazi 
supplies.
33
  Others treated, fed, or housed wounded Soviet soldiers.
34
  The 
homelessness and lack of supervision that inspired some to patriotic duty created 
conditions conducive to delinquency for others.  Children learned “to steal, to 
cheat, to lie, in order first to survive.”35  A rise in theft and begging was noted in 
occupied Ukraine.
36
  Hunger could drive one to extreme actions.  In the Donbass, 
Grossman saw one enterprising twelve-year-old boy attempt to trade bogus 
intelligence information on the Germans to a Soviet regimental commander in 
exchange for some chicken and vodka.
37
  In Stalingrad, starving children agreed 
to fill water bottles in the Volga River for the Germans in exchange for food, 
knowing that Soviet snipers had orders to shoot them for collaboration if they did 
so.
38
  There were certainly benefits for collaborators, however short-lived:  the 
Stakhanova children, for example, “looked healthy and tanned and had rosy 
cheeks.  [They] played all day long . . . . [and] ate the plentiful variety of fruits” 
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available in southern Ukraine, while their father served the Germans there.  Vera 
Stakhanova remembers, “Sometimes we would even forget that there was a war 
out there.”39  Neither criminal activity nor collaboration with the enemy is 
surprising, considering the desperate conditions of territory overrun by the 
Germans. 
 
Leningrad 
 There was perhaps no city in the Soviet Union as uniquely desperate as 
Leningrad.  In limbo between German occupation and Soviet defense, the 
surrounded city endured a blockade from August 30, 1941, to January 27, 1944.  
Leningrad‟s population was decimated by starvation, disease, cold, and near-
constant air attacks by the Nazis, with perhaps as many as 800,000 dying in the 
first, horrific winter of 1941-42.  Though as many as 216,000 children had been 
evacuated from Leningrad in the months before encirclement, hundreds of 
thousands of others remained.
 40
  As German bombs and inept Soviet planning 
combined to create conditions of incredible deprivation, the lives of children 
changed immeasurably.  Everyday activities were disrupted, as, among other sites 
                                                 
 
39
 Stakhanova, et. al., Separated at Stavropol, 100-101.  It should be noted that this 
idyllic period in Vera‟s life was fleeting;  she and her family suffered years of hardship, attached 
to the Cossack army which fought for Germany, attempting to flee west, and managing to escape 
repatriation. 
 
40
 Overy, Russia‟s War, 103.  Harrison Salisbury writes that there were at least 700,000 
individuals still holding dependent ration cards in the first quarter of 1942.  Children up to the age 
of fourteen were classified as dependents.  Even accounting for fraud and bureaucratic mistakes, 
the number of children in the city remained in the hundreds of thousands.  Salisbury, The 900 
Days: The Siege of Leningrad, reprint ed. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1985), 492. 
76 
 
such as hospitals, the Hermitage, and libraries, the Germans destroyed schools 
and the Pioneer Palace with artillery.
41
  Kozhina recalls that by the fall of 1941, 
“there was not a single school left near us.  Some were bombed, others converted 
into hospitals.”42  While a handful of schools may have remained open, the 
majority were closed for, at least, the 1941-1942 school year.
43
  When some 
schools reopened, after the disastrous first winter, schooling was still rather 
sporadic.  Evgeniia Vadimovna Shavrova recalls attending school every other day 
and having only three classes per day.
44
 
 The students (and people) of Leningrad, however, were receiving a new 
sort of education.  As early as July, the state attempted to mobilize city defense 
units;  Salisbury notes that “youngsters eight to sixteen were to be trained to fight 
in hand-to-hand combat.”45  Up to a million Leningraders were mobilized to dig 
anti-tank trenches, build earth and concrete pillboxes, and erect barbed-wire 
barricades;  children, too, contributed to this effort.  By September 1
st
, 
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schoolchildren had collected a million bottles for use as Molotov cocktails.
46
  For 
survival‟s sake, they learned new skills.  Kozhina, who was eleven at the time, 
remembers, “This was a time when all children, even ones younger than myself, 
could tell unerringly a Messerschmitt from a Focke-Wulf by sound alone, not to 
mention the difference between a bombing raid and an artillery attack.  I was from 
Leningrad.”47  During the siege, witnesses recount seeing children extinguish 
incendiary bombs, carry water, work in truck gardens, and care for wounded 
soldiers.
48
  After the city survived the first winter, agricultural work became 
increasingly important to supplement the supplies received.  Shavrova remembers 
a “red-letter day” on October 28, 1943, when “We were awarded, along with the 
boys, medals „For the Defense of Leningrad.‟ We were decorated for our 
agricultural work. . . . It means that we schoolchildren are now considered to be 
real defenders of the city.”49   
 Surviving starvation conditions in Leningrad, frankly, was heroic.  
Dependents‟ rations – for young people up to age fourteen – were half those of 
workers.  As of October 1, this meant a ration of 200 grams of bread daily;  
                                                 
 
46
 Ibid., 283. 
 
47
 Kozhina, Through the Burning Steppe, 82-83. 
 
48
 See, for example, Fadeev,  Leningrad, 46; Salisbury, The 900 Days, 196, 329; V. 
Ivanov, The Youth of Heroic Leningrad (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1942); 
Boris Skomorovsky and E. G. Morris, The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Books, Inc., 1944), 45; 
Evgeniia Vadimovna Shavrova‟s memoirs in Simmons, Writing the Siege, 44.  Shavrova: “1 Feb. 
1943: We have become the sponsors of a hospital on the corner of Moika and Dzerzhinskii Street . 
. . . Our class has been assigned wards where some are even seriously wounded. We visit the 
soldiers almost every day, read books, write letters, fulfill various requests . . .” 
 
49
 Shavrova, in Simmons, Writing the Siege, 44. 
78 
 
between November and December, bread rations were 125 grams a day.
50
  
Svetlana Magayeva, ten at the time of the siege, remembers children with huge 
heads, swollen stomachs, and matchstick arms and legs.
51
  Starvation exacerbated 
the effects of disease and unsanitary conditions.  Fatality rates for all diseases rose 
drastically during the siege: from 4 percent to 60 percent for typhus and from 10 
percent to 50 percent for dysentery.
52
  Death might have been a blessing for some; 
many children experienced the pain of outliving their own families.  Vsevolod 
Vishnevsky, among others, recalls seeing children hauling the bodies of their dead 
parents on sleds through the streets of Leningrad.
53
  Human predators of children 
were not unknown.  Though it was a crime, adults sometimes expropriated ration 
cards, purporting to be “guardians” of neighborhood children.54  In extreme cases, 
some children were killed for their ration cards, despite the low category into 
which they fell.  By November of 1941, mothers kept children inside because of 
reports of kidnapping and cannibalism.  Boys and girls were prime targets 
because of their youth and because their “flesh was tender.”55  Not all children 
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had relatives to protect them.  In order to survive, some children took to the 
streets, resorting to theft, risking the punishments and beatings it would entail.
56
   
 
Evacuation 
 Urban populations in wartorn regions of the Soviet Union declined 
dramatically.  In Stalingrad, for example, only 12.2 percent of the population 
remained; in Voronezh, only 20 percent.
57
  War correspondent Grossman 
witnessed thousands of refugees fleeing the advancing German military on the 
Gomel highway in the summer of 1941.
58
  At the same time, over half a million 
Soviets were evacuated from Leningrad.  Adding to the congestion was the 
“methodical and meticulous” deportation of over two million occupants of Poland 
and the Baltics to various parts of the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941.
59
  
Though the evacuation of industries and essential workers has long been hailed as 
a major achievement of the Soviet government and a key reason for the eventual 
Soviet victory, the movement to and resettlement of civilians to various regions of 
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Russia, Central Asia, and Siberia was far from laudatory.  Almost all traveled by 
railway on filthy, overcrowded cattle cars for hundreds or thousands of miles, not 
knowing where their final destinations lay.  Though Poles were deported as 
“enemies of the people” after Soviet occupation and might be expected to receive 
poor treatment, Soviet evacuees report similar conditions.  Kozhina, a Leningrad 
evacuee, remembers that on her lice-infested, disease-ridden trip, “We had lain 
together like sardines on wooden bunks and straw, falling asleep with the living 
and waking up with the dead.”60  Elena Skryabina, another Leningrad evacuee, 
remembers train cars so crowded that people rode on the steps and roofs.  Even 
the anticipation of evacuation could be stressful.  Svetlana Magayeva recalls, “We 
had been told that only half the children who were transported along the Road of 
Life reached the opposite shore of the lake.  The others never made it.”  Few 
children could sleep the week before evacuation, perhaps preoccupied by 
accounts of children‟s hats rising “like water lilies that had been dropped in the 
water as funeral flowers.”61  Unconfirmed memoirs relate that thousands of 
schoolchildren were evacuated, on foot and without food or water, in order to 
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escape the German invasion of Kiev.  The children were not allowed to tell their 
families good-bye, nor were they able to take anything with them.  Many of them 
died of exhaustion along the road, while hundreds of others were driven across a 
minefield in Pechersk district “in order not to hand them over to the enemy” 
“when it became clear that it was impossible to lead them through the [German] 
encirclement.”62 
 Most evacuation centers were ill-prepared to receive vast numbers of 
refugees, and local populations were loath to share any of their own provisions.  
On at least one leg of her journey, Skryabina‟s family – and those traveling with 
her in a boxcar – was simply shunted onto a siding and forgotten.63  For those 
who survived the journey, separation from family members and neighbors, loss of 
possessions – often traded for food or other essentials – and horrendous housing 
awaited.  Many regions, particularly those in Central Asia, were ill-prepared to 
receive an influx of refugees.  The state‟s policy of allowing “free resettlement” 
usually meant that refugees had to find their own housing, often in areas of low 
population.  Any village home with an extra interior wall could be rented;  often 
three, four, or five families lived in one- or two-room houses.  Anyone twelve 
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years or older was expected to report to work, either on state farms, in mines, or 
in factories; by 1942, “even the ten-year-olds were forced to work, weeding millet 
fields, poisoning gophers, and gathering manure.”64  Again, food was a constant 
source of concern and anxiety as were accompanying diseases, such as 
avitaminosis and dysentery.   
 For parentless children, the difficult journey must have been especially 
harrowing.  Based on figures from Leningrad‟s evacuation, in the first year of the 
war it was quite likely that children traveled as groups rather than as families.  For 
example, of the 79,826 children who passed through Yaroslavskaia oblast in 
1941, 85 percent evacuated with organizations – schools, orphanages, parents‟ 
workplace affiliation, and so on – rather than with mothers, grandparents, or 
siblings.
65
  Children arriving at evacuation drop points received mixed reactions.  
Despite the assertion that people “vied with one another in efforts to assist the 
young evacuees,”66 it is apparent that advanced notice and preparation for the 
overwhelming number of refugees was decidedly lacking.  In Altai region, while 
some children were greeted by locals, others were simply ignored.  One group of 
children, abandoned at the railway station in Biysk, lived there for a month before 
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attracting the attention of local officials.
67
  Nine thousand Polish children were 
put in children‟s homes outside Kuibyshev, but provided with no bedding, 
furniture, kitchen utensils, disinfectants, or other supplies.
68
  Of the 227,235 
children evacuated from Leningrad by December 1941, over a quarter of them 
simply could not be accounted for; as far as recordkeeping goes, those children 
had simply vanished.
69
  Small wonder: the monumental task of organizing proper 
records for hundreds of thousands of children – many of whom were probably in 
shock, ill, and disturbed by wartime experiences – would be daunting, even today.  
In Altai region alone, forty-three children‟s homes housed evacuees from Kiev, 
Kalinin, Smolensk, Rostov, Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, Ordzhinikidze, Grozniy, 
German republics in Povolzhe, Poland, and Leningrad.
70
   
 The children‟s home (detdom) could be a blessing or a curse.  Despite the 
propaganda that children of the Red Army officers and men were being provided 
“more education, more dining-rooms, better sanatoria and rest-homes, the 
maximum amount of clothing and the love of the whole to compensate for their 
father‟s absence,” the resources were simply not provided to make this so.71  
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While examples of excellent children‟s homes existed, the majority were 
hampered by lack of supplies, staff, and unhealthy children.  In “good” children‟s 
homes, residents could expect a highly-regimented schedule, consistent schooling, 
tri-weekly war briefings, defense training, volunteer agricultural work, and 
Pioneer activities.
72
  One suspects there were not many children‟s homes 
functioning this effectively.  In a good many children‟s homes, the children 
simply ran the home as a sort of cooperative.  The children chopped their own 
firewood, cleaned, did laundry, prepared meals, and mended clothes and linens as 
needed.  The same report which recognized these self-serve orphanages, however, 
also noted that many children‟s homes had curtailed extracurricular activities and 
physical training “primarily due to lack of lighting and absence of kerosene 
lamps.” 73 Most children‟s homes faced food shortages, forcing children to fend 
for themselves, planting gardens, stealing, or foraging for sufficient nourishment.  
The residents of one children‟s home simply “ate the park” nearby, leaving trees 
stripped of bark and buds.
74
  No psychological care was provided for orphans, 
and, often, inadequate staff.  After an inspection tour of children‟s homes, one 
Komsomol Central Committee member, Chukovskii, reported that, “At each 
[detdom] there are always three or four „atamans‟ who give orders to the rest of 
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the children and make them steal and sell things.  Mass raping of girls is a norm in 
those places.” He goes on to describe the gang-rape of an eleven-year-old girl at a 
children‟s home in Uzbekistan.75   
 Most children‟s homes were neither the picture of perfection nor dens of 
iniquity, but a bit of both.  Svetlana Magayeva paints a complex, detailed portrait 
of life in a children‟s home, based on her experiences in 1941-1942.  She was fed 
– generally bread, three times a day, gruel twice a day, and tea twice a day.  In the 
same home where troublemakers fought, teased, stole, and humiliated other 
children, a teenage resident, ill from dystrophy, “nursed” his toddler-aged brother 
to sleep each night because it was the only means of pacifying him.   In the same 
home where a child was murdered because he witnessed theft from the pantry, a 
ten-year-old took on the role of nurse/monitor to dozens of sick children, trying to 
help them recover enough to be evacuated.
76
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Behind the Frontlines 
 Conditions in children‟s homes reflected day-to-day conditions and 
concerns on the homefront.  In Soviet-held territory, beyond the reach of the 
Germans (though not much beyond, as in the case of Moscow), the population 
struggled to feed and clothe themselves, to live any semblance of a normal life.  
Certainly, deprivation was nothing new to the Soviet people;  rationing had been 
used in various locales during the 1930s, housing had been in short supply since 
the revolution, and consumer goods were scarce before the war began.
77
  The war 
simply exacerbated these conditions, particularly in the first few years.  The bread 
ration in Lenger-Ugol, Kazakhstan, in the fall of 1941 was 400 grams/day, if one 
could get it before the state stores ran out – a daily occurrence, according to one 
young witness.
78
   In Gorky, promised rations were rarely provided;  on the black 
market, people traded whatever they had – clothes, furniture, kitchen goods, their 
bodies – for food from peasants or kolkhoz workers.79  Elena Skryabina, a 1942 
evacuee from Leningrad, witnessed shortages from north Russia to the Urals 
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region to central Russia to the Caucasus - in Cherepovets, Vologda, Perm, Gorky, 
Liske, Pyatigorsk – despite the people‟s and state‟s efforts to provide for them.80  
The state had closed all local markets and forbidden the sale of local foodstuffs, to 
direct the bulk of produce to the front, and this remained the rule until the summer 
of 1942.  After that, food was either in short supply or too expensive for most to 
afford.  In Moscow, bread could be had, “but very little else” and “fuel . . .[was] 
very short.”81   The scarcity of fuel was felt by all but the most privileged.  
Children and adults snuck pieces of fence, wood from lumberyards, or coal 
dropped near railroad tracks or factory grounds to warm themselves.
82
   
 These shortages dramatically affected schools and school attendance on 
the homefront.  Very little schooling occurred in the first year of the war, due to 
evacuations, shortages of fuel, and lack of teachers.  Even Moscow closed all of 
its primary schools during the first year of the war, though some secondary 
schools reportedly remained open.  By 1942, school seems to have resumed in 
most unoccupied parts of the Soviet Union, though attendance was certainly 
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hampered by wartime conditions.
83
  According to a 1943 Gosplan report, the 
student population declined precipitously with the onset of war.  In 1942, only 
14,015,000 children attended any kind of school – only 47.6 percent of the total 
number of students in 1937 (the beginning of the Five Year Plan) and only 40 
percent of total students in 1940.  After the onset of war, attendance in rural 
schools declined by approximately 58.4 percent; urban schools suffered a decline 
of approximately 62.4 percent.
84
   
 Each memoirist discussed attended school at some point during the war 
years, though the quality of the education appears to have been varied.  Fuel, staff, 
and resources were always lacking, except in a few select schools.  Hautzig 
recalls all grades meeting in one room, sharing old textbooks and writing on old 
newspaper due to shortages of resources.
85
  For five rubles a month, she received 
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lunch at school: a slice of bread with an occasional piece of cheese.  In Lenger, 
Kazakhstan, Goldberger attended a “modern” school for three years during the 
war.  She, too, remembers making exercise books out of newspaper, but adds that 
only children with enough money for shoes and books could attend.
86
  
Interestingly, no Kazakhs attended her school, though a wide variety of ethnic 
groups – mostly evacuees and deportees, it seems – were represented.  Mordvins, 
Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and Chechens (after 1942) shared classes, and 
Goldberger reports that “every ethnic group thoroughly disliked all others.”87  
Hautzig, on the other hand, describes the Siberians in her new school as very 
warm and embracing;  unlike Goldberger, she experienced no anti-semitic or 
nationalist-inspired taunting.   
 The war dominated the curriculum: topics often reflected wartime 
concerns, geography could be taught using the war as a guide, and so on.  Military 
training was added to the curriculum.  In Goldberger‟s school, students learned to 
march, put on gas masks, take a rifle “to pieces” and repair it, run five kilometers 
wearing gas masks and carrying rifles, and throw two types of grenades.  Students 
also took turns standing guard at the school from the end of the school day until 
the following morning.
88
  Military training was considered so important that in 
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1943, the state decreed an end to coeducation in secondary schools in order “to 
produce the best citizen who will create the finest family.”89  In boys‟ schools, 
additional military training was added to the existing curriculum;  in girls‟ 
schools, housecraft and childcare training was added.  Despite the law, most 
children who lived outside of major cities probably attended co-ed schools during 
the war, due to the shortage of teachers and resources.  A generous estimate 
suggests a 40 percent decrease in the number of teachers between 1941 and 
1943.
90
   
 In addition, students and teachers engaged in kolkhoz (collective farm) 
agricultural work, on “volunteer” days (subbotniki or voskresenki), summer 
vacation, and during the school year.
91
  The tremendous loss of manpower caused 
by the draft necessitated that children help to fill their places.  A 1942 decree had 
added a weekly two hours of agricultural training “to provide . . . skills essential 
for intelligent and satisfactory work on a farm” to the secondary school 
curriculum.
92
  That training was to be put to use.  A 1943 letter from a student in 
Irkustskaia oblast‟ to the front reads, “We are on summer vacation now but this 
year it‟s a different vacation because of the war.  All of our teachers and students 
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work in the kolkhoz to help the front.”93  In one of Maya Ganina‟s short stories 
about the war, evacuated children from Moscow work on the collective farm, 
getting up at 5:00 a.m., weeding and digging holes.
94
  Komsomol Central 
Committee member Martiianova reported that children were working ten to 
eleven hour days on a local kolkhoz.
95
   
A wide variety of other war-driven tasks competed with school for the 
attention of children.  Official workdays (trudodnei), which were supposed to be 
logged and compensated, excluded other commendable activities such as 
collecting medicinal plants or scrap metal, foraging for wild food sources (i.e., 
mushrooms or berries), or working in factories, all of which contributed to the 
homefront effort and were sanctioned by the state.
96
  
Not all children devoted themselves to betterment of society.  In a 
September 1942 report, Mikhailov enumerated a variety of troubling trends 
around the Soviet Union. Teenage thugs roamed the streets in Chkalov and armed 
gangs of children in Prokopievsk (Novosibirskaia oblast‟).  In Moscow, 
authorities had to “constantly catch children running away from schools.”  In 
Cheliabinsk, young workers committed 42 percent of work discipline violations.  
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He explained, “We are talking about fourteen- to fifteen-year olds many of which 
. . . do not do any work.  Why? . . . the saw is too dull, then he is two hours late 
for lunch and that undermines his health, so he really cannot perform . . . .” 97  
Goldberger remembers from her years in Kazakhstan that theft was simply a 
means to an end: survival.  From marketplace thieves with razors strapped to their 
palms to workplace thieves furtively slipping an extra can of milk in their coats, 
she recounts, “Everybody who had the opportunity stole.  A good job was the one 
which offered most opportunity to do so.  It was the only way to survive . . . it 
was perfectly respectable. . . . After all, the government owned everything on our 
behalf, . . . [but] it was a terrible thing to get caught.”98 
 State policies toward children engaging in such illegal – and during the 
war, treasonous – activities were dealt with in an increasingly adultlike manner.  
At fourteen, a child could be tried as an adult for any offense, including political 
crimes;  a twelve- to fourteen-year-old could be tried as an adult for theft, murder, 
sabotage, and violent acts.  The state already had penal camps for children and 
youth prior to 1941, but the extraordinary conditions created by the war 
apparently increased both the amount of petty crime as well as the number of 
bezprizorniki across the Soviet Union.  The state addressed the problems of child 
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neglect, hooliganism, and crime in a predictable, if unimaginative, way.
99
  In June 
1943, Stalin authorized the NKVD to set up labor colonies for the estimated 
50,000 eleven-to-sixteen-year-olds who fell into one of three categories:  
neglected (or homeless) children and youth, those arrested for hooliganism and 
petty crime, and children at state orphanages who misbehaved.
100
  A subsequent 
directive, in July 1944, ordered the NKVD to increase the number of children in 
labor colonies by ten thousand.
101
  Lavrentii Beria‟s instructions, issued six days 
after Stalin‟s initial order, make it clear that, in most respects, children‟s labor 
colonies differed little from “regular” NKVD camps.  He authorized “all 
measures” to prevent children from escaping the camps or transport to the camps 
and required that processing procedures not exceed two weeks.  “Work ethics” 
and “curriculum” were to be conducted “in accordance with the norms of the 
NKVD‟s work colonies.”102  State-provided provisions were, predictably, meager.  
A list for the labor colonies claim that inmates received a median portion of 2500 
calories daily, but Beria‟s instructions clearly state that exceptional workers were 
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to be rewarded with food.  The median of 2500 calories, then, must take into 
account the half who received more, and the half who received far less.
103
  Tasks 
performed in labor colonies included ammunition production, agricultural work, 
and military clothing production.  “Exceptional” workers were to be identified 
and placed in special camps where skills such as metalwork, woodwork, and wool 
production were taught;  these special colony sites ranged from central Russia 
(Moskovskaia oblast‟ and Yaroslavskaia oblast‟) to the Caucasus (Georgia, 
Azerbaijan) to southcentral Russia (Bashkir ASSR) to Central Asia (Uzbekistan), 
though children‟s labor colonies were located throughout the Soviet Union.104  In 
an August 1944 report, the NKVD reported that children‟s labor colonies had 
produced 52 million rubles worth of goods in the first half of 1944, overfulfilling 
most norms while simultaneously being directed to “reduce assignations from the 
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government to support their needs,” a euphemism which resulted in depriving the 
young workers of adequate food and shelter.
105
  By decree, children could not be 
released before age fourteen (except by parental request, in the case of abandoned 
children).   Youth were to be released from penal colonies at age sixteen with 
trade certification and job placement, unless sentence extensions were imposed by 
NKVD leadership.   
 The only account of an NKVD children‟s penal colony, written by a 
Polish deportee, suggests that extensions were quite usual.  Twenty-six Polish 
girls were placed in a juvenile penal colony in 1941.  The camp housed five 
hundred inmates, from thirteen to eighteen years old.  Most of the Soviet inmates 
appeared to the Poles to be hard-drinking, swearing “prostitutes, murderesses, 
thieves, and female hooligans” wracked with syphilis, “covered with tattoos like a 
Chinese screen,” yet “loyally disposed toward the Soviet Union.”106  The girls 
worked in a sewing factory and knitting mill – probably engaged in the wool and 
military clothing production noted above – in two shifts of ten hours each.  Cotton 
dust blanketed the workers, clogging their noses and enflaming their lungs.  Many 
girls showed signs of lead poisoning, perhaps from pipes, paint, or machinery at 
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the factory/mill.  Punishment for misbehavior included time in solitary, called the 
“carcer,” a narrow cell filled with water.  Political prisoners, usually children of 
political offenders, were treated more cruelly than other inmates.  The memoirist 
remembers that the hair of one “political” turned completely gray within weeks of 
her arrival at the colony.
107
 
 In a 1944 booklet published by London‟s Russia Today Society, Georgii 
Miterev, People‟s Commissar for Health, claimed, “Despite all our war-time 
difficulties, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government have not for a 
moment forgotten the children.”108  The state had not forgotten the children; 
however, state policies towards children were not particularly benign or paternal.  
On the one hand, the state launched a huge campaign to encourage the adoption of 
war orphans;
109
 on the other, orphans in children‟s homes were given little food 
and few resources, and directors of children‟s homes were granted enormous 
latitude in seizing, disposing of, and making revenue from children‟s personal 
possessions.
110
  Fourteen-year-old boys could enroll in newly-created five-year 
trade schools for mining, construction, engineering, or transportation which 
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offered the benefit of deferred draft, yet trade school students were among those 
who received the lowest of rations – so low that Leningraders remember the 
starving boys, as a group, as the most desperate and most likely to steal one‟s 
rations.
111
  While Soviet propaganda prided itself on “regard[ing] children‟s 
leisure with great seriousness,”112 there was effectively no children‟s 
entertainment by July 1943.  The Committee for the Arts of the USSR ordered the 
reopening of children‟s theatres and showing of plays for children in May 
1944.
113
  When children‟s theatres, circuses, and cinemas were reopened, 
performances could only be held in the daytime.  Upon first glance, this seems 
designed to protect and honor children, but successive documents make clear that 
the state was combating juvenile ticket-scalping.  The sale of evening tickets to 
children under sixteen was prohibited, and performances for children had to occur 
in the daytime, due to the “recent rise in instances of theatre tickets being resold 
by schoolchildren,” presumably on the black market.114   
 
* * * 
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During the liberation of the Ukraine in the late summer offensive of 1943, Vasily 
Grossman attached himself to the 75
th
 Guards Rifle Division and kept notes of his 
observations.  He wrote: 
 
On a windy and overcast morning, we met a boy on the edge of the village 
of Tarasevichi, by the Dnepr.  He looked about thirteen to fourteen years 
old.  The boy was extremely thin, his sallow skin was tight on his 
cheekbones, large bumps protruded on his skull.  His lips were dirty, pale, 
like a dead man‟s who had fallen face flat on the ground.  His eyes were 
looking in a tired way, there was neither joy nor sadness in them.  They 
are so frightening, these old, tired, lifeless eyes of children. 
  “Where is your father?” 
  “Killed,” he answered. 
  “And mother?” 
  “She died.” 
  “Have you got brothers or sisters?” 
  “A sister.  They took her to Germany.” 
  “Have you got any relatives?” 
  “No, they were all burned in a partisan village.” 
99 
 
 And he walked into a potato field, his feet bare and black from the mud, 
 straightening the rags of his torn shirt.
115
 
 
What was unique about the experience of children in the Great Patriotic War?  
Fear, anxiety, deprivation, death, loss – these experiences and emotions were 
shared by children, youth, and adults.  Yet children lived these emotions and these 
trials differently than other groups due to age and position in society.   
 A young age put children at great risk for physical harm.  Low rations and 
scarcity created conditions conducive to malnutrition and starvation, and indeed, a 
recollection shared by all memoirists is an acute awareness of a lack of food.  
After all his experiences in occupied Ukraine, Dovbenko claims that “what has 
stuck most strongly in my mind for all my life is that I was perishing with 
hunger.”116  Kirshin agrees: “During the entire period of occupation, I cannot 
remember a single day that I did not feel hunger.”117  In Siberia, deportee Hautzig 
recalls being “perpetually hungry.”118  Unlike adults, however, the starving child 
suffers developmental problems.  Decades of studies demonstrate that the harsh 
wartime conditions are “reflected in a reduction in general (overall) body size and 
weight, in chest measurements and in retarded sexual development.”119  This 
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delayed development was particularly acute for those children who lived through 
the siege at Leningrad.   Kozhina stopped growing during her years as a 
Leningrader and evacuee, though she was only ten years old.  Teenage Shavrova‟s 
weight fell from 92.4 pounds to 68.2 pounds by 1942.
120
  Skrjabina watched as 
her son and his friends promptly fell ill and despondent from lack of food, 
appearing to regress in development.
121
  Scarcity caused many to dream of food, 
to obsess over tiny amounts of wasted bread or grains of sugar.  The 
preoccupation with food even filtered into children‟s innocent questions.  In 1943, 
writer Vera Inber recorded some overheard conversations.  “Boy: Mother, what is 
ham?  Mother tells him.  Boy: And who has tried it?” And, “Girl: Mother, what 
does a giant weigh? And what rations is he getting?”122  Despite the contention 
that children of Leningrad turned out to be “normal” adults due to their superior 
training as Pioneers,
123
 long-term studies suggest that siege survivors lost 
approximately two years of life expectancy and were more likely to be susceptible 
to a variety of diseases.
124
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 Remarkably, however, older children also seemed to have been the most 
resilient of sufferers.  While the resiliency itself does not surprise (“kids just 
bounce back”), the degree does.  In the wartime demographic catastrophe, 
population reconstructions demonstrate that each age cohort in every part of the 
Soviet Union experienced population loss.   A decrease in fertility and rise in 
child/infant mortality levels during the war halved the number of children under 
age five.  But the two cohorts of children born between 1927 and 1936 suffered 
the lowest degrees of loss during the war;  in fact, of children born between 1932 
and 1936, an astonishing 96 percent were still alive by 1946.  Of those born 
between 1927 and 1931, 94 percent were alive in 1946;  the largest losses in this 
group (1.064 million males) are probably largely attributable to the attainment of 
draft age (sixteen) by a majority of this cohort during the war.
125
  The loss of 
hundreds of thousands of children remains staggering and tragic, but the 
amazingly high rate of survival is suggestive and deserves more exploration in the 
future. 
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 There are several factors which probably contributed to this astonishing 
survival rate among older children.  One must be parental care and sacrifice.  All 
memoirists recall their mothers (occasionally fathers, though men were primarily 
absent due to combat) finding creative ways to keep their children fed, or doing 
without food themselves in order to give what little they had to their children.  
Magayeva‟s family and neighbors, living in a building with no bomb shelter, 
stayed in an apartment playing games during air raids.  No matter how bad the 
bombing got, the adults encouraged play to continue “in order to protect [her] and 
other children from fear.”126   
 A second factor is age.  In order to survive the war, it helped to be an 
“older” child rather than a “younger” child.  According to Kozlov and 
Samsonova, the “age most vulnerable to adverse conditions” appears to be three-
to-four.
127
  Though all children who lived through siege conditions experienced 
physical difficulties and developmental retardation, the greatest effects were felt 
by children who were under the age of eight by war‟s end (born 1938-1945).  
Greater developmental difficulties generally relate to a weakened immune system 
and greater negative response to stress factors.  It follows, then, that children 
under eight would have a higher mortality rate than children over eight.  Kozlov‟s 
and Samsonova‟s study specifically referred to siege conditions in Leningrad, but 
the experiences of starvation, combat, anxiety/fear, separation, and so on, were 
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common throughout the most populated areas of the Soviet Union;  therefore, 
their assertions about the increased chance of survival for older children may be 
cautiously extended beyond the city limits.  
 Perhaps childish imagination played a role in survival.  Though most were 
unable to literally hurt the enemy, many children seemed to nurse the dream that 
one day, they might.  In the summer of 1941, Leningrader Kochina observed that 
“spymania, like an infectious disease” swept through the ranks of her friends.128  
Twelve-year-old Liubov‟ Borisovna Beregovaia mused, “I often thought about 
what I would do to Hitler if he had been caught.  Gouge out his eyes, like they do 
to bandits and cyclopses in fairy tales? Brand him with the Fascist sign, like the 
Germans did to our partisans with a star?”129  When the prompt “What I would do 
if I had an invisible cap” was given to a class of sixth graders, thirty “almost 
identical answers” returned in essay form:  reconnaissance in the German rear, 
sabotaging of German weapons, and fighting in the Red Army.
130
  Ganina‟s 
characters, young boys in wartime Moscow, fantasize about killing Germans.  
Mishka makes a stiletto and uses an anatomy book to figure out where to stab a 
German should he encounter one.  He claims he will scalp them in order to keep 
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count of how many he‟s killed.  Kesha, his friend, agrees that “it would be sheer 
delight to watch them dying in horrible convulsions . . .”131     
 Accordingly, play and leisure time were dramatically influenced by the 
war.  In most memoirs, free time is devoted to day-to-day activities such as 
foraging, resting, housework, or schoolwork.  Children, though, express 
themselves through play, and it is nonsensical to assume that it was absent, even 
in a time of war.  For many, the war provided unprecedented freedom from 
supervision – fathers were at the front, mothers worked and slept at the factories 
six days a week, the elderly charged with keeping an eye on children were, for the 
most part, incapable.  Kirshin remembers that “every day we played war, and 
passionately argued who would play the part of the Soviet troops, and who – the 
Germans.”132  He also recounts that boys were blown up while playing with 
discarded grenades, cartridges, and shells lying in the streets of his village.
133
  
Others made games of collecting shrapnel, making up rules to protect one another 
from burning fingers on red-hot metal, ran pretend air raids on Berlin, and played 
military hospital.
134
   
 What is most striking is the normalization of war and war-related activities 
in the lives of children.  A Soviet War News article quotes a child from an evacuee 
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camp in 1942: “We practice grenade throwing and play with our pets.”135  A 
friend of Vera Inber received a letter from her evacuated daughter which read, “I 
am mastering the rifle and reading Gogol‟s Dead Souls.”136  The equation of 
weapons training with typical hobbies in each quote is quite telling;  playing war 
had become standard, as had mortality.  “Death has become routine, a part of 
everyday life,” wrote one deportee.137 
 Death visited many Soviet children in an intimate way.  The Great 
Fatherland War produced an epidemic of fatherlessness in the Soviet Union.  
Over 76 percent of human losses were men, more than half of them between the 
ages of fifteen and forty-four.
138
  Hautzig, in Siberia, recollects, “Almost without 
exception, the children of [my] village had lost either a father, an uncle, a brother, 
a cousin; sometimes, there were none left, no male relatives at all.”139  Mothers, 
too, became casualties to war, separated from children by evacuation, away at 
work, or preoccupied by survival.  Of the 994 children who lived through the 
Battle of Stalingrad, only nine could be reunited with their parents.
140
  Even 
children who remained with their families sometimes “lost” them to the war.  
Teenage Lida, in occupied territory, wrote to her brother, Vanya, “Father‟s hair 
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turned grey from worrying; and mother has changed, too.  She looks as if she 
were seventy years old.”141  Imagine the horror of a granddaughter whose 
grandmother prepared to eat her.
142
  Some children tried to replace their lost 
families with new ones.  There may have been as many as 25,000 “sons of the 
regiment” (syn pol‟pad), children six to sixteen who were adopted by various 
soldiers or army units, many accompanying them into battle or acquiring military 
duties along the way.
143
  While this filled a need, both for a parentless child and 
for childless parents, this was a precarious situation that could be no more 
permanent or dependable than the next gun battle.  Still, surviving “sons” testify 
to warm, paternal relations between soldiers and children.  But even authority 
figures could disappoint in wartime.  Yuri Kirshin and his family were turned in 
to the Germans as Party members – by Yuri‟s Pioneer leader!144  The “orphaning” 
of Soviet children, literally or figuratively, was a unique part of their wartime 
experience. 
 The war orphan – probably the most popular image of the child in the 
press for adults – symbolized powerlessness.  In society, children, like women, 
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are often regarded as weak or immature in some sense; thus, the issue of age is 
reflective of the issue of gender.  Certainly, the state portrayed children as 
vulnerable and helpless, as a perusal of wartime propaganda posters 
demonstrates.
145
  Occupation, siege, frontline fighting, evacuation, the children‟s 
home, displacement – all could contribute to feelings of helplessness.  Without a 
parent, the situation became more perilous and uncertain.  Abandoned or 
orphaned children had few ways to feed or take care of themselves, many of them 
illegal.  Most children could not fight in the war, could not choose whether or not 
to be evacuated, could not avenge the loss of home or family.  Twelve-year-old 
Tolya Zakharov wrote, “I am sorry about one thing only.  The Nazis will be 
beaten before I get a chance to grow up.  I‟ll have no chance at all to put my 
hands on them.  I did put out some incendiary bombs but that doesn‟t count.  I 
didn‟t have a chance to hit them and probably never will.  I won‟t be grown up 
enough.”146 
   And yet, the war did pressure children to grow up quickly.  There was 
adult work to be done, adult responsibilities to be shouldered, younger siblings to 
be kept alive.  Vera Inber gave a speech in Moscow about the inhabitants of 
Leningrad; in it, she described a little boy “who wept as he put out an incendiary 
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bomb with sand.  He was afraid of it, he was only nine years old; nevertheless, as 
he wept, he was extinguishing it.”147  With many mothers and fathers absent, 
responsibility to care for younger siblings or grandparents often fell upon older 
children.  Children helped to bury their family members whose bodies were 
sometimes mutilated and hideously disfigured by injury or disease.
148
  The 
boundaries between childhood and adulthood were blurred by extraordinary 
circumstances.  Social upheaval affected family roles, definitions, and values.  
Few families had the luxury of preserving “normal” childhood; the war simply did 
not allow it.   Attempts to treat children as children led to contradictions in daily 
life.  Kirshin had witnessed the deaths of family and neighbors at the hands of the 
Germans, yet, because of his age, was kept from attending funerals.
149
  By 1943, 
children were being sent to Pioneer camp in Leningrad – a city still under siege.  
While camp was supposed to be a time for play, rest, and relaxation, the children 
met all visitors with the same questions: was there any shelling? in which 
districts? what was the forecast for future attacks?  Some children could not bear 
to be away at camp, feeling the responsibility to check on relatives back in the 
city.
150
   
                                                 
 
147
 Inber, Leningrad Diary, 99. 
 
148
 See, for example, Prof. Nikolai Viktorovich Goncharov, interview, 23 November 
1995, in Beevor, Stalingrad, 105.  Eleven-year-old Goncharov helped his mother bury his 
grandfather, noting, “Before filling in the grave, we searched for his head, but could not find it.” 
 
149
 Kirshin, in Anderson, No Longer Silent, 278. 
 
150
 Inber, Leningrad Diary, 151; Magayeva, Surviving, 48. 
109 
 
 For some, the burdens of loss, deprivation, sorrow, and survival were too 
much to bear; hence the “old, tired, lifeless eyes” Grossman witnessed.  An aid 
worker in Stalingrad described children “swollen with hunger [who] cringed in 
corners, afraid to speak, to even look people in the face.”151  Others, however, 
recognized the necessity of change.  Kozhina, subject to deep depression during 
the war, realized, “I was now regarded as an adult, expected to do something 
more than study my homework well or keep my hands clean.  I had to summon 
some force within, which would help me defeat my plague.”152  Perhaps as 
Fadeev noted, “these were neither children nor were they grown-ups – they were 
simply new people . . .”153 – new people with one foot planted firmly in the 
familiar world of childhood and another thrust into the unpredictable, hazardous 
world of adulthood.  Inna Bityugova, a ninth grader in Leningrad, submitted an 
essay to a writing contest in 1943.  She wrote about her work on a collective farm: 
“‟I know now what hard work means, and I feel responsible for the work I do.  I 
feel I‟m not a child schoolgirl any more, but a schoolgirl warrior.  I have worked 
for the city and for the Front.‟”154  On the cover of the warrior‟s essay dance 
hand-drawn, smiling beets, radishes, and turnips.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND 
CRISIS FOR THE YOUNG PIONEERS 
There is no evident Pioneer movement at the present time. 
Komsomol Central Committee Council on Children‟s Education, 
September 7, 1942
1
 
 
 Few experiences of the 1920s or 1930s foreshadowed the widespread 
devastation and utter disruption the Great Patriotic War would bring about in the 
Soviet Union beginning in June 1941.  No institution was immune to the effects 
of war, yet this national emergency had serious consequences for the Young 
Pioneers.  After two decades of incredible growth and important collective 
definition, the Pioneers, like the nation itself, were thrown headlong into a 
heretofore unknown fight for existence.  The organization did not respond well to 
the calamitous conditions created by Germany‟s invasion.  In fact, in the 
estimation of the Komsomol leaders responsible for the Young Pioneers, the 
Pioneer organization had almost disappeared by the fall of 1942, crushed beneath 
the weight of wartime demands, seemingly irrelevant to the children it was 
supposed to be leading, and erased from the public milieu.   
 
                                                 
1
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* * * 
 
 In some sense, the decline of the Young Pioneers was a foreseeable 
consequence of war.  Memoirs of those who were children during the struggle 
against Nazi Germany illustrate the all-encompassing nature of war.  Daily life for 
many was consumed by the tasks necessary to survival, both small and large.  The 
chaos of evacuation and resettlement dislocated individuals, families, and 
communities.  Occupation brought new and unpredictable change to the 
quotidian.  Even areas far removed from the frontlines experienced upset to 
routine.  Commitments to military service or labor broke up families.  Shortages, 
common in the prewar era, were exacerbated by the onset of hostilities with the 
Axis Powers and the implementation of a war-driven economy.  In conditions 
such as these, any collective body reliant on schedule, routine, and ritual the way 
the Young Pioneers were was bound to suffer.   
 In addition, the most important site of Young Pioneer activity and contact 
with children, the school, had been dramatically affected by the war.  Primary and 
secondary schools, the headquarters of local Pioneer links, troops, and 
detachment, were closed or erratically attended and suffered from a shortage of 
teachers and Pioneer staff.  Members of the Komsomol manned and led local 
Pioneer detachments; any of them would have been of age to volunteer for active 
duty in the military or to join the workforce diminished by the draft.  Student 
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attendance dropped dramatically during the war.  According to statistics from the 
1937 Five-Year Plan, the number of students in kindergarten, primary, and 
primary/secondary schools had increased steadily in the years leading up to 1941.  
This figure dropped sharply in 1942, the total number of students in school 
plummeting to  47.6 percent of the 1937 total.   The number of students of Pioneer 
age had decreased by about half, both in cities and in the country.
2
  This was 
critical.  Having located the Young Pioneers in the schools in the 1930s in order 
to take advantage of the school‟s rising ubiquity, popularity, and authority, the 
organization was forced to share the fate of the educational system as it faltered 
during the Great Patriotic War. 
 Its primary site of influence compromised, the organization struggled to 
remain relevant to children in the early years of the war.  No directives were 
issued or conferences held concerning the effects and meaning of the conflict for 
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the Young Pioneers between June 1941 and August 1942.  In other words, despite 
the upheaval of more than fourteen months at war, the Pioneer message remained 
unchanged.  No measures were taken to restructure the organization or shore up 
members‟ faithfulness to it.  Few steps were proposed to involve children in mass 
campaigns.  No sense of exigency compelled the Pioneer leadership to rework the 
themes and slogans of the previous decade.  To be sure, the rhetoric of the 1930s 
suggested war-readiness and combative language, the sort of rhetoric which had 
long characterized the Young Pioneers, but it lacked the urgency which could 
only be a product of reality.  The failure to act and adapt clearly indicates an 
indifference on the part of the Pioneer leadership, born of necessity or ignorance, 
toward the future of the children‟s organization.   It seems as if it never occurred 
to them that the organization might need to adapt to the times.   
 Practically speaking, resources for the Pioneer organization – and 
children, in general – were less important to the war effort than the needs of 
defense and industry.  As was the case with other aspects of the Soviet 
infrastructure, money was diverted to the more pressing requirements and 
resources of the war machine. While defense spending rose steadily from 1940 to 
1944, social-cultural expenditures – including education and physical culture – 
dropped significantly in the first few years of the war.
3
   One sign of this decline 
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in state funding:  Pionerskaia Pravda ceased publication in June 1941, not to 
resume again until 1943.  A round of reorganization within Soviet broadcasting 
occurred in late June 1941.  One month later, the Department of Children‟s 
Broadcasting was closed, for “lack of work.”  The Literary-Musical department 
was tasked with organizing a group for children‟s broadcasting.4  The daily 
Pioneer broadcast, “Pioneer Dawn” (“Pionerskaia Zor‟ka”) was discontinued 
until fall of the same year.  Pioneer camps, funded primarily by state-sponsored 
trade unions, found their budgets were slashed dramatically.  The budget for 
children‟s camps was 258 million rubles in 1941;  by the very next year, 1942, the 
budget had declined by 84.5 percent to 40 million rubles.
5
  The regional 
committee of Krasnodar‟ reported in May 1942 that, in addition to other factors, 
no camps would be held because no money was available to purchase food for the 
campers and staff.
6
  The welfare and needs of a children‟s organization – even a 
children‟s Party organization – tumbled down the list of priorities in the early 
months and years of the Great Patriotic War.  It should be noted, however, that 
this funding crunch was worst in 1942;  from 1943 until the end of the war, 
budgeted amounts increased steadily.  By 1944, most line items had met or 
                                                                                                                                     
for defense in 1940: 56.8 billion; 1941: 83 billion; 1942: 108.4 billion; 1943: 125 billion; 1944: 
137.8 billion; 1945: 128.2 billion. 
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 Arkhiv Gosteleradio SSSR op. 1 1/s, d. 143, l. 96, and op. 1 1/c, d. 143, l. 186. 
5
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6
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exceeded prewar (1940) levels.
7
  These budget issues, while temporary, coincided 
with other factors in the early years of the war, contributing to the demise of the 
Pioneer organization. 
 By the fall of 1942, it seems clear that the Young Pioneers were reaching a 
critical point in its organizational operations.  As local units floundered along, 
trying to keep up some semblance of normalcy, various documents from regional 
and local levels began to appear in early 1942, suggesting problems within the 
organization.  Representative of such reports is a letter written by Ivolgina, 
Secretary for Schools of the Bashkir Komsomol obkom, to Koniaeva, the 
Komsomol member who led the Pioneer organization, in which she asks that the 
issue of Pioneer work at schools be “urgently reconsidered.”8  Though Ivolgina 
asserts that Pioneers in Bashkiria are “collective-minded, independent, and well-
prepared for life,” she urges Koniaeva to revise the by-laws and minimum 
knowledge level required of Pioneers in order “to place greater demands on the 
Pioneer and the organization.”   
 Of serious concern in Bashkiria was the massive shortage of workers and 
high turnover rate among local leadership.  Though the obkom secretary stoutly 
maintains that “lack of cadres” was a poor excuse for not improving the 
performance of the Pioneer organization, the reality of the situation is apparent in 
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8
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 94-94 ob.  The letter is dated March 1942. 
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an attached statistical report.  As of June 1942, the Bashkir republic was assigned 
525 Pioneer leaders for 243,000 Pioneers – one Pioneer leader for every 445.7 
Pioneers! Even if all 525 leaders existed – which is unlikely – this is far from the 
ideal ratio of one Pioneer leader for each detachment (druzhina), much less a 
leader for each troop (otriad) or link (zveno).
9
 
 The issue raised in Bashkiria was illustrative of a national, institutional 
predicament.  The Komsomol considered proper and competent leadership crucial 
to the success of the Pioneer organization, and here they were faced with serious 
shortcomings.   The problem was twofold:  first, there were not enough Pioneer 
leaders, and second, the Pioneer leaders they had were woefully inexperienced 
and/or incompetent.   
 Shortages of Pioneer leaders were endemic across the Soviet Union during 
the war, as might be expected.  Surely many Komsomoltsy felt that working with 
children was a far less admirable or useful wartime task than enlisting for military 
duty or working in a defense industry.  An excerpt from a meeting of the 
Penzenskaia oblast‟ Party cell places full blame for the failure of the Pioneers on 
local Komsomol cells, reporting that “regional, city, and provincial Komsomol 
committees have become negligent in selecting and training Pioneer leader 
cadres. . .”10  Most of Moscow‟s schools were without Pioneer leaders by the end 
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of 1942, one memo blandly noting that the Moscow Komsomol had “not grasped 
the full extent of the shortcomings in work with the Pioneers or the meaning of 
the Komsomol Central Committee‟s resolution.”11  A blistering 1943 report from 
Kuibyshev, the “capital of the rear”, lists a barrage of charges such as “most of 
the detachments [druzhini] . . . exist only on paper”, “only two out of the 
[Molotovskii] region‟s eight schools had senior Pioneer leaders”, “there was not a 
single discussion of the Pioneer organization‟s work at the Komsomol city bureau 
meetings in all of 1943”, “the provincial committee [obkom] does not know how 
many Pioneer leaders are supposed to exist”, concluding that “it is impossible to 
say anything about the work of the Pioneer headquarters, only because they do not 
exist either at the Komsomol provincial committee or the city committee, while 
those that formally exist at some regional committees, do nothing.” 12   
 The leaders the organization did have, however, were, for the most part, 
raw and unproven.  Of Gor‟kii‟s five hundred twenty-nine Pioneer leaders, nearly 
60 percent had less than one year‟s experience.13  Of the two hundred twenty-six 
senior Pioneer leaders approved for work in Moscow in 1943, 86 percent had less 
than one year‟s experience.14  Of one thousand six hundred eighty-three Pioneer 
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 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 64. 
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leaders active in Kalininskaia province in 1943, 89 percent had less than two 
years‟ experience.15 Some of this inexperience could be attributed to age.  The 
Kuibyshev report recounts that a school principal appointed an eighth-grade 
student, Vera Bednaia, to be senior Pioneer leader at School No. 80, and that 
another eighth-grade student, Klara Oltyreva, had been senior detachment leader 
in her village of Russkie Lipiagi for over twelve months.
16
   
 Other evidence suggests that education level (or lack of) might be a factor 
in explaining the incompetence of Pioneer leaders.  Of the five-hundred-odd 
Pioneer leaders mentioned in the Gor‟kii report above, only thirty-seven are listed 
as having completed any kind of higher education.
17
  In a statistical report on 
senior Pioneer leaders from February 1944, the vast majority of the regions in the 
Soviet Union listed their leaders as having completed only secondary school.
18
  
Whether or not level of education is to blame, some leaders simply appeared to 
have insufficient general knowledge for leadership among Pioneers.  In an 
institution so heavily dependent on leaders to prescribe behavior and 
propagandize, ignorance amongst organizers was unforgiveable. Anecdotal 
evidence provided in the Kuibyshev report is suitably damning: 
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 For instance, at the large Kuibyshev School No. 13, one 
Aleksandra Sheveleva worked as a senior Pioneer leader for an entire year.  
She was completely unable to organize the children, and was not even 
capable of giving a coherent speech at a troop or detachment convention.  
Her pathetic blabber at a solemn convention deprived it of any sort of 
solemnity.  The manner in which Comrade Sheveleva directed her troops 
is apparent from the fact that the troop considered the “best” did not hold a 
single link meeting in the course of an entire year. . . . The Komsomol 
regional committee has recommended Comrade Chernaia and Comrade 
Durasov as the best Pioneer leaders in the city of Kuibyshev.  What are 
these “best” Pioneer leaders like?  In talking with them, it became 
apparent that, for instance, Comrade Chernaia, despite having led a 
discussion of Chapaev with her Pioneers, does not know who Chapaev 
actually was. . . .She cannot name a single one of Lenin‟s or Stalin‟s 
works. . . . she was unable to recall who wrote The Queen of Spades or 
who composed the music to the opera based on this work.  Comrade 
Durasov displayed a similar level of erudition.
19
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 In the estimation of the Pioneer leadership, such link and troop leaders 
were useless, despite the great probability that these youth had little training for 
these positions, were consumed with the tasks of day-to-day survival, and were 
preoccupied by the war.  Formal reports took no notice of non-Pioneer activities – 
affection shown, tears dried, games played – informal gestures that these youth 
might have made toward their young charges.  The inability to hold conduct 
formal meetings meant that the Pioneer message was not being conveyed.  Thus, 
in the perception of the Young Pioneer leaders, the institution lacked adequate 
personnel, both in quantity and quality, to lead children.   
 Despite the absence of Pioneer link and troop leaders, however, children 
contributed to the war effort in a multitude of ways.  Childrens‟ activities did not 
cease because of a lack of leadership from the Pioneers.  The implications of this 
leadership problem were serious and potentially humiliating for the Pioneer 
organization.   
 
Response to Crisis 
 The situation within the Pioneer organization was serious enough to merit 
a special meeting of the Komsomol‟s Central Committee Council on Children‟s 
Education on September 7, 1942.  A stenographic account records the comments 
of eight members of the Central Committee council, including the Secretary of the 
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Komsomol, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov.
20
  Overall, the meeting laments 
the woes of the Pioneer organization.  There is no defense of the organization‟s 
performance, nor does any council member praise its contribution to the war 
effort. 
 The first major concern about the Pioneer organization was its invisibility 
in the public sphere, especially among children.  Council member Kulichenko 
declared that “a major organizational defect of the Pioneers‟ organization is the 
fact that at present, the organization has completely merged with the school, and 
that it does not act outside of school walls.  In reality, the Pioneer movement is 
absent . . . . It is hard to draw a line between a Pioneer and a student.”21  Council 
member Morozov agreed, “there is no evident Pioneers‟ movement at present.”22  
Any public evidence of Pioneer activity – parades, marching to drums, line-ups, 
and so on – had evaporated, a sure sign that the organization itself was “on the 
decline.”23  Another council member, Schneiderov, swore that all the symbols and 
traditions of the Pioneers had vanished.
24
  The Pioneer organization had been 
moved within and bound intimately to the environment of the schoolhouse in the 
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1930s, by the Party‟s direction.  By the 1940s, however, the Pioneer organization 
had melded so completely with the school system that it had no separate identity.  
Kulichenko continues, “What differentiates the Pioneer organization from schools 
today and what differentiates the upbringing of children by the Pioneer 
organization from the upbringing given by schools?  Nothing does.”25  Though 
this was, perhaps, the logical outcome of the strategy employed in the 1930s, it 
was not the desired outcome.  For two decades, the Pioneer organization had 
specifically positioned itself to prescribe ideal behavior for children in the Soviet 
Union.  The Pioneer was to be the public face of Soviet childhood, not only to 
children, but to adults as well. Without a tangible presence – or even a perceived 
presence – the Pioneer organization was in danger of losing its influence, perhaps 
even its purpose for existing. 
 Another grave concern among council members concerned leadership 
within the Pioneer organization.  Secretary Mikhailov contended that the staffing 
question was the number one priority to be addressed.
26
  Morozov argued that his 
investigation revealed that “there is no one to supervise them [the Pioneers], no 
one to give directions.”  The children needed “determination, defined goals, and 
not just general wishes.” 27  Council member Chukovskii affirmed this sentiment, 
noting that scarce resources were often wasted because children received no 
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instruction or guidance from a leader.
28
  As a result, the organization seemed 
aimless, impotent.  Council member Akhapkin suggested that, in order to combat 
the high turnover rate, Pioneer leaders should be subject to a minimum 
commitment of three years.  Further, he envisioned a role for discharged veterans 
within the organization, proposing that former officers would make excellent 
leaders for children.
29
  Akhapkin and Mikhailov both pointed out the necessity of 
requesting that teachers pull double-duty, serving both as educator and Pioneer 
leader, though this would seem to be problematic considering the issue discussed 
above.  The issue of leadership appeared insurmountable:  how could the 
organization convince youth that working with children was important, in the 
context of ongoing war?  More to the point, how could a seemingly invisible, 
insignificant organization be so persuasive?   
 It could not.  The lack of action and discipline that characterized the 
Pioneer organization by 1942 was lamented and lambasted by several council 
members.  Schneiderov stressed, “We must build the Pioneer organization as an 
organization of action . . . . concentrat[ing] all work around real community deeds 
and around the needs of the government.”30  Public perception, according to 
Schneiderov, was that the Pioneers did nothing useful.  Children loved the Timur 
movement because it involved action;  the Pioneers, apparently, were perceived as 
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the antithesis of this.  In fact, a later report from Kuibyshev recounts that Timur 
teams and Pioneer troops were pitted against one another, as competitors, rather 
than the preferred scenario in which Pioneer links or troops were the leaders of 
the Timurites.
31
  Chukovskii, who based his comments on a ten-month stint with a 
childrens‟ evacuation commission in Uzbekistan, noted not only a sad lack of 
initiative and interest among Pioneers there, but also acts among the children that 
could only be described as wicked:  “I saw Pioneers with red ties who reminded 
me of small „Hitlers‟ who wanted to be evil for the sake of evil.”32 He saw 
children throw dirt into the eyes of monkeys at the zoo, dirt at people on trams, 
rocks and nails at cars.  In the childrens‟ homes, he alleged seeing child 
perpetrators of rape, theft, and bullying.
33
  Morozov viewed the Pioneer 
organization as entirely too forgiving of children‟s antics and a shoddy work 
ethic.
34
  Council member Martianova blamed the children‟s poor behavior on 
boredom.  They “have nothing else to do” but misbehave; therefore, the Pioneer 
organization ought to step in and increase their collective work load.  The best 
way, in her opinion, to inspire children to action was to appeal to their patriotism.  
Children ought to be inspired to love the motherland and to hate the enemy.  Since 
the children have knives anyway, she asserted, the Pioneer organization should 
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make them want to turn those weapons on the fascists rather than each other.
 35
 
Akhapkin asserted the Pioneer organization could address concerns about 
discipline and work ethic through increased emphasis on military training.
36
  
Whatever the solution, the deplorable work ethic among children had to be 
addressed if the Pioneers were going to resurrect any sort of image as an 
organization of action and relevance. 
 Finally, the members of the council agreed that the Pioneer organization 
itself needed “radical restructuring.”37  Akhapkin suggested that the whole 
organization needed “strengthening” – the structure of the organization, its tasks, 
the role of its leaders, its oaths and traditions.
38
  Schneiderov criticized the 
organization for being insensitive to the age range of children involved, proposing 
instead that there ought to gradations within the Pioneers (similar to the Boy 
Scouts‟ Wolf Cubs, Tiger Cubs, and Webelos) based on age and age-appropriate 
tasks and activities.
39
  The Pioneer organization had undergone moderate 
updating, especially in terms of tasks or language, from time to time throughout 
its history.  What these council members were suggesting, however, went beyond 
change of language or venue.  The organization itself appeared to be broken and 
in need of internal repair.  Whatever the concern, the situation was deemed to be 
                                                 
35
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 17. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 13. 
38
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 17. 
39
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 14. 
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dire.  Chukovsky melodramatically warned, “If we do not arrive at some drastic 
resolutions at this time, then the entire children‟s generation may die.”40 
 Secretary Mikhailov concluded the meeting, and drafted the September 
1942 report which resulted from it, “Six Major Shortcomings in the Work of the 
Pioneer Organization and Measures to Be Taken to Eliminate These 
Shortcomings.”41  His ideas form the core of the final proposal.  The Komsomol, 
he claimed, had dropped the ball in working with children, and “as a result, the 
Pioneer organization‟s image [was] growing vague and ill-defined,” its attributes 
forgotten.  While he condemned the obscurity into which the Pioneer organization 
had fallen, he firmly reasserted the relationship between the Pioneer organization 
and schools.  The Pioneer organization was to remain in schools, to work with 
schools in promoting academic achievement, and to operate under the authority of 
school principals.  Rather than restructuring the Pioneer organization, Mikhailov 
suggested reeducation.  New laws, traditions, and symbols were not needed;  the 
existing laws, traditions, and symbols simply needed to be retaught to a cohort 
who had forgotten them, he argued.  Though the organization itself needed little 
in the way of restructuring, it could benefit from the updating of rhetoric to 
correspond with wartime realities.  To address the issue of discipline and action, 
the organization was to be imbued with a new militarization.  The Pioneer 
organization was not to be an organization of “helpless and pampered sissies” but 
                                                 
40
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 16. 
41
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 1-8. 
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of warriors-in-training.  Children should be inspired to heroic action, under the 
aegis of the Pioneers – working, fighting, or studying for the glory of motherland 
and Party.  The romanticism of participation in the war effort would draw children 
to the Pioneers.  As for the issue of age-appropriateness, Mikhailov snorted, 
“Let‟s face reality here . . . we are treating the children as if they were adults, so 
there is no age principle there.”42  This “reality” – that the war signaled an abrupt 
break with normalcy – was to be reflected in the qualities and responsibilities that 
the Young Pioneers emphatically supported in the organization‟s post-1942 
efforts at recovery.  Children had already taken on grown-up characteristics out of 
necessity or coercion;  rather than attempt to counter that reality with a fantasy of 
childhood restored, the Pioneer leadership used it as the foundation for their drive 
to regain visibility and reputation. 
 The council‟s report begins, “In many families, parents cannot devote the 
same attention to their children as they did before the war.”43  What should have 
been a prime opportunity for the Pioneer organization to mold and shape young 
Soviet children was lost in the early years of the war.  Rather than actively 
influencing the minds and activities of children, the Pioneer organization settled 
into oblivion, out of sight and out of mind in Soviet society.  The organization, 
though, was determined to rectify this situation.  Beginning in 1943, the Pioneer 
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 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 10, l. 19-20. 
43
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 1. 
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organization began the slow struggle to reassert its influence and prescriptive 
powers among the children of the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER 5 
WHAT IS A PIONEER?:   
SOVIET CHILDREN AND IDENTITY IN WARTIME 
I would rather die myself than let the Motherland die. 
Zoya Kirilova, 6
th
 grade
1
 
 
 Essential to the daunting task of reviving the languishing Pioneer 
organization was the rescue of its reputation.  The Komsomol leadership tasked 
with this responsibility quickly moved to redefine and reestablish the identity of 
the Pioneer within the organization, among children, and in Soviet society.  
Above all, the Pioneer had to be reinserted into the Soviet narrative and public 
eye as a positive force for the state-defined good;  in short, the Pioneer had to be a 
hero.  Careful culling, editing, and dissemination of numerous stories, anecdotes, 
literature, and ideas by the Pioneer organization resulted in an attractive, yet 
demanding, definition of heroism for children.  This calculated definition of 
heroism provides insight into the state‟s wartime values and its expectations for 
children.  Intentional or otherwise, the Young Pioneers immensely complicated 
the traditional image of the Soviet child in war.  Whereas state propaganda 
overwhelmingly portrayed children as victims, Pioneer messages recast them as 
actors with grown-up responsibilities and sacrifices to make. 
                                                 
1
 From a letter printed in Pionerskaia Pravda and read in a “Pioneer Dawn” broadcast, 1 
January 1943.  GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 18, l. 5. 
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*  *  *  
 
 One component of the “Measures” handed down by the Komsomol‟s 
Central Committee Council on Children‟s Education involved the updating of 
rhetoric in Pioneer oaths and the reeducation of Young Pioneer leaders in the 
principles and structure of the organization.  The Komsomol Central Committee 
moved quickly on the first matter.  By mid-October of 1942, the committee had 
drafted and adopted new language for the Pioneer oath, laws, and customs 
designed to more manifestly mimic the bellicose language made familiar to 
children during the war.   
 Prior to 1942, beginning at initiation into the organization, Pioneers were 
asked to solemnly promise: 
 
I, a Young Pioneer of the Soviet Union, in front of my comrades, 
solemnly swear that I will firmly stand for the cause of Lenin and Stalin 
for the victory of communism, and that I will honestly and unfalteringly 
carry out the laws and customs of a Pioneer.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Pionerskaia organizatsia imeni lenina (Moskva: UchPedGiz, 1950), 41, as quoted in 
Ina Schlesinger, “The Pioneer Organization:  The Evolution of Citizenship Education in the Soviet 
Union”  (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1967), 84.  The original pledge, composed in 1922, 
substituted the words “defend the cause of the working classes in the struggle for the liberation of 
the workers and peasants of the world” for “stand for the cause of Lenin and Stalin for the victory 
of communism.”  Iunyi pioner:  posobie dlia instruktora  (Moskva:  Novaia Moskva, 1924), 57. 
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Mikhailov and the Central Committee rewrote the Pioneer oath this way: 
 
 
I, a Young Pioneer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in 
front of my comrades, solemnly promise to the Great Stalin, the Bolshevik 
Party, and the Leninist Komsomol, to live, study, and work in a way that 
will make me worthy of the high rank of a Young Leninist. 
I promise to be disciplined, honest, hard-working, courageous, and 
tough. 
 I hate the fascist invaders with all my heart and I will tirelessly 
prepare to defend the Motherland.  In this, I swear by the names of the 
soldiers who gave their lives for our happiness.  I will always remember 
that their blood burns on my Pioneer tie and on our Red Banner.
3
 
 
According to the adults who directed the Young Pioneer organization, this was 
the sort of fiery, passionate language to which children could relate in wartime.  
This oath captured the tough attitude and dedication the committee believed to be 
lacking among Pioneers:  the word “work” is repeated or implied three times, 
children are invited to share in the defense of their country, and, for those children 
foolhardy enough to ask, “Why should I?” there is a healthy dose of guilt meted 
out in the final paragraph. The method by which a child could “stand . . . for the 
                                                 
3
 Tsentr Khraneniia Dokumentov Molodezhnykh Organizatsii (hereafter cited as 
TsKhDMO) f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 59. 
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victory of communism” was made much more explicit in the new version of the 
pledge.  Values of self-sacrifice and patriotism, hatred for the enemy, action on 
behalf of Stalin and the Motherland – themes already familiar to Soviet youth and 
adults – were now officially prescribed for children.  Three times a year, at Young 
Pioneer induction ceremonies, these words would be repeated by children new to 
the organization and heard by children already in membership;  more often, these 
words would be visible in classrooms or painstakingly copied into school 
notebooks. 
 The commandments of the Young Pioneers evolved in a similar fashion.  
The original commandments (1923) are as follows: 
 1.  The Pioneer is faithful to the cause of the working class. 
2.  The Pioneer is the youngest brother and helper of the Komsomoltsy 
and communists. 
3.  The Pioneer is a comrade of [other] Pioneers and workers‟ children 
worldwide. 
 4.  The Pioneer loves labor. 
 5.  The Pioneer is honest and truthful (his word is like granite). 
 6.  The Pioneer is healthy, robust, and never falls in spirit. 
7.  The Pioneer strives for knowledge.  Knowledge and ability are strength 
in the struggle for the workers‟ cause. 
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 8.  The Pioneer carries out his duties quickly and accurately.
4
 
 
Changes to this list of rules detailing prescribed behaviors and attitudes were 
substantial, both in concept and content.  Here are the commandments approved 
on October 13, 1942: 
 
 1.  The Pioneer is faithful to the Leninist-Stalinist cause. 
 2.  The Pioneer fervently loves his motherland and hates its enemies. 
3.  The Pioneer considers it an honor to become a member of the Leninist 
Komsomol. 
 4.  The Pioneer is honest and truthful.  His word is as strong as steel. 
 5.  The Pioneer is as courageous as an eagle.  He despises cowards. 
 6.  The Pioneer has a sharp eye, muscles of iron, and nerves of steel. 
 7.  The Pioneer needs knowledge like a weapon in battle. 
 8.  The Pioneer is not a sissy.  He is hard-working. 
 9.  The Pioneer is the pride of his family and his school. 
 10.  The Pioneer is an example for all children.
5
 
 
                                                 
4
 “Iz organizatsionnogo polozheniia detskikh kommunisticheskikh grupp iunykh pionerov 
imeni spartake.  Utverzhdeno Buiro TsK RKSM 28 avgusta 1923 g.” TsKhDMO, TsK VLKSM f. 
1, op. 3, d. 8, l. 58, as printed in Tsentr Khraneniia Dokumentov Molodezhnykh Organizatsii, 
Molodezhnoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 1917-1928:  dokumenty i  materialy,  chast‟ 1 i 2  (Moskva:  
Tsentr Khraneniia Dokumentov Molodezhnykh Organizatsii), 21, 1993. 
5
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 58.  Earlier drafts are located at l. 60 and l. 62. 
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The original commandments emphasize the international character of the 
communist movement, reflecting a time when the Bolsheviks still preached that 
widespread proletarian revolution was imminent.  The rewritten commandments 
mirror both the changes of the past decades and the immediacy of the war.  Stalin 
looms large in the new version of these laws, directly (commandment #1) and 
indirectly, in references to a word “as strong as steel” and “nerves of steel” 
(commandments #4 and #6).  As in the pledge, the committee‟s desire to 
emphasize work ethic and vigorousness, patriotism, and accountability among 
children is apparent.  Compared with the commandments that served as the 
standard for two decades, there is a physicality to these new laws that is 
fascinating.  Far beyond simply being “healthy” and “robust,”  as listed in the 
earlier iteration, the new and improved Pioneer is to acquire “a sharp eye” and 
“muscles of iron” (commandment #6).  Even personality traits such as 
courageousness (commandment #5) and studiousness (commandment # 7) are 
assigned word-pictures that increase their masculinity or macho appeal.  
Knowledge is not just a tool, but a weapon.  Cowardice is not only discouraged, it 
is despised.  Honesty is not simply virtuous, it is a sign of potency and power.  
Tellingly, one of the proposed but discarded commandments read, “The Pioneer is 
a faithful and sensitive comrade.”6  The committee was not concerned about 
                                                 
6
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 60.  Though it is not a part of this project, a gendered 
reading of the Pioneer organization would be quite fruitful.  From its inception, the Pioneer 
135 
 
displaying the Pioneer‟s “soft side” or emotional well-being, but about his or her 
attitude toward tangible, physical contributions to the war effort.  Again, the 
objective was to raise the visibility and prestige of the Pioneer organization.  
Outward acts of heroism and sacrifice, whether small or large, were necessary to 
resuscitate the Pioneer image.  Introversion, acts of kindness, and emotional 
fitness would not aid the effort and were, therefore, expendable.   
 In order to balance the sometimes abstract commandments, the customs 
(obychai) of the Pioneers provided a list of daily behaviors children were 
expected to abide by.  This is the original list of customs (1923): 
 
1.  The Pioneer gets up early in the morning, washes hands, neck, and 
ears, brushes his teeth, bathes his body, and does gymnastics. 
2.  The Pioneer rises, drinks, eats, and works in fixed time and always 
knows today‟s date and what time it is. 
3.  The Pioneers value their time as well as others‟. 
4.  The Pioneers write and speak concisely.  They know that 
loquaciousness is a sign of idleness. 
5.  The Pioneers all do their best.  They know how to work in any 
conditions, to discover an outlet for all circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                     
organization used language that could be construed as more masculine than feminine, though 
during the war, it becomes increasingly so. 
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6.  The Pioneer should work with an axe, chisel, hammer, plane, and know 
how to turn on and turn off motors.   
7.  The Pioneer is thrifty with social property.  He uses books carefully, 
equipment skillfully, and clothing appropriately. 
8.  Pioneers guard the health of the others;  they practice cleanliness, don‟t 
litter, and don‟t spit on the floor. 
9.  Pioneers don‟t smoke and don‟t drink (wine and tobacco are poison). 
10.  Pioneers don‟t curse.  Cursing is either a slave or a master. 
11.  Pioneers don‟t put their hands in their pockets, it is a harmful habit. 
12.  A pioneer has bright eyes and fine hearing.  He attentively listens and 
precisely takes notes. 
13.  Pioneers work together, helping each other, working collectively, 
quicker and better than working alone. 
14.  Pioneers always remember these rules and customs.  Without these it 
is impossible to be a real Pioneer.
7
 
 
The customs differ from the commandments in that they demonstrate how the 
adults who directed the Pioneer organization believed children ought to act.  The 
commandments convey ideal personality traits or values while the customs 
explain ideal behavior.  These original customs, for the most part, tend to focus on 
                                                 
7
 TsKhDMO, TsK VLKSM f. 1, op. 3, d. 8, l. 58, in TsKhDMO, Molodezhnoe dvizhenie, 
21-22. 
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what might be considered proper etiquette, especially in light of the prohibition on 
“uncivilized” habits such as spitting, cursing, or personal hygiene.  They are 
indicative of a desire to lionize working class skills while simultaneously 
attempting to improve or transform working class behavior, manners, and 
attitudes.  In this sense, the commandments are reflective of the NEP era and its 
sometimes ambivalent, uncertain attitude towards workers, the bourgeoisie, and 
social change. 
 The much expanded and much updated list of customs promulgated in 
September 1942 by the committee reflects the perceived crisis within the Young 
Pioneer organization: 
 
1.  Pioneers tirelessly prepare to defend the Motherland.  They are hardy, 
do physical exercises every morning, and participate in sports.  They learn 
to walk fast, run, belly-crawl, swim, ski, camouflage themselves, dig in, 
and administer first aid. 
2.  Pioneers honorably carry out their primary duty to the Motherland – 
they receive only “good” and “excellent” grades at school.  The book is a 
Pioneer‟s great friend.  Every day, Pioneers read books, newspapers, and 
magazines. 
3.  Pioneers train to weather hardships beginning at a young age.  They 
love work and are not afraid of menial labor.  They can take care of 
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themselves.  They can mend clothing, repair shoes, and cook a meal.  
They know how to light a fire in any weather, find their way by the sun 
and the stars, distinguish animals‟ tracks, and use a compass and maps.  
They are not disheartened by difficult circumstances, and do not become 
discouraged in the face of obstacles. 
4.  Pioneers set the standard in discipline.  They are never late and are 
always neatly dressed and groomed.  They value their own time and that 
of others, never put off until tomorrow what they can do today, and always 
finish what they have started. 
5.  Pioneers respect elders and always protect younger children.  They help 
their families in any way they can.  They are always cheerful and polite to 
their elders. 
6.  Pioneers are devoted friends of the Red Army and Red Navy.  They 
take care of fighters‟ families, the wounded, and the invalids of the 
Patriotic War. 
7.  Pioneers are the initiators of new and useful undertakings, interesting 
things to do, and exciting games. 
8.  Pioneers value the people‟s property and help protect it. 
9.  Pioneers value the honor of the collective.  They know how to work 
together and rest collectively.  They will never permit the banner of their 
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troop or unit to become stained with an act of hooliganism, cowardice, 
dishonesty, or any other act unworthy of a Young Leninist-Stalinist.
8
 
 
The new customs, in the most straightforward of ways, capture the fears and 
hopes of the leaders of the Pioneer organization.  The complaints and charges 
about Pioneers raised by the Komsomol committee – laziness, boredom, ill-
naturedness, destructiveness, apathy, abusive behavior – are addressed in these 
customs, with the antithesis of each.  Wartime jobs for Pioneers permeate the list 
(customs #1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7);  these include military training, scholarship, household 
chores, survival skills, care for families of soldiers (i.e., the Timur movement), 
care for soldiers, and leadership among non-Pioneer children.  Children were 
drawn into participation in the war, even on the homefront, by encouragement 
from all Pioneer channels to engage in military training.  Pioner ran regular 
features illustrating and explaining physical exercises and skills that could be used 
in time of war.  One article, in late 1942, exhorts children to improve their ability 
to ski because of its use in military scouting.  Even throwing snowballs at a 
snowman takes on martial significance as training for accuracy in lobbing hand 
grenades.
9
  The radio program “Pioneer Dawn” ran daily programming that 
instructed children in the art of camouflage, tracking, scouting, and shooting.  
Military training exercises – running, putting on gas masks, antiaircraft defense, 
                                                 
8
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 61. Underlining is from the original document. 
9
 “‟Dzhigitovka‟ na lizhax,” Pioner 12 (December 1942), 33. 
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shooting – were incorporated into the school day.  While it may be appalling to 
think of children in such activities or roles, the reality is that Soviet children were 
bombarded with images from the war.  Such military training might have been 
appealing to many children, and certainly helped to combat the perception that 
Pioneers did nothing, or worse, only boring things.   
 While ostensibly upholding the ideal of collectivism (custom #9), these 
customs promote a great degree of self-sufficiency among Pioneers.  It was 
common knowledge that parents were largely absent in many children‟s lives – 
fathers at the front, mothers at the factory or farm – so survival skills and 
knowledge of household skills (custom # 3) were considered paramount.  In 
addition, Pioneer leaders were known to be in short supply, hence the directive 
that good Pioneers could entertain themselves and other children (custom #7), 
included perhaps to alleviate some of the Komsomol‟s responsibility for the 
Pioneer organization‟s egregious shortcomings in the leadership department.   
 The final custom places the burden of fixing the observed shortcomings 
squarely on the shoulders of the Pioneers themselves.  Indicative of the new 
Pioneer commandment, “The Pioneer is an example for all children” 
(commandment #10), Pioneers are challenged to uphold the honor of the 
organization by avoiding any actions which might reflect poorly on the 
organization, such as hooliganism, cowardice, or other “unworthy” actions.  The 
new, revived Pioneer organization had no room for thugs, opportunists, or 
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deadbeats, but neither did the committee want sissified prigs or incompetent 
know-it-alls.  The committee was attempting to convey a delicate balance 
between pride and arrogance, work and study, individualism and collectivism, 
independence and responsibility, all in the context of a struggle for the nation‟s – 
and an organization‟s – existence. 
 
Qualities of Heroism for Pioneers 
 Once the Pioneer leadership in the Komsomol had decided what qualities 
a Pioneer ought to possess, this message had to be distributed to its primary 
audience – Soviet children.  Ideally, they would encounter the newly-modified 
pledge, commandments, and customs of the Pioneer organization in link, troop, 
and detachment meetings, but to reach even more kids, the organization used 
various children‟s media to disseminate their expectations.  The Pioneer 
leadership recognized the usefulness of the hero, having had enormous success 
with the Pavlik Morozov canonization in the 1930s, and hoped that the tactic 
would work again in the 1940s.  Building on the supposition that “what captivates 
the children more than anything else these days is an immense interest in the 
heroism of our fighters,” the organization launched an intentional campaign to 
mold and refine the definition of heroism for children across the Soviet Union.
10
 
                                                 
10
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 2.  
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Definitions of the heroic most commonly appeared in narrative or visual 
rather than pedantic form.  Anecdotes recounting the actions of various types of 
heroes pack the pages of the Pioneer newspaper, Pionerskaia Pravda (Pioneer 
Truth), the transcripts of the organization‟s radio program, “Pionerskaia Zor‟ka” 
(“Pioneer Dawn”), and the contents of two children‟s magazines published by the 
Komsomol, Pioner (Pioneer) and Murzilka.
11
  Pionerskaia Pravda was the 
primary press organ of the Young Pioneers.  The Pioneers first put the paper out 
in 1925.  In the 1920s and 1930s it was published semi-weekly, although it came 
out only sporadically during the war.  While it was not the only program 
dedicated to an audience of children – the two hours of scheduled childrens‟ 
programming also included music, literature, current events, and a game show 
(“Try to Guess!”) designed to teach military concepts – “Pionerskaia Zor‟ka,” 
according to one scholar, was the only daily radio newspaper in the country.
12
  
While precise listenership among children is impossible to ascertain, it is 
                                                 
 
11
 The introduction to the archival fond which contains transcripts of Pionerskaia zor‟ka 
or Pioneer Dawn states that the program was broadcast four times a week, but the date of the 
actual transcripts and broadcasts indicate that the show was broadcast daily on Radio Moscow – 
the most powerful domestic and international broadcasting station in the Soviet Union at the time 
– with sporadic days off, beginning in October of 1941. This dissertation draws from a sample of 
over eighty transcripts of Pioneer Dawn dated October 1941 to June 1945.  Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. R-6903, op. 16, introductory note.  Gosudarstvennnyi Arkhiv 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii hereafter cited as GA RF.  Pionerskaia Pravda hereafter cited as PP. As the 
title Pravda is common usage in English, I have chosen to retain the transliterated title of 
Pionerskaia Pravda for use in this dissertation.  Though fifteen Pioneer children‟s magazines were 
published prior to the war, only three were published during the war:  Pioner, Murzilka, and 
Druzhniye Rebiata. Issues published between January 1941 and January 1946 of Pioner and 
Murzilka are used in this dissertation. 
12
 Pavel Semenovich Gurevich and Vsevolod Nikolaevich Rushnikov, Sovetskoe 
radioveshchanie: Stranitsy istori (Moskva: Iskusstvo, 1976), 205-207. 
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important to note that broadcast radio was the leading source of firsthand news in 
the Soviet Union during the war.  The state knew that it was the most far-reaching 
medium it possessed, making broadcasting technology and radio workers 
protected assets during the early days of the war and evacuation.  By early 1943, 
radio broadcasting was up to its prewar signal strength.
13
  Childrens‟ magazine 
publication dropped dramatically during the war, from fifteen titles in the prewar 
period to three between 1941 and 1946.  Pioner, a magazine aimed at Pioneer-age 
children, and Murzilka, a magazine for young children, had been around since the 
1920s, and provide additional sources for the examination of stories and, 
particularly, visual images.  Both magazines are illustrated with a wealth of 
drawings, both professional and child-generated.  Contents of each typically 
included serial stories, poems, war-related science articles, tales from Russia‟s 
history, and instructional pieces on physical culture, games, and, occasionally, art.  
Other sources of heroic narrative include curriculum suggested by the Pioneer 
leadership and Pioneer handbooks published during the war.  As models for 
children, the heroes chosen by the state were carefully constructed to deliver 
approved ideas about ideal behaviors and motivations.   
The following is a story from “Pioneer Dawn,” broadcast in 1942. 
 
                                                 
13
 James von Geldern, “Radio Moscow: The Voice form the Center,” in Richard Stites, 
ed., Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1995), 44-45, 58-59. 
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The village where Shura Yanokov lives is located far 
behind the line of the front – in Kirovskaia oblast.  Shura studies in 
the fourth grade.  He is going to take finals for the first time in his 
life. Even last fall he spoke about it with his father. 
“Shura, when you start going to fifth grade, we will 
celebrate that day,” said his father. 
But Shura will not be able to celebrate this significant day.  
His father left for the front to defend the motherland.   
Now is a very important time on the collective farm, just 
like in schools. They have started to sow.  Schoolchildren help the 
farm.  Shura also works in the fields.  But he is not behind in his 
school work.  Here‟s what he writes: 
“I work at the collective farm on Sundays and also after 
school.  But my school work doesn‟t suffer from it.  I organize my 
day in the following way: come home from school, have lunch, do 
my homework, review the material which I learned that day, and 
then go to work. 
Now my father is in a hospital.  When I take my finals, I 
will write him a long letter, telling him what they asked me and 
what I answered.  I will be answering well so that father can be 
proud of my grades and can get well soon . . . 
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A man always has enough time when he knows how to use 
it.  Organize yourself, and then you will find time to do physical 
exercises and military practice every day.”14 
 
 The state‟s proposed heroes contribute to the war effort in any way 
possible.  Specifically, heroes work.  In this narrative, Shura, though not subject to 
the horrors of frontline warfare, has suffered in a fashion familiar to many 
children.  His father has gone to the front and is unable to mark special childhood 
occasions with him.  His daily schedule has been disrupted by the war.  Work on 
the local collective farm shares time with school and daily military preparedness 
training.  Note that there is no time for play in Shura‟s day.  He uncomplainingly 
preaches the value of time management to other children.   
 Other stories echo this emphasis on work.  Fifth grader Zhenya Geras‟kin 
was praised for balancing his school work with four hours of daily work at a 
welding shop.
15
  Eight students ranging in age from eight to fourteen were marked 
to be recognized because each had contributed more than four hundred workdays 
to the war effort in 1942.
16
  A mandatory minimum of fifty workdays per year had 
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 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 9, l. 330-331.  If Shura is in fourth-fifth grade, he is 
probably about ten years old. 
 
15
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 18, l. 1. 
 
16
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 154.  Of the eight, seven are boys.  Four are from 
various oblasts in European Russia; of the other four, two are from Primorskii Krai (at the juncture 
of Russia, China, and Korea), one from the Chuvash ASSR, and one from Kazakh SSR.  A 
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already been established by Sovnarkom for collective farm residents twelve to 
sixteen, so overachievers‟ statistics were constantly trumpeted.17  Frequently 
groups of school children or Pioneer troops were recognized for raising animals, 
caring for soldiers in hospitals, collecting metal scraps and medicinal plants, and 
digging defensive trenches. A January 1942 “Pioneer Dawn” broadcaster 
harangued: “Children! . . . What are you doing?  How are you helping to destroy 
the Hitler-following bandits?  How are you helping the motherland which is 
wounded by the brutal beast?  Maybe are you sitting, doing nothing, and waiting 
for the victory?  Eating, sleeping, partying, thinking only about your own benefit 
and about your life?”18 
 Concern that children lacked a strong work ethic or were somehow 
deficient in the desire to work is suggested repeatedly in Young Pioneer internal 
documents.  In the Komsomol Central Committee, leaders worried that “children 
have nothing to do,” that “none of the children would help” those in need, and, 
worst of all, that some children refused to work or obey adults.
19
  The Young 
Pioneers even published a handbook in 1942 designed to “get children interested 
in working,” a sort of how-to book for kids on  household chores such as cooking, 
                                                                                                                                     
completion of six workdays.  Less clear (to me, anyway) is the system of compensation for 
workdays.  Memoirs suggest that some workdays were compensated with extra pay or rations 
while others were strictly volunteer work. 
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sewing, home repair, and cleaning.
20
  As mentioned above, the newly-propagated 
Pioneer pledge emphasized work as a key component of the Pioneer experience, 
and the rewriting of the Pioneer commandments in 1942 had addressed work ethic 
similarly:  “The Pioneer is not a sissy.  He is hard-working.”21   
 It seems clear that the state expected children to contribute to the war 
effort through labor.  The jobs they could be expected to perform were numerous 
and their participation essential.
22
  The message dominated the children‟s press.  
Headlines from Pionerskaia Pravda in the summer of 1943 include “Go to War 
with Weeds!”, “Pioneers in the Fields”, and “How We Work.”23  Even the annual 
issue, usually dedicated to end-of-year school exams and well wishes for summer 
vacation, included an article in 1943 entitled, “The Soldiers Await Your Help” 
within a full-page spread commanding Pioneers and schoolchildren to collect 
medicinal plants and berries for the front.
24
   The magazine Pioner ran monthly 
features detailing and instructing children in various agricultural tasks, child care, 
and domestic skills such as food preservation.
25
 Even Murzilka, the magazine 
whose audience was young children, clearly dictated this expectation.  Whereas 
cover illustrations prior to the war commonly depict folk tales, children playing, 
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or nature scenes, cover illustrations during the war show young children engaged 
in labor.  A 1942 cover shows children engaged in the task of rebuilding and 
repairing a building. A young girl in the foreground paints a window frame, while 
a boy carries lumber; another boy is repairing a roof as another climbs a ladder to 
hammer a nail.
26
  Though the tasks might vary, the expectation remained clear: 
heroes are supposed to work. 
A second story, also broadcast via radio on “Pioneer Dawn”: 
 
Drunken German officers dragged Tatiana Ivanovna, a 
teacher, out into the street.  The young woman was losing 
consciousness; . . . [her] face swelled and became purple.  Her red 
dress was torn, breasts exposed, and her neck and shoulders were 
covered in blood. . . .  
They tortured the teacher for a long time, but she did not 
tell them anything and she refused to lead them to the partisans‟ 
camp.   
Tatiana Ivanovna was a colonel‟s daughter; her father was 
fighting in the South front.  She died without fear and with dignity, 
as a daughter of a Soviet soldier, as heroes die. 
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The Germans hung the dead teacher on an old tree by the 
school.  The lightweight body stretched and turned towards the 
village as if the girl wanted to say good-bye to the world for which 
she died.  
Schoolchildren who ran from all over the village gathered 
around . . . Silently, they watched the executioners . . . the hearts of 
the children were burning with a very adult-like, fierce madness.  
Sharp pain penetrated their innocent children‟s souls – she was 
their favorite teacher. 
Tatiana Ivanovna was always with the children.  She knew 
many interesting tales and stories . . . She taught children to hate 
everyone who wanted to enslave the Russian people.   
How enraged she was when the Germans stepped onto 
Soviet land! Those dishonorable killers wanted to deprive us of 
freedom and happiness.  Fascist troops brought oppression, slavery 
and death . . . . 
Among the children, one girl stood out;  she was strong, 
wearing a sailor‟s hat and boyish clothes.  Her fast, darting eyes 
were full of rage.  Saying good-bye to her friends, she shook their 
hands like an adult and pointing her head towards the Germans she 
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said angrily:  “Watch them. . .  if you find anything, hide it: we are 
not little, we will fight.”  
Then she added, implying many things, adult-like: “We 
will avenge Tatiana Ivanovna! We will never forget!”27 
 
 At least two dominant messages about Soviet heroism are revealed in this 
astonishing story.  First, heroes die.  The values of self-sacrifice and intense 
loyalty are certainly not unique to the Soviet experience; they are common to 
most belligerent countries.   The honorable death of heroes – soldiers, partisans, 
parents, teachers, children – is characteristic of narratives for children throughout 
the war.  In this story, a beloved teacher displays bravery by refusing to provide 
information to the Germans and dies a public, but heroic, death.  Her death has 
meaning – she protects the local partisan movement – and purpose, as it provides 
her students with an essential example.  As the daughter of a Red Army officer, 
she upholds not only her family name, but the honor of her nation with her final 
actions.  Her torture, strangulation, and execution are described in graphic detail, 
in language usually considered inappropriate for children.  The passage, and 
others like it, reflect the wartime intensification of rhetoric evident in the 
rewritten Pioneer pledge, commandments, and customs.  
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In the story, the teacher‟s execution inspires her students.  Their hearts 
burn with “madness,” having seen with their own eyes the confirmation of all the 
teacher‟s ideas about the Nazis. To the Pioneer leadership, purposeless death was 
a useless standard of behavior.  All the sacrifices depicted in Pioneer narratives 
glorify the national effort in the war in some way.  In a letter published in Pioneer 
Pravda, “Teacher-Hero,” a soldier at the front writes to some students, recounting 
the bravery and “glorious death” of the students‟ former teacher.  He exhorts them 
to remember their teacher fondly, always keeping in mind that he died for the 
motherland.
28
  The lead illustration in a Pioner article titled “Partisan Tanya,” an 
account of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya‟s martyrdom at the hands of the Germans, 
is a close-up of Zoya‟s dead, slightly bloated face, with the noose still wrapped 
around her neck and her hair blowing in the wind.  The author exhorts children to 
sacrifice themselves – literally, to die – “as she did.”29 
Children could also die heroically:  another story, this from a “Pioneer 
Dawn” broadcast, relays that  
 
Soviet children, if captured by the paws of the fascist executioners, 
are being very brave and proud.  In fascist-occupied Lieza, a German 
officer demanded a little twelve-year-old girl show him the location of the 
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farm‟s animals.  Nura refused to answer him.  She was shot.  Forever 
remember and glorify Nura Drozdova – a young hero of our country.30   
 
However contrived these stories of heroism might have been, the horrors 
of war were real.  In the first desperate years of the war, millions of children lived 
in occupied territory and could into contact with the enemy at any time.   Rather 
than sugar-coating reality for its young audience, however, the state preferred to 
exploit it – perhaps to build patriotism, perhaps to excuse its own atrocities.  
Many nations, the Soviet Union included, used images of children as victims of 
war to build adult support for national war efforts.
31
  What is rather shocking here 
is that the Soviet state used narratives about torture and death – even of children –  
for children.   
Repeatedly, Young Pioneer radio emphasized that while annihilating the 
population of occupied villages and cities, the Germans “[were] killing the 
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children with special pleasure.”32  The same story recounted the shooting of a six-
year-old and a twelve-year-old, and the bombing of the local Pioneer Palace.  A 
“Pioneer Dawn” program from 1941 warned that invading Germans were seizing 
“young virgins” to molest.33  A 1943 “Pioneer Dawn” broadcaster read a letter 
that sent New Year‟s greetings from orphans hiding out behind frontlines to 
listeners:  “Kolia, the littlest, is a partisan on our team.  His heart is full of burning 
hatred for the German perverts.  He remembers how the fascists drowned his 
mother and sister in a river. . . .”34  A poem, ostensibly submitted by schoolboy 
Sergei Baruschin, concluded: “We are remembering atrocities in Minsk and 
L‟vov, / Where we will drag a fascist flag. / For the mountains of corpses, for the 
rivers of blood, / The cruel enemy will soon answer.”35   In a story entitled “In An 
Animal‟s Tracks,” the “Pioneer Dawn” broadcaster recounts the pillaging of the 
Ukrainian village of Shtepovka, using the words of village children to help 
recreate the Nazi invasion.  Leaving very little to the imagination of the young 
listeners, the broadcaster explains how the Germans burned homes, the library, a 
nursery, and barns, stole money, slaughtered livestock, beat and killed villagers, 
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and raped girls.  An excerpt from the story, to illustrate the brutal candor the state 
considered appropriate for children: 
 
A frightening scene took place in the house of a farm worker 
Smirnov from a neighboring settlement S.  Fascists grabbed his wife, and 
when Smirnov tried to take her out of the hands of the Germans, they shot 
him, and cut the wife‟s head off.  In another settlement, the Germans beat 
a seventy-year-old Ivan S., and shot his invalid daughter. . . . The Fascists 
were going from house to house demanding that the parents show them 
where they hid their daughters. In front of fathers and mothers, they used 
the daughters;  in front of children, they used their mothers.  A German 
officer ran down the street to catch a twelve-year-old girl and when he 
caught her, he dragged her into a shed.
36
 
 
 The second dominant message in the Tatiana Ivanovna narrative recounted 
above is that heroes despise the enemy.  The martyred teacher is lauded for her 
hatred of the enemy and for passing that hostility towards the “dishonorable 
killers” on to her pupils.  One of her small, enraged protégés speaks ardently in 
favor of revenge (apparently a good thing) after witnessing Ivanovna‟s execution.  
For children, messages about the enemy were made crystal clear:  to passionately 
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hate the Germans was, indeed, admirable.  The Germans were given hundreds of 
labels by the Pioneer press: fascist beasts, snakes, wolves, blood suckers, slayers, 
cannibals, Hitlerite bandits, bloodthirsty killers, to name a few.
37
  The magazine 
Pioner consistently uses the derogatory term “fritz” in stories involving the 
enemy.  A drawing by eleven-year-old Eduard Motkina, published in Murzilka, 
depicts German soldiers in various stages of dying, retreating at Stalingrad.  Some 
of the cartoon-like figures have been blown up by mines while others appear to be 
shot.
38
  Though the Soviets were part of an alliance opposing the Axis Powers, of 
which there were at least ten major and minor nations, only Germans were vilified 
in Pioneer media.  No other enemy is mentioned, although in the story above, 
Ivanovna‟s belligerence could theoretically – and conveniently – extend to anyone 
who “wanted to enslave the Russian people.”  Fascism is never defined;  children 
were to equate “fascism” with “evil” by example – and the Pioneers provided 
plenty of examples of German atrocities. 
It is notable that the child-hero in the Ivanovna story is a girl – despite her 
boyish appearance.  There was concern in Pioneer leadership that girls “must be 
involved to a greater extent in sabotage and subversive activities” against the 
Germans.
39
  The Pioneer organization and Narkompros may have been working at 
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cross-purposes here, or at least, sending mixed messages to girls of Pioneer age.  
As stated in Chapter Two, in 1943, coeducational schooling was ended in order to 
provide gender-specific skills, military training for boys and home and family life 
skills for girls.  All stories of frontline soldiers broadcast on “Pioneer Dawn” had 
male main characters.  Soldiers were very often referred to as “our brother and 
fathers” – never as mothers or sisters, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had 
more women in combat during the Great Patriotic War than any other country and 
that fascist ideology supported exactly the kind of traditional female role being 
indirectly advocated by the Soviet state.
40
  The gender messages on “Pioneer 
Dawn” can be viewed as another sign of the Stalinist retreat on women‟s issues 
and supports the idea that placing women in combat was merely a “temporary 
measure” of gender equality not intended to fundamentally change gender roles.41 
The inconsistency is indicative of the ambivalence the Soviet state felt 
about the place of women in society. Attempts at reconciling these ideas were 
made, though sometimes with unintentionally comical results.  Antonina Petrova, 
“girl guerrilla fighter” in a partisan troop from the Leningrad region was 
described as a “stalwart fighter” and “splendid scout” who “spent her brief leisure 
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moments in serving the personal needs of the men,” mending, washing, darning 
socks, and cooking.  Petrova was named Hero of the Soviet Union, posthumously, 
for killing not only herself, but also a fellow partisan who basely surrendered once 
Germans overran their camp.
42
  Maybe the two worlds of ideal femininity could 
come together.  
This ambivalence did not extend to attitudes towards the Nazis, and 
children were encouraged to join the state‟s hate-mongering.  Rather than 
shielding children from violence and hate, the state nurtured it and fed it.  Topics 
approved for discussion with schoolchildren in Pioneer meetings included 
“German atrocities” and “why the fascists should be stopped.”43  One Pioneer 
leader claimed, “We need to bring up a child in such a way that when a 
conversation is about fascists, he runs to get a knife.”44  In the effort to update the 
Young Pioneers, the Komsomol stated that “The most important goal of the 
Pioneer organization must be raising the Pioneers in the spirit of deep devotion to 
their people and the Bolshevik Party and passionate hatred for the enemies of the 
motherland, the German fascists. . .”45  Sometime during the war, a special 
wartime humor section was added to Pioneer Pravda.  The jokes typically played 
up the alleged cowardice and stupidity of the Germans.  Most disturbing, 
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however, is the cartoon‟s heading:  the phrase “Na Shtyke” (literally, “On A 
Bayonet”; figuratively, “Skewered”) with a cartoon figure of an obviously-
deceased, mangled, German soldier impaled by a bayonet.
46
   Apparently, nothing 
should be funnier to children than a dead Nazi – or so the Pioneer leadership 
attempted to convey. For the state, intense hatred for the enemy was inextricably 
linked with patriotism and loyalty. 
One final story, from a Pioneer handbook published in 1944: 
 
The following story took place in a Ukrainian village in the 
fall of 1941.  A German soldier broke into the house of Galia 
Dotsenko, a Pioneer.  He began rummaging through the things on 
the shelves, in drawers, closets and trunks. 
   Galia was holding her school bookbag. 
The German approached her . . . and began taking 
everything out . . . suddenly, it was as if the German was scorched 
by a flame.  A new Pioneer tie fell out of the bag. 
“Klein Kommunist!” yelled the infuriated German, 
grabbing the tie.  He threw it  on the floor and trampled it with his 
feet. 
   Galia sprang on the fascist. 
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 “Why are you trampling my Pioneer tie?” she screamed, 
and she pushed the German as hard as she could. . . . She snatched 
her tie from under the German‟s feet, ran out of the house, and 
headed for the forest.  She heard shouts and assault rifle fire behind 
her, but she managed to hide from the pursuers in the woods. 
Galia spent the next two years with a guerrilla unit.  In 
October 1943, the Red Army liberated her village from the 
German invaders.  Now Galia goes to school again, and a Pioneer 
tie glows red on her neck – the same tie that she tore away from a 
German bandit‟s hands in the fall of 1941.47 
 
The state‟s heroes are Pioneers – and by extension, Soviet.  This Pionerka 
displays laudable contempt for the German enemy and admirable horror for the 
abuse of her piece of the revolutionary flag, her Pioneer tie.  Note, too, that by 
attacking the German soldier to rescue her tie, Galia risks her life.  She then 
completes the heroic narrative by fighting with partisans, working in her own 
way, for the remainder of the war in her region.   
Though stories about Pioneers run throughout the war, child heroes 
become more and more consciously “Young Pioneer” beginning in late 1942.  
This coincides with the attempt by the Pioneer organization to resurrect the image 
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of the Young Pioneers.  Pioneer links, troops, and detachments were challenged to 
cooperatively achieve for the motherland, often by other links, troops, or brigades.  
Heroes of children, such as the popular martyr Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, were 
linked with their Pioneer “roots.”  Though Zoya was a Komsomolka when she 
committed her acts of defiance toward the Germans, she is repeatedly identified 
as a role model for Pioneers and commended for her activities as a Pioneer.
48
    
Individuals with noteworthy accomplishments in Pioneer Pravda, for example, 
are almost always identified by region, school, and Pioneer troop or simply 
labeled “Pioneer Ivan Ivanovich.”  In fact, only rarely are such examples not 
identified as Pioneers. Whether or not a child-hero actually belonged to the 
Pioneer organization was immaterial.  At least one scholar claims that Pioneer 
Hero #1, Pavlik Morozov, could not possibly have been a Pioneer, as the 
organization did not exist in his village, yet he was and continues to be 
inextricably linked to the red scarf of the Pioneers.  The organization had 
fabricated or exaggerated membership facts prior to the war with good results, 
and there is no reason to believe that this practice would have ceased in wartime. 
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 These messages about heroism are significant because they communicate 
the values, desires, and expectations of the Soviet state for Soviet children.  That 
the state should recognize and reward those who vilify the enemy and live only to 
see his demise during wartime is not very surprising.  That the state should hold 
up for emulation those individuals who contribute mightily to the war effort on 
the homefront – again, not surprising.  Heroes chosen by the state for children to 
emulate displayed loyalty, courage, dedication, and grew more and more 
consciously Soviet by war‟s end to save a floundering Pioneer organization.  In 
fact, characteristics of heroes for Soviet children are identical to those of society-
wide heroes.  And this is chilling:  there is absolutely no concession for age in the 
state‟s expectations.   
The Soviet state expected its children to act like adults in this war.  Note 
that in the Tatiana Ivanovna narrative, the children who witness the death of their 
teacher suffer “adult-like” emotions, and the young avenger in the story shakes 
hands “like an adult.”   There was no debate within the Pioneer organization about 
whether or not to expose children to the grim realities of war as there had been 
within Russian pedagogy during the First World War.
49
  There was no attempt to 
protect children from the reality of violence, death, hatred, disease, or scarcity that 
they may experience, either in the present or the future.   Even the magazine that 
targeted the youngest audience, Murzilka, interspersed tales such as “The Three 
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Bears” with stories written by a frontline war correspondent.50  Clearly, the fact 
that much of the land war played out inside the Soviet Union contributed to this 
decision to rush children into adulthood.  It also played into the Pioneer 
organization‟s plans to resuscitate the children‟s movement by co-opting and 
claiming selected wartime experiences of children as its own.  Further, it is 
reflective of Soviet messages, in general, to the population during the Great 
Patriotic War.  As Lisa Kirschenbaum so aptly states, “To a degree unmatched 
elsewhere, Soviet wartime propaganda reflected and envisioned a catastrophic 
rupture in the normal world.”51  According to the narrative, the experience of Nazi 
cruelty “penetrated the innocent souls” of the children, an experience probably 
played out in quite a few locations in occupied territory.  But, if encountering war 
and its atrocities caused the loss of childhood for some, the Soviet state‟s decision 
extended this involuntary loss of innocence to millions of other children through 
the messages of the Pioneer organization. 
In so doing, the Young Pioneer organization contested the one-
dimensional image of the child – the child as victim – which dominated state 
propaganda aimed at adults.    As mentioned above, images of children in Soviet 
visual propaganda implied that the protection of children was a prime reason for 
defending the motherland and destroying the enemy.  In poster after poster, 
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photograph after photograph, sketch after sketch, Soviet children are depicted as 
victims of Nazi brutality – as corpses, as prisoners, as orphans, as homeless, and 
so on.  This straightforward, uncomplicated image of the Soviet child had a clear 
purpose for adults:  to arouse the defensive, compassionate, perhaps outraged, 
instincts in the viewer, in order to further support for the war.  This message was 
not meant for children;  they were merely passive objects in a state propaganda 
campaign.  The Young Pioneers, however, could not be satisfied with this single-
faceted image because it undermined their own goals for the revival of the 
organization.   
The Pioneers did not repudiate the state‟s primary message.  According to 
the Komsomol leadership, experience had shown that children, as well as adults, 
could be inspired by images or narratives about youthful victims.  Based on 
examples like those described earlier in this chapter, Pioneer media regularly used 
narratives for children which portrayed children as victims of Nazi atrocities.  
Instead of rejecting the characterization itself, the organization rejected it as the 
only characterization.  The revitalization of the Young Pioneers‟ reputation was 
dependent on the image of the active, contributing, sacrificial child.  While the 
child-as-victim paradigm was useful for motivational purposes and emotional 
appeal, it was too passive for the Pioneers‟ objective.  The Pioneer organization 
needed to lead, not to mourn; it needed to cultivate agents, not objects.  
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Thus, the Komsomol leadership sanctioned several more versions of the 
Soviet child in its media:  the hero-worker, the sacrificial hero, the Pioneer hero-
patriot, the hero-warrior.  In so doing, the organization expanded the image of the 
child exponentially.  Rather than a flat, faceless, inert victim, the child was 
recognized as having the agency to create, to contribute, to memorialize, to 
sacrifice, to labor.  Jeffrey Brooks argues that in the early years of the war, before 
the tide had turned and victory was more or less assured, state media such as 
Pravda conveyed “real” motivations – patriotism, anger, revenge, love of family, 
adventure – in individual accounts of war experiences, before the post-Stalingrad 
penchant of interpreting all positive actions as paeans to Stalin replaced such 
unmanageable, suspect sources of inspiration.
52
  The Pioneer organization shared 
none of this unease with its adult counterparts.  These emotions worked in favor 
of the Young Pioneers because, based on decisions made in the fall of 1942, they 
had co-opted these emotions as legitimate for Pioneer children.  Patriotism?  
Fantastic.  Anger toward the enemy and the desire for revenge?  Excellent.  Love 
of family? Fine.  Adventure and initiative?  Super, as long as it‟s directed toward 
contributing to the war.  All of these qualities had been incorporated into the 
heroic exempla disseminated by Pioneer media. With this move, the Young 
Pioneers transformed a problem for their organization – the conditions of war – 
into a solution for their revival.  Children were already responding to the war, in a 
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 Jeffrey Brooks, “Pravda Goes to War,” in Stites, Culture and Entertainment, 14-16. 
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variety of ways;  the Pioneers simply needed “an in” to this ad hoc children‟s 
movement.  By presenting qualities and characteristics children were already 
displaying as a result of the war as worthy of emulation and Pioneer-like, the 
organization could claim ownership and leadership of those qualities and 
characteristics.  This more complex picture of the Soviet child during the Great 
Patriotic War, as expressed through the heroic narratives of the Pioneer 
organization, was a good bit closer to reality than the image presented in state 
propaganda for adults.   Though it is not a complete representation – for obvious 
reasons, it ignores anything deemed negative or deviant – the Pioneer-supplied 
heroic archetypes are more dynamic and helpful for understanding the various 
roles the child was expected to play as well as those that children genuinely 
embraced. 
 Though this project is not about reception, there is at least preliminary 
evidence that much of this heroic idealization was internalized and adopted by 
Soviet children.  As several former students of Moscow‟s School No. 25 
explained to historian Larry Holmes, “„Propaganda gave meaning to our lives.‟ . . 
. . „We lived in a cult of the exceptional.‟”53  Accordingly, the rhetoric of the state 
was used regularly by children who wrote or contributed to Pioneer publications 
and organizations during the war.  Without doubt, children voluntarily served 
                                                 
53
 Larry E. Holmes, “Part of History: The Oral Record and Moscow‟s Model School,” 
Slavic Review 56, 2 (1997): 297.  These former students, interviewed as adults, were reflecting on 
their student life in the 1930s, but agree that this genuine belief and inspiration they found in 
communism – and Stalin, to lesser or greater degrees – lasted until his death in 1953. 
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with partisan or Red Army forces.  It has been suggested that postwar youth 
political opposition, critical of careerism and indifference in the Komsomol, 
expressed itself in the language and ideals of the Party
54
 – a model of heroism and 
self-sacrifice first disseminated to children during the war.  Even childhood 
memories of the war were influenced by the Party‟s messages about proper 
heroism.
55
   
 Whether or not these definitions of heroism were internalized by Soviet 
children, they reflect an expectation of behavior by the Soviet state.  Heroes were 
to work, die, hate the enemy, and love the Party, all to save the motherland.  
Forced to confront the realities of war, children were expected to act as adults, 
sacrificing their childhood to the war effort – a childhood lost, both to war and to 
wartime policies of the Soviet state. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHAT DOES A PIONEER DO?:  WARTIME TASKS FOR CHILDREN 
You tell every father at the front, 
That we will take care of business here. 
In the farm‟s field, 
In the housekeeping, 
Well, where we can be, we‟ll be. . .  
from “To Fathers, Going to the Front,” V. Bil‟chinskii, student, 19411 
 
 Above all else, in order to regain visibility and social currency, the Young 
Pioneers had to get active.  For over a year, the organization had been almost 
mute about the role of children in conditions of war.  In the fall of 1942, the 
Komsomol leadership of the Pioneers finally recognized the danger of this silence 
and took immediate steps to remedy it by unveiling a torrent of campaigns.  Aside 
from one significant exception, the Pioneers did not introduce any new 
responsibilities to the children it was trying to reach.  Children made contributions 
to the national cause throughout the course of the war, contributions that have 
been largely neglected in the story of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic 
War.  The Pioneer organization, however, had to reassert itself as leader of and 
inspirer of all children‟s activities in order to take credit for them.  Thus, the 
Pioneer organization dispatched a flurry of missives – via Pioneer media, 
detachment meetings, school curriculum, and so on –  exhorting “Pioneers and 
                                                 
1
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 3, l. 293.  Broadcast on “Pioneer Dawn” on 22 November 
1941. 
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schoolchildren” (“pioneri i shkol‟niki”) to do what they were, in large part, 
already doing.  Once the Young Pioneers endorsed children‟s activities, all of the 
positive, constructive efforts of Soviet children could be claimed by the 
organization, whether or not the fiery rhetoric of the Pioneer pledge was the 
original motivation.   
 
* * * 
 
Agricultural work 
Of all the tasks allotted to children, agricultural work was among the most 
important, and it is in this area that children made quite significant and 
underappreciated contributions to the Soviet effort.   Pioneers were to be 
encouraged to participate in agricultural work not only because of the dire labor 
shortage, but also because of its importance for their upbringing (vospitanie).
2
  
Spurred on by slogans such as “Our work is our attack on the fascists!” (“Nash 
trud – nash udar po fashistam!”), Pioneers joined millions of Soviet citizens 
attempting to keep farms and factories running during the war.  An average of 
five million Soviet children worked, each year, on collective and state farms, 
contributing over 760 million workdays (trudodnei) between 1941 and 1944.
3
  
                                                 
2
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, ll. 11-16. 
 
3
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 94, l. 13-14.  Trudodnei for 1941, 172,100,000; 1942, 
148,798,784; 1943, 197,492,432; 1944, 242,310,678.  Children working on farms in 1941, 
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While Sovnarkom and the Party‟s Central Committee had decreed that each 
twelve- to sixteen-year-old belonging to a kolkhoz (collective farm) family 
contribute a mandatory fifty workdays annually, it is evident from the figures and 
from anecdotal evidence that all sorts of Soviet children, urban and provincial, 
contributed far beyond this minimum requirement to agricultural work during the 
war.  Various reports suggest that the majority of schoolchildren did some kind of 
agricultural work throughout the school year and during vacations, and the 
memoirs of those who were children during the war bear this out.
4
 
The contribution of children to collective and state farm labor appears to 
have been quite significant.  A report to the Central Committee in the winter of 
1942-1943 claims that on some collective farms, children constituted as much as 
70 percent of the agricultural workforce.
5
  In Moskovskaia oblast alone, children 
made up 30 percent of collective and state farm labor.
6
  In Irbitskii raion, 
Sverdlovskaia oblast‟, the Party‟s District Committee concluded that 
                                                                                                                                     
1,550,600 (incomplete statistics); 1942, 4,765,107; 1943, 4.983,913; 1944, 5,858,698.  Based on 
rough estimates of approximately 20 million children of Pioneer age, this means that at any given 
time in the war, approximately a quarter of children were reported as participating in agricultural 
work.  A “workday” was measured in output.  For example, if harvesting two puds of grain was 
considered a day‟s work, then a child who harvested 12 puds in one day would be able to record 
completion of six workdays.   
4
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 17, l. 3.  This report to the Central Committee on the 
summer/fall of 1942 suggests that up to ninety percent of students were participating in 
agricultural work, though, to be fair, the report lists numbers as low as sixty-six percent.  On 
memoirs, see, for example, Goldberger, Stalin‟s Little Guest, 72;  Hautzig, The Endless Steppe, 
140; Winterton, Eye-witness, 11-12; Tobien, Dancing, 104. 
5
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 128-128 ob.  While most examples given estimate 
children were responsible for  30 percent to 50 percent of agricultural labor, the report states that 
“the students of Noshinskaia School (Krasnoiarskii Krai) performed 70 percent of all the 
agricultural work in the collective farm „Forepost‟.” 
 
6
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 17, l. 7-8. 
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schoolchildren performed at least half of the most important agricultural tasks 
there.
7
  Incomplete statistics for 1941 suggest that workdays by children 
accounted for about 5.6 percent of the total Soviet agricultural output that year.  
The highest contribution was 8.3 percent of total output in the Bashkir ASSR and 
the lowest, 1.8 percent, in Uzbekistan;  most reporting administrative units place 
the percentage of workdays attributable to children between six and eight 
percent.
8
  The number of children working on farms nearly quadrupled by 1944, 
so the implication is that children‟s output increased as well.  Even by simply 
doubling output (which I think is extremely conservative), that would make 
children responsible for over 10 percent of output on collective and state farms in 
the Soviet Union during the war. 
Agricultural work was done on collective farms, state farms, village 
communal plots, and urban gardens, and the jobs that children performed were 
varied and numerous.  Most of the tasks fall under the category of physical labor.  
They range from chores that sound, frankly, like busy work to occupy little hands 
to duties essential to the functioning of the farm.  Every year of the war, children 
harvested crops, transported manure and feed, aerated the soil, dug holes for food 
storage, collected ashes for use as fertilizer, cared for livestock, mowed, plowed, 
threshed wheat, baled hay, repaired fence and barn stalls, built granaries, 
                                                 
 
7
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 17, l. 7. 
8
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 123.  Only twenty republics, regions, or provinces 
reported statistics for this report.  
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sharpened scythes, operated heavy equipment such as combines and tractors, 
sowed various crops, chased birds away, and destroyed mice.
9
  Less helpful, 
perhaps, but nonetheless “socially useful” work included educational work on the 
collective farm – conducting newspaper readings, putting on plays for farm 
workers, holding talent shows, and distributing edifying leaflets.
10
  While the 
Pioneers would argue that this work, too, contributed to Soviet productivity, it is 
obviously immeasurable and thus debatable.   
Immediate, short-term needs for mass labor – such as harvest time – were 
addressed by the creation of national workdays called voskresnika.  These 
weekend workdays were held throughout the war.
11
  Well over two million 
Pioneers participated in the “Pioneer Front” Sunday-workday on December 22, 
1942, chopping over 74 million cubic meters of firewood for schools and families 
of front soldiers, collecting over four million tons of scrap metal, gathering over 
two million puds of corn and two million tons of other vegetables, distributing 
fifty tons of bread, collecting 297 tons of coal, and clearing about thirty thousand 
cubic meters of snow.
12
  These workdays were not without problems;  a report 
                                                 
9
 Astrakhantseva and Khorunzhii, Po obe storony fronta, ch. 1, 18-19; TsKhDMO f. 1, 
op. 7, d. 26, l. 26; TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 128; TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 142; 
TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 17, l. 12 – which also notes, oddly, that children collected grain from 
mouse burrows to add to grain collection; PP “Summer on the Collective Farm,” 2 June 1943, No. 
22 (2743), 3; PP “Schoolchildren Go to the Fields!” 9 June 1943, No. 23 (2744). 
10
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 26, l. 52; TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 17, l. 10. 
11
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 13. 
12
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 13, ll. 7-9.  Activities and accomplishments listed above are 
only a partial list. 
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from Ivanovskoi oblast states that no workdays were held in five regions because 
no leaders were available to direct activities.
13
   
Poor organization and coordination plagued agricultural work among 
children across the Soviet Union.  Various district and oblast‟ personnel 
complained bitterly about collective farms unwilling to accept help or assign 
meaningful tasks, provide for meals or housing of child workers, provide 
equipment for children, distribute record books, norms, or payment to children, 
and about the lack of enthusiasm by school personnel in leading and overseeing 
the work.  Children, too, could be less than enthusiastic about their tasks.
14
    This 
led to an effort by Komsomol Secretary N. Mikhailov to push through a 
Sovnarkom resolution forcing Narkompros and Narkomsovkolkhoz to more 
closely monitor the progress of and recognize the value of children‟s agricultural 
work.
15
 Accordingly, the People‟s Commissar of Agriculture (head of 
Narkomsovkolkhoz) recommended that Pioneers and schoolchildren spend, 
depending on age and type of work, between six and eight hours a day doing 
agricultural work, under proper supervision.
16
   
                                                 
13
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 13, ll. 21-22. 
 
14
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 129 ob., 131 ob.; RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 28.  In 
the same report to the CC, Komsomol secretary Mikhailov discusses many shortcomings in 
collective farm participation by children.  In some instances, children were given no instructions 
or were given useless tasks to keep them out of the way. (see l. 37-38)  In her memoir of 
experiences as a Polish exile in Russia, Janka Goldberger recalls being sent to a collective farm in 
Central Asia where “work” consisted of horseplay, napping, and occasionally hoeing weeds.  See 
Goldberger, Stalin‟s Little Guest. 
 
15
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 17-21. 
16
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 15, l. 40. 
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This signaled an enormous shift away from contemporary Soviet labor 
law.  Even with a relaxing of the Soviet labor code in July 1940, youth ages 
fourteen to sixteen were officially permitted to work only four hours a day, and 
even that only with the permission from the Trade Union.  Labor for children 
under fourteen was absolutely prohibited.
17
  A Supreme Soviet decree of October 
1940 allowed collective farms to draft two boys fourteen to fifteen years old per 
hundred workers for four years of service; again, by implication, children under 
fourteen were deemed too young for this sort of work.
18
  The Young Pioneers 
never made a strong case for factory work among children – though certainly 
some children labored in homefront industries
19
 – but by 1942, the Komsomol 
leadership agreed that, despite the labor laws, agricultural labor was appropriate 
for all Pioneer-aged children and advocated it regularly.  Students kept small 
copybooks in which they recorded the number of workdays (trudodnei) they 
completed.  Contests were held which rewarded students, schools, and teacher-
                                                 
17
 Anglo-Soviet Youth Friendship Alliance, Soviet Youth in Industry (London: Anglo-
Soviet Youth Friendship Alliance, 194?), 6. 
18
 Ibid., 9.  The same decree provides terms and ages for Trade Schools (in metallurgy, 
chemicals, mining, and oil production), Railway Schools, and Factory Training Schools.  The 
terms of service range from six months (the FTS) to two years.  Minimum age for the Trade 
School and Railway School was fourteen while the minimum for the FTS was sixteen. 
19
 B. Sergeev, who was a fourteen-turning-fifteen-year-old boy during the war, recounts 
his experience as a laborer making Katyushas at the “Kompressor” factory in Moscow:  “We were 
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http://www.vor.ru/55/55_b/ 55b_eng. html#9, accessed March 2005 (Moscow:  Voice of Russia, 
2000).  TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 14, ll. 1-4, states that 25,000 Pioneers took mechanics classes in 
order to learn to repair civilian machinery such as tractors or trucks.  See GA RF f. R-6903, op. 
16, d. 18, ll. 5-6 for an account of a Vologda girl who worked in a sewing factory. 
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leaders who contributed extraordinary amounts of work time in the fields.
20
   
Some children regularly worked in excess of their officially-permitted hours, one 
observer noting that some older children worked fifty-five to sixty hours a week.
21
  
Soviet labor law, especially in the early years of the war, was quietly ignored, as 
the need for workers outstripped prewar concerns about education or child labor.  
By the closing years of the war, the Young Pioneer organization was claiming the 
labor of children in agriculture as one of – if not the – most significant 
contributions of Soviet children to the home front. 
 
Collect-o-mania 
 The collection of various useful materials was a task common to children 
in most, if not all, belligerent nations in World War II.  Military needs, the vast 
numbers of people made homeless by evacuation or invasion, scarcity of supplies, 
all created the necessity for careful conservation and recycling of existing 
resources.  Young Pioneers and schoolchildren were exhorted by the Komsomol 
leadership to collect a wide variety of items.  As a job that even the youngest and 
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 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 17.  Exemplary students might have participated in excess of 
340 workdays (ll. 145-181) or exceeded the norm by 200 percent (l. 208).  An example of a 
student copybook of workdays is included in TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, ll. 56-61.  It records the 
daily journal of the 5
th
 class of School Number 52 in Tula. 
21
 Fay Caller, In Freedom‟s Cause: Soviet Youth at War (New York: New Age 
Publishers, Inc., 1943), 13.  Caller notes that this amount of work was against state regulations for 
child labor.  At least one source suggests that summer holidays were extended by one month 
during the war (June 1 to October 1, instead of September 1), in order to allow schoolchildren to 
work a longer period of time.  See Beatrice King, Soviet Children in Wartime (London: Russia 
Today Society, 1943), 12. 
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smallest of Pioneers could participate in and succeed in, it appears to have been 
incorporated into the daily life of most children. 
 Pioneers and schoolchildren were encouraged to collect recyclable 
materials, such as scrap metal and paper.  This encouragement often took the form 
of a challenge issued by a particular school or Pioneer detachment.  An open letter 
to all Pioneers daring them to collect paper – scraps, used copybooks, old 
newspapers and so on – reported that Moscow Girls‟ School Number 131 had 
collected two tons in the autumn of 1942.
22
  Scrap metal, according to the 
Pioneers, could be recycled into weapons and machinery, and children were urged 
to collect all they could find.  Young Pioneers of Priomor‟e pressed their fellow 
members to try and collect at least one hundred kilograms each.
23
  In response, 
Pioneers of Stalingrad collected 11.5 tons of scrap metal in 1943, those in 
Novosibirsk, six thousand tons in 1942-1943.
24
  One report asserts that Pioneers 
collected at least 134,000 tons of scrap metal during 1942, 1943, and 1944, an 
average of eighty kilograms per Pioneer.
25
   
To supplement the diet of front soldiers and provide them with home 
remedies considering the shortage of medicines, Pioneers were instructed to spend 
between three and four hours each day collecting medicinal plants, berries, 
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 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 111-112.  Other examples can be found in PP, “Mission 
Accomplished,” 4 August 1943, No. 31 (2752), and  
23
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, l. 9. 
24
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 62, ll. 57, 103. 
25
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 103, l. 14. 
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mushrooms, and the like.
26
  Dogrose, willow bark, chamomile, sorrel, nettles, 
berries of various sorts, root of valerian, pine needles to fight vitamin C 
deficiency, dried mushrooms to supplement soldiers‟ diet when meat was scarce – 
all could be put to use healing or feeding soldiers at the frontlines.  Children were 
told that one hundred kilograms of dried mushrooms could replace the meat of an 
entire cow or eight sheep, and urged on by energetic ditties such as, “Summer and 
camp are waiting ahead./Don‟t just walk through the woods in summer-/Bring 
home/Many healing herbs./Healing juice of these woodland herbs/Is needed for 
the wounded and sick.”27  Soldiers could be healed by drinking “a wonderful 
magic drink” made from wild rose.28  Regular features in Pionerskaia Pravda, 
Pioner, and Murzilka informed children which herbs or plants were ready to be 
collected.
29
   
Model collectors were publicly lauded in the Pioneers‟ newspaper and on 
the radio.  Moscow School No. 318 was commended for collecting almost 40,000 
kilograms of wild plants at summer camps they organized.  In one year, children 
                                                 
26
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 67, ll. 175-178. 
27
 GA RF f-6903, op. 16, d. 3, 188;  GA RF f-6903, op. 16, d. 3, l. 508.  TsKhDMO f. 1, 
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 GA RF f-6903, op. 16, d. 3, l. 505. 
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 See, for example, PP, “What to Collect in August,” 4 August 1943, No. 31 (2752).  
The series is called “Calendar: Gathering Wild Plants” (“Kalendar: sbora dikorastyshchikh”); “K 
mnogomillionnoi armii nashikh malen‟kikh pomoshchnikov,” Murzilka 3-4 (March-April 1942), 
19. 
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collected almost 15,000 kilograms, or 275 kilograms each.
30
  Once Pioneer camps 
reopened, collection of medicinal and edible plants was part of the daily agenda 
for campers.
31
   Though Pioneers were admonished for only preparing 105 tons, 
or fourteen percent of the projected plan, in the first six months of 1943, by the 
end of the war, more than 241,000 tons of wild plants had been gathered and 
prepared for shipment to the front by Pioneers.
 32
  Soviet children were 
responsible for almost 78 percent of the total amount of medicinal and 
supplemental plants collected during the years of the war.
33
 
 The Pioneers began vigorously advocating the collection of items for those 
less fortunate as well.  Items might include clothing, books, school equipment, 
comestibles, and cloth bandages, while recipients could be orphans, wounded 
soldiers, the children of Leningrad, or hospital patients.
34
  Special emphasis was 
placed on gifts for the military.  Pioneers created and collected small presents that 
were sent to soldiers on the front.  A decree of the Komsomol‟s Central 
Committee requested that each soldier receive a tobacco pouch and handkerchief 
handmade by Pioneers.  The Novosibirsk oblast reported sending 500,000 tobacco 
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 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, l. 12. 
31
 See, for example, Leninskoe Znamia, 22 July 1944, in N. M. Kuz‟mina and N. K. 
Tin‟kova, Ot pervikh kostrov pionerskikh: iz istorii pionerskoi organizatsii Karelii dokumenti i 
materiali (Petrozavodsk: “Karelia”, 1984), 348, and TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, l. 11. 
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 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 64, ll. 1, 7. 
33
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, l. 13. 
34
 See, for example, Moldavskaia SSR v godi BOB, Sbornik dokumentov i materialov v 
dvykh romakh T. 1 (Kishinev, 1975), in V. M. Kovalchik, et.al., ed., Strana leningradu, 348. 
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pouches to the front.
35
  Pioneers of Iaroslavl  made handkerchiefs embroidered 
with phrases such as “to the dear soldiers,” “to protector of the motherland,” or 
“to the great front soldier.”36  Sometimes Pioneers sent packages of gifts to the 
front, each one including handkerchiefs, tobacco pouches, neckcloths, cigarette-
holders, envelopes and writing paper, or socks.
37
  Often, these gifts were sent in 
honor of a holiday such as the anniversary of the October Revolution, the 
anniversary of the founding of the Red Army, or May Day.
 38
  Samples of these 
gifts, often unevenly yet touchingly embroidered with dedications, are on display 
today in the Great Patriotic War museum in Moscow‟s Victory Park. 
 Finally, Pioneers actively collected money for the construction of tanks, 
airplanes, armored cars, and other military vehicles, as well as for the national 
defense fund and the national children‟s fund.  Often, monies collected were 
designated for tank columns or airplanes named after the children or region that 
gathered it.  For example, Kirghiz Pioneers collected 130,200 rubles for the tank 
dubbed “Pioneer Kirghiz.”39  Pioneers collected millions and millions of rubles 
nationwide;  individual Pioneers often challenged others to follow their 
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 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 117. 
36
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 12, l. 48.   
37
 See, for example, TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 62, ll. 2-3. 
38
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 67, l. 195. 
39
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 14, l. 20.  Other examples include the tank “Saratov Pioneer” 
funded by Pioneers from Saratov (f. 1, op. 7, d. 14, l. 46), tank column “Young Pioneer” (f. 1, op. 
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PP, 7 April 1943, No. 14 (2735), 1,  
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example.
40
  In the town of Kisolovsk, Pioneers collected forty thousand rubles for 
military vehicles, but one fifth grade Pioneer turned in 7,200 rubles for a plane 
and 1,000 rubles to build a ship.
41
  Pioneer Tamara Frolova‟s gift of seven 
thousand rubles for the tank column “Young Pioneer,” sent to Stalin personally in 
a letter, inspired several copycat gifts and letters to Stalin.
42
  Challenges and 
contests may have been effective:  Pioneers of the Gorki oblast alone collected 
four million rubles for the construction of a tank column.
43
 
 
Timurovtsy 
We are not a gang of roughs 
Nor a rabble band. 
We are disciplined and tough 
And our pranks are planned. 
Pioneers all are we! 
Pioneers are we!
44
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The timurovtsy (timurites), Pioneers and children who decided to emulate 
Arkady Gaidar‟s popular, fictional hero, Timur, by taking care of the families of 
soldiers sent to the front emerged spontaneously early in the war.  In squads or 
teams of as few as three and as many as twenty, these timurites stepped in to fill 
the shoes of absent husbands, fathers, and brothers, clearing yards, chopping 
wood, gathering fuel, babysitting young children, fetching water, cleaning streets, 
shoveling snow, and so on.  One such squad received a citation from the regional 
soviet for taking care of 293 families.
45
  In School Number 22 in Arkhangel‟sk, 
fifty-three Pioneers cared for 350 families of front soldiers.
46
  A letter to 
Pionerskaia Pravda praised a timurite squad for its work in a Kuibyshev hospital.  
There, Vera Krontovskaia‟s troop of eighteen Pioneers allegedly worked in the 
kitchen and laundry of the hospital, sang songs and wrote letters for the wounded, 
collected money for books for patients, and collected items of clothing for 
evacuated children.
47
  Initially, there had been some concern about the timurovtsy, 
as in some cases, their troops and activities had apparently been pitted against 
those of the Young Pioneers.
48
  By 1943, however, the Pioneer organization had 
adopted the timurite movement as one of its own creation and design.  The work 
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of the very first Timur team – intentionally presented as a group of Young Pioneer 
boys and girls –  and its adult sponsor, nicknamed “Baba Shura,” became part of 
the organization‟s lore during the war, as the story was recounted in print and in 
song.
49
   
 
Grave-tending 
 In July of 1944, the Komsomol Central Committee received a secret letter 
from the Deputy Directors of the Central Urban Public Amenities Authority of 
Narkomsovkolkhoz and the military‟s Casualty Data Collection Authority.  
Military cemeteries, it noted, were being neglected, and individual graves of 
soldiers unmarked and uncared for.  These authorities gave Komsomoltsy and 
Young Pioneers the duty of tending the graves of soldiers or sailors who were 
killed in action or died of injuries at a hospital, to memorialize those in the 
military who perished in the war.  This new job for youth and children was 
twofold:  first, they were “to assist in compiling exact data on the numbers of 
graves of privates, sergeants, and officers,” and second, they were to “place a 
grave marker over each grave, inscribed with an error-free, indelible inscription 
that include[d] military rank, last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth, and 
date of interment.”50  It decreed “continuous care” for the graves of soldiers, 
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sailors, and partisans, as the proper, grateful response of youth and children to 
those who sacrificed their lives defending Soviet freedom.   
The Red Pathfinders, as they were later known, were tasked with both an 
administrative role, in recording fatalities, and a civic role, as they memorialized 
the sites of military burials. The number of military casualties was certainly a 
sensitive matter for the state.  Soviet media used nebulous, collective phrases such 
as “heavy losses” or simply omitted quantifying casualties altogether when 
describing military actions.  Admitting, even in a small way, that Soviet deaths 
were so numerous and widespread that it was beyond the state‟s capabilities to 
tend to them properly was quite a concession to reality. 
That the state would hand over this job to youth and children is thought-
provoking.  The secrecy with which this task was handled is indicated by the 
remarkable absence of its existence in contemporary, self-promoting reports about 
Pioneer activities during the war.  Because their activities were not recognized or 
popularized until years later, at least one scholar mistakenly asserts that the 
Pathfinders were not founded until the mid-1960s.
51
  Later Pioneer publications 
gloss over the specifics of the original purpose, innocuously defining a Red 
Pathfinder as “a Pioneer who studies the revolutionary, military and labor history 
of our people, Party, Komsomol, and his own organization.”52   
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What accounts for this?  Historian Catherine Merridale suggests that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Great Patriotic War, the state (she claims Stalin 
himself) was initially reluctant to encourage popular remembrance of the war 
because “the memory of fighting could be personally liberating, and that made it 
dangerous.”53  The state could influence memory, but it could not entirely control 
it or the associations it threatened to arouse.  As time passed and impressionable 
memories became more susceptible to the state‟s version of events, the 
commemoration of the war became a state-endorsed national pastime.  Giving this 
task to youth and children might have been a method of instilling gratitude, 
patriotism, and nationalism in the rising generation;  it may also have been 
considered the best, most efficient way to delegate responsibility for a delicate, 
sensitive task the state preferred to hush up. 
 
Pioneer-Partisans 
 As demonstrated by Juliane Fürst, Soviet partisan (or underground) 
activity was given publicity and press coverage disproportionate to its frequency 
among youth.
54
  To be sure, partisan activity occurred behind German lines from 
1941 until the end of the war.  The Soviet state, however, had mixed feelings 
about such potentially autonomous groups.  Begrudgingly, the state eventually 
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sanctioned partisan actions, recognizing their value as part of the Soviet military 
effort and as public morale boosters.  Though not exactly a Pioneer dictate, 
children were encouraged to idolize and, if possible, emulate the actions of 
Pioneer-partisans.   
The number of Pioneers working with partisan groups seems to have been 
quite small, but their accomplishments drew a great deal of attention in Young 
Pioneer media.  Underground Pioneer organizations, working closely with 
partisan groups, were identified in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltics.
55
  Pioneers in 
Pokrovskoe, a village in Ukraine, created a secret meeting site in a cave, devised a 
secret code corresponding to the Ukrainian alphabet, and worked with local 
partisans, transporting arms and weapons, distributing messages, and cutting 
German communication lines.
56
  The Pokrovskoe group was the subject of much 
attention within the Pioneer organization.  An intensive interview with these 
Pioneers and regional secretary L. G. Melnikov provided the material for 
numerous stories disseminated to children.
57
  Most commonly, Pioneers were 
lauded for service as scouts or spies for partisan troops, but occasionally, one 
finds incredible stories of individual bravery recounted.  One Pioneer, fourteen-
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year-old Zhenia Zemliakov, held off Germans for two hours by throwing 
grenades, providing time for Soviet soldiers to reposition and attack.
58
  Another 
group of Pioneers, eleven and twelve-year-olds Vladimir Sharapanin, Ivan 
Treskov, Anatolii Smirnov, and Petr Marin, under cover of night, dug up and stole 
the mines laid by Germans to blow up a bridge used by the partisans, thus saving 
the partisans and running the Germans out of their village.
59
  In all, over 200,000 
Pioneers received awards and medals for defense of the motherland, including 
twenty thousand for the defense of Moscow and more than fifteen thousand for 
the defense of Leningrad.  Six Pioneers, all partisans, were posthumously named 
Heroes of the Soviet Union.
60
 
The Pioneer leadership romanticized the lives and acts of children who 
joined the partisans, tapping into a preexisting desire among some children to “do 
something” for their nation.  Too young to officially enlist, too old to embrace 
obliviousness, stirred by anti-German propaganda, some Pioneer-age children 
yearned to contribute to the war militarily.
61
  By publicizing and heroizing 
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partisan activity, the organization validated these feelings among children, 
officially resolved any question about partisan acceptability, and allowed millions 
of other children to live vicariously through the few who did engage in partisan 
activity. 
 
Pioneer-“Otlichniki”62 
 In principle, being a good student had always been a requirement for 
Pioneer membership.  The war, however, had seriously disrupted regular 
schooling, both in occupied territory and in areas not threatened by conflict.  
Shortages of faculty and materials plagued the education system.  Students 
attended school in morning and afternoon half-day shifts, school years were often 
abbreviated, and some school days were scrapped altogether in favor of 
agricultural labor.  Absentee parents could not enforce school attendance.  For 
some, daily struggles to survive diminished the importance of studying.  The 
number of children in school dropped precipitously.  Despite these difficulties – 
or more likely, because of them – the Pioneer leadership pressed children to apply 
themselves to their studies, to study hard, and to make excellent grades.  
Performing well in school had been a well-rehearsed theme in Pioneer media for 
years.  Once Soviet fortunes in the war turned, though, the demands of rebuilding 
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the Soviet Union and the need for an educated population necessitated a return to 
normalcy in education.  Thus, the frequency and intensity of the messages 
emphasizing the importance of doing good work in school escalated after 1943. 
 Schoolwork, however, had to be made significant in the war effort.  How 
could it compete with the physical activities like collective farm labor, partisan 
aid, and scrap metal collecting that seemed so relevant to the war effort?   The 
Pioneer leadership‟s solution was twofold:  first, they invoked the names of 
heroes and soldiers in promoting the importance of study, and second, the content 
of schoolwork (and organizational work) itself was changed to more accurately 
reflect the national context.  
 Pioneer media presented outstanding school work as an appropriate, 
grateful response to the war by children.  Via “Pioneer Dawn,” Major-General 
Miasnikov advised children that, “The best New Year‟s gift for your fathers and 
brothers at the front will be your honorable success in school,” and President of 
the Academy of Sciences, Dr. Komarov intoned, “Right now, your fathers and 
brothers, heroes of the Red Army, are fighting for your happiness. . . . Be worthy 
of their efforts.  Study hard, so that you can grow up to be educated and brave, 
honest people, worthy of your great Motherland.”63  Receiving excellent grades in 
school established a connection with the most popular of Pioneer heroes, Zoya 
Kosmodemyanskaya.  An article in Pionerskaia Pravda, just before final exams, 
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entreats children to “Study Like Zoya!” and reproduces Zoya‟s own certificate of 
completion.  In the same issue, two-time Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. 
Molodchevo informs children that succeeding in school “is the best thing you can 
do to help the front.”64  Veterans of selected schools, such as Moscow (Boys) 
School No. 110, gave testimonies about their roles in the war, so that current 
students would begin to see themselves as part of a larger school-wide legacy.
65
  
A poem by a fifth-grader about a younger brother‟s first day of primary school 
includes the memory of an older brother – “now . . . a soldier” – who had attended 
the very same school.
66
  Murzilka published a poem entitled, “Two Otlichniki” 
which compared the efforts of a young student diligently studying his math, 
Russian, and geography with the brave acts of a frontline soldier, his father:  “I 
take after you, father:/We are both otlichniki./You are a Red Army soldier,/My 
war is my studies.”67  The underlying principle of the organization‟s promotion 
was that even the most mundane of children‟s activities could be injected with 
new enthusiasm if it were connected to the war.  Armed with slogans such as 
“Knowledge is strength” and “Knowledge is as important as a rifle in battle,” the 
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Pioneers‟ leaders set out to elevate the prestige and significance of studying and 
schoolwork.
68
 
 By decree from the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the war was 
introduced into all school subjects, including literature, physics, and geography.
69
  
Features in Pionerskaia Pravda emphasized the importance of being able to read 
a map properly, of reading about Russian heroes such as Kutuzov or Aleksandr 
Nevskii, and of appreciating the Russian language more fully.
70
  All these 
educational lessons, however, were given war aims.  Children needed to be able to 
read a map to more fully understand news from the front and to hone their 
survival skills, when life might depend on deciphering topographical features.  
History, in general, focused on the defense of Russia against foreign aggressors 
and the heroes, popular actions, and military men who had achieved it.
71
  Nevskii, 
in particular, resonated with the Soviet public, as his successful battle against the 
Teutonic Knights was recounted in a myriad of ways.  Observing English lessons 
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in Tbilisi during the war, journalist Margaret Wettlin noted that the vocabulary for 
the day included the terms “tank,” “pilot,” and “gunner.”72 
More insistently, however, authorities urged that children‟s play, 
especially that in the Pioneer organization, revolve around war-preparedness.  The 
Central Committee asserted that war-preparedness training should occur at least 
two times a week for at least two hours, with an emphasis on wartime roles 
Pioneers might be expected to play, such as spies, messengers, firemen, and 
drivers, along with massive political work against fascism.
73
  Physical training 
was a very important part of this war-preparedness.  Each Pioneer was 
encouraged to do exercises and wash with cold water each morning to toughen the 
body.
74
  Pioneer media urged children to practice martial skills.  In one broadcast, 
for example, the “Pioneer Dawn” narrator suggested they organize grenade-
throwing contests in their Pioneer links, in order to develop lobbing accuracy 
whether standing or prone.
75
  The radio program advertised a book on 
camouflaging people and vehicles by a Major Palkevich that it encouraged 
children to read and utilize, to learn how to become invisible and get close to the 
enemy unnoticed.
76
  Accurate marksmanship was a particularly prized skill.  This 
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training was to be integrated into children‟s daily routines, so that it became a 
normal part of school and Pioneer activities.  Children‟s school carnivals could 
include skiing competitions;  holiday festivities provided the reason for shooting 
competitions and tactical war games between students.
77
  In the description of 
Moscow‟s 1st Lesnaya School‟s New Year‟s celebration, Grandfather Frost 
appears, and indicates that the “best shooters will receive gifts first.”78 
Organized games suggested for Pioneers pitted two teams against each 
other in role-playing games such as “Whites and Reds,” “Workers and the 
Slacker,” or “Bolsheviks and Mensheviks,” more often than the previous decades, 
which tended toward cooperative games.
79
  Other contests were meant to teach 
practical martial skills.  The game “Spy,” for example, was designed to develop 
children‟s orientation and stealth.  One team played the role of a resting division 
in the forest, while the objective of the other team was to surround them while 
remaining hidden and on the lookout for enemies.
80
  Another game, “Listen to the 
Commander‟s Order!,” is a sort of “Simon Says”-like game designed to teach 
“children to pay attention and follow orders quickly.”  One of the Pioneers is to 
shout various commands at his troop – “Forward – march,” “Air raid!,” “Tanks!” 
– at which the other Pioneers were to perform specific actions, such as marching 
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or hiding in the nearest ditch.
81
  Role-playing games invented during the war such 
as “Zoya and Shura” and “The Young Guardsmen” reflected figures made famous 
by the Pioneers and remained popular for years after the war was over.
82
 
 
* * * 
  
This is far from an exhaustive list of the tasks and responsibilities 
appointed for children during the war, but it gives a picture of some of the major 
areas in which the Pioneers‟ leaders attempted to mobilize children for the war 
effort.  In addition to those described in detail, Pioneers were expected to be self-
sufficient at home, mending, babysitting,  cleaning, repairing, or stretching scarce 
resources, and at school, cleaning up, making repairs, storing fuel, making up the 
Pioneer room, and maintaining the physical education area.
83
  Visiting hospitals to 
read to or write letters for soldiers and spending time at children‟s homes playing 
with orphans were also commonly endorsed activities, especially for younger 
Pioneers.
84
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As the Communist Party‟s mouthpiece among children, the Young Pioneer 
organization is uniquely qualified to illuminate state aspirations.  The vast array 
of duties that the Young Pioneer organization promoted provides insight into the 
state‟s expectations for children in this war.  In combination with the qualities 
explored in the previous chapter, a portrait of the Soviet state‟s ideal child in the 
years of the Great Patriotic War begins to emerge.  This child actively contributed 
to the homefront in a wide variety of ways and, when called upon, willingly and 
heroically sacrificed life and limb, inspired by a passionate patriotism, hatred for 
the enemy, and loyalty to the red scarf he or she wore as a member of the Young 
Pioneers. 
But the intensive campaign of responsibilities launched by the Pioneer 
organization had an ulterior goal beyond that of defining state expectations for 
children.  The Komsomol perceived that the Young Pioneers were at a critical 
juncture in their existence.  Without drastic action, the organization was in danger 
of being another casualty of the war.  The revival of the Young Pioneers appeared 
dependent upon increasing the visibility, the relevance, and the presence of 
children in Soviet society.  The tasks assigned to children by the Pioneers were 
intended, as a whole, to both accomplish these aims and reestablish the leadership 
role of the Young Pioneers among Soviet children.  Their public espousal of such 
a wide variety of tasks – assignments which, frankly, must have covered every 
child in the Soviet Union – allowed them to claim leadership and take credit for 
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the children‟s accomplishments.  Everything from harvesting grain to collecting 
rosehips to babysitting to doing homework became war work.  All war work, once 
publicly supported by the Pioneers, became Party property. 
What must be reiterated, however, is that, with the exception of the Red 
Pathfinders movement, the Pioneers did not invent the duties they commissioned.  
Neither did they initiate them.  Children did.  Based on reports sent to Moscow 
and anecdotal evidence from memoirs and children‟s communications, these 
activities emerged spontaneously, as children reacted to the war and its peculiar 
set of problems and issues. 
As early as July 1941, a trickle of reports began arriving from various 
parts of the Soviet Union addressed to the Komsomol Central Committee, 
describing the efforts of Pioneers and schoolchildren in response to the war.  
Activities recounted include agricultural labor on collective and state farms, 
factory work, collection of scrap metal and plants, collection of funds for the 
defense fund, Timur teams to care for soldiers‟ families, aid to soldiers and 
partisans, physical training, working at hospitals, manufacture of gifts for soldiers, 
and doing well in school – all of the major campaigns that the Pioneers would 
“launch” in the fall of 1942. 85  Children‟s play, unprompted, reflected the 
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national context.  Witnesses in Leningrad found children playing games such as 
“stretcher bearer” (pointing out that “our wounded don‟t cry [like] theirs”) and 
“Red Army versus the Fascist Dogs.”86  Wettlin noted that as early as the summer 
of 1941, children played army constantly, turning everyday objects into tanks, 
planes, and grenades.
87
  Without direction from the center, teachers recognized 
and reported children‟s emotional reactions to characterizations of the enemy.  In 
the fall of 1941, one instructor from Siberia wrote “Pioneer Dawn” to report that 
her students‟ “eyes light up with such hatred and anger when one reads to them 
about animal acts of fascists.  The hated Hitler dared to take away our freedom, 
our bright and happy life.”88  These sorts of lessons – “lessons that stimulated the 
will to live” in the midst of death – were used from the beginning of the war in 
schools.
89
  Though the reports are relatively few in number compared to the 
hundreds of reports about children‟s activities which the Central Committee 
received beginning in late 1942, the content of these reports and of early 
                                                                                                                                     
KPSS f. 1229, op. 3, d. 386, l. 23, in Kuz‟mina and Tin‟kova, Ot pervykh kostrov pionerskikh, 65-
66;  Tsentralnyi i gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskikh dokumnetov Sankt-Peterburga 
(TsGAIPD SPB) f. K-598, op. 5, d. 2, 1. 18, and Amurskaia oblast‟ v B.O.B. 1941-1945. Sbornik 
dokumentov i materialov (Blagoveshchenski: 1976), 173-174, in Koval‟chik, et. al, Strana 
Leningradu, 54;  PP 5 July 1941, 3, in Astrakhantseva, Po obe storoni fronta, ch. 1, 18-19; 
TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 77, d. 108, l. 26, in Astrakhantseva, Po obe storoni fronta, ch. 2, 65-66. 
86
 Skomorovsky and Morris, The Siege of Leningrad, 44, 50.  The authors relate a 
morbid, but amusing anecdote.  While watching children play “Red Army vs. the Fascist Dogs,” 
one child protested having to play the role of “fascist dog.”  His consolation?  He agreed to play 
the fascist dog, but only if he could be a dead fascist rather than a live one. 
87
 Wettlin, Russian Road, 8. 
88
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 2, l. 188(3)  (24 October 1941) 
89
 Interview with Natal‟ia Borisovna Rogova, in Simmons and Perlina, Writing the Siege, 
119. 
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anecdotal evidence is significant for it demonstrates the localized, spontaneous 
nature of children‟s initiatives and mind-set in absence of centralized directives.   
Further, these reports suggest that the Young Pioneers made a significant 
shift in tactics during the war.  For decades, the Pioneers could best be described 
as a prescriptive organization:  the organization used decrees, heroic narrative, 
media, and propaganda to tell Soviet children how to behave and what values to 
espouse.  Changes in Pioneer messages for children reflected socio-political 
events from above, not grassroots movements from below.  In the first eighteen 
months of the Great Patriotic War, however, the Pioneers appeared paralyzed.  In 
an effort to save a floundering movement and inject life into a moribund 
organization, the Young Pioneers needed no-fail, popular campaigns that would 
immediately produce returns.  Rather than “reinventing the wheel,” so to speak, 
the organization followed the lead of Soviet children.  Caught in this unique and 
uncomfortable situation, the Pioneer organization prescribed very little that 
children were not already doing or already idealizing.  For the first time in its 
history, the Pioneers became a descriptive organization rather than a prescriptive 
organization.  This shift was the mark of an organization desperate to revive its 
reputation.  Placing its fortunes in the hands of its own members, the Young 
Pioneers hoped to regain its position at the forefront of children‟s activities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
BECOMING THE VANGUARD:   
THE RESURRECTION OF THE YOUNG PIONEERS 
 
“. . . the Young Leninists, the children of the Soviet people, who dearly love the 
Motherland, perform heroic deeds, study, work, and help their fathers and 
brothers in the struggle against the enemy.”  
“Young Pioneers,” 19441 
 
 The revival of the Young Pioneer organization and the rescue of its 
reputation commenced with the recognition of the crisis in late 1942.  For the last 
three years of the war, the organization used directives and media at its disposal in 
a clandestine attempt to regain its leadership position, however illusory, among 
Soviet children.   While the orders themselves were public and widely-
disseminated, the motivation for them was not.  According to reports and 
telegrams received, the response from the provincial and local level was 
immediate, which had to be gratifying for the Komsomol members responsible for 
the welfare of the Pioneer organization.  To increase the prestige and visibility of 
the Young Pioneers, the organization identified and publicly lauded child heroes 
for their actions during the war.  The creation of summative documents reporting 
the contributions of children – under the leadership of the Young Pioneers, of 
                                                 
1
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 103, l. 86.  This is a handbook for Pioneer leaders which 
provides a brief history of the Young Pioneers, a summary of the role of Pioneers in the Great 
Patriotic War, and details about the internal structure of the organization. 
 
198 
 
course – to the victorious war effort began in early 1944 and continued 
throughout the duration of the war.  Later Soviet literature adopted this official 
version of Pioneer leadership in the Great Patriotic War activities, with slight 
modifications, and incorporated it into the state-approved narrative. 
This reassertion of the Young Pioneers into the mix, however, was not 
without its difficulties.  Some regions of the Soviet Union were reluctant or 
merely unable to cooperate with the dictates of the Party and lagged behind in 
implementing the measures handed down by the Komsomol leadership.  
Membership in the Pioneer organization increased over the course of the war, 
though not nearly as quickly as the organization might have hoped.  Conditions of 
war impeded the full application and execution of Pioneer plans to self-promote, 
and internal struggles over approaches and strategies continued after the war‟s 
conclusion in 1945.  Though the extent of these complications demonstrates the 
superficiality of the organization‟s “recovery,” the Young Pioneers accumulated 
enough response to and support of their programs to credibly claim leadership of 
Soviet children and their contributions to the war.  With this, their place in the 
war narrative was assured, as was the organization‟s future. 
 
* * * 
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Local responses to Young Pioneer directives 
  Initially, the reports which reached Moscow were not promising.  Various 
cities, provinces, and regions complained of Pioneer leader shortages, inactive 
Pioneer troops, lack of resources, apathetic teachers and principals, disruption 
caused by the war, and a general dearth of knowledge about and enthusiasm for 
Young Pioneer activities.
2
  These were all the problems the Komsomol identified 
as contributing factors in the decline of the Pioneer organization at their meeting 
in the fall of 1942.  The accounts appeared to confirm what the Pioneer leadership 
had feared was happening to the Pioneer movement across the nation. 
A particularly acerbic report came in from Kuibyshev.  After complaining 
of a vast array of problems – from detachments which “exist only on paper” to 
pathetic, boring Pioneer meetings to children with “mental problems” who faked 
activities to report –  the account concluded, “It is impossible to say anything 
about the work of Pioneer headquarters, only because they exist neither at the 
Komsomol obkom nor at the gorkom, while those that formally exist at some 
raikoms do nothing.”3  The brutal honesty of the Kuibyshev report may well have 
                                                 
2
 See TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 38-53 (from Kuibyshev), TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, 
ll. 107-107 ob. (from Kursk), TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 122-124 (from Penza), and 
TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 125-126 (from Riazan‟). 
3
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 53.  Apparently this report was a bit too direct;  a 
handwritten note on the top of it indicates that the report‟s writer, A. Gol‟din, was to be fired and 
replaced.  Gol‟din, (assuming it is the same A. Gol‟din) however, resurfaces as the secretary of the 
Komsomol in Leningrad in a report he submitted in 1944 (RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 94, ll. 38-49).  
Experienced Pioneer leaders were few;  it might be assumed that Gol‟din was removed from his 
position as Kuibyshev oblast‟ secretary and transferred to the Leningrad city committee, rather 
than being terminated from service altogether. 
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cost the author his job, but other reports were similarly troubling, if more 
diplomatic in tone.  The Kursk Pioneer director complained of Pioneer raion 
committees formed but non-functional.
4
  Riazan‟ and Penza both complained of 
indifferent Komsomol leadership and poor training of Pioneer leaders.
5
  Even in 
the capital city of Moscow, Pioneer leader shortages were endemic, thus, very 
little had been done beyond discussing responses to the Komsomol‟s 1942 
resolution, “Major Shortcomings in the Work of the Pioneer Organization and 
Measures to be Taken to Rectify These Shortcomings.”6   
In January 1943, the Komsomol Central Committee‟s Department for 
Schools and Pioneers fired off an eight-page “informational note” to all of the 
oblast, krai, and republic Komsomol Central Committees.  With scarcely-
concealed annoyance, the report listed, in rapid-fire, terse statements, four pages 
of accomplishments – “Over five hundred people were present at the Pioneer 
members meeting in the city of Chita,” “Over four hundred Pioneers took part in a 
ski parade in the city of Molotov,” “Poets and composers in Georgia are working 
on a Pioneer march” – and then proceeded to pack four more pages with scathing 
criticism of “extremely slow and unsatisfactory” efforts among Pioneer leaders to 
carry out the wishes of the Komsomol.
7
  Four primary deficiencies were 
identified:  Pioneer leaders were not being adequately recruited and trained, 
                                                 
4
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 107 ob. 
5
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, l. 122, 125. 
6
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7. d. 9, l. 64. 
7
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 89-91. 
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content of Pioneer link and troop activities was uninteresting and deficient, 
Pioneer Palaces were nonfunctional, and schools were not adequately supportive 
of Pioneer activities.  To ensure clarity of intention and address some of the 
concerns expressed, the Komsomol distributed a point-by-point instructional 
document for Young Pioneer headquarters that enumerated responsibilities and 
described organizational procedures for Pioneer leadership at the district, city, 
regional, and provincial levels.
8
 
Though many of the “measures” handed down by the Komsomol to 
improve the Pioneer organization were aimed at raising interest among children, 
all of the shortcomings and failures of the organization‟s strategies were blamed 
on leadership.  To fault children for insufficient interest or enthusiasm would be 
fatal;  it would indicate that the organization had been damaged beyond repair.  
Impugning the leadership was the easier way out.  The primary reason for the 
failure of the Komsomol‟s directives, according to the Komsomol, was that the 
tactics had not been properly communicated or completely implemented.  The 
problem lay with the messenger, not with the message.   
Despite any setbacks, however, by mid-1943 activities among children in 
local Pioneer troops and detachments began to pick up, ostensibly inspired by 
                                                 
8
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 86, ll. 1-7.  The statement, dated 9 December 1944, begins 
with ideas as fundamental as “The headquarters staff consists of seven to ten people” and “The 
headquarters should carry out the tasks related to directing the work of Pioneers. . . .”  The 
perception that some Pioneer leadership would be ignorant of such basic information must have 
been distressing to the Komsomol! 
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orders from the Young Pioneers.  Beginning with the all-important “Measures” 
memo in the fall of 1942, the Pioneers issued directives about reviving camp 
attendance among children, collection of medicinal plants, collective farm work 
for schoolchildren, the collection of gifts for soldiers, the collection of scrap 
metal, other recyclable materials, and money – often introducing national 
competitions and prizes for high-achieving children and Pioneer troops – and 
Pionerskaia Pravda sponsored a literary contest and arts competition to celebrate 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army.
9
   
Responses to Moscow in the form of official reports began as early as the 
winter of 1942 and continued throughout subsequent years.  Leningrad recounted 
that 15,354 Pioneers were active in 626 timurite squads, caring for over a 
thousand families of soldiers and injured veterans by doing chores such as 
cleaning apartments or courtyards and providing fuel for heaters.
10
  In addition, 
Pioneers gave over a thousand concerts at hospitals, collected over fifteen 
thousand gifts for soldiers, and made hundreds of pairs of socks and underwear 
for wounded soldiers.
11
  Magnitogorsk testified about the excellent work of a 
particular timurite team led by eleven-year-old Pioneer Oleg Koppa.  Members of 
this team, which grew from twenty-five to one hundred fifty children, not only did 
odd jobs for families of soldiers, but led the Cheliabinsk oblast‟ Pioneers in 
                                                 
9
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 67, ll. 1, 17-20, 23-34, 170-171, 175-181; TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 
7, d. 62, ll. 1, 37-43; TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 64, l. 5, 21-34. 
10
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, ll. 36-37. 
11
Ibid. 
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collection of medicinal plants (over seven thousand kilos), collection of money 
for the construction of the “Cheliabinsk Pioneer” tank, and collection of scrap 
metal (nearly seven thousand kilos).  Koppa‟s Pioneers cleaned their 
schoolrooms, repaired maps and other supplies, and took care of orchards 
surrounding their school.
12
  Tula oblast‟ submitted a report which detailed 
contributions by Pioneers via agricultural work, collection of tons of wild plants 
and scrap metal, numerous activities of timurite squads, and exceptional 
schoolwork – both physical and academic.  The account alleged that over two 
million Pioneers and schoolchildren had produced over eleven million workdays 
in agriculture labor, and then went on to note outstanding individual or Pioneer 
troop achievements in other tasks.
13
  Formal reports such as these emphasize the 
“Pioneer-ness” of young activists far more than earlier accounts, and it seems 
clear that the volume of reported endeavors increased dramatically after 1942.  
Whether the amount of activity multiplied due to Young Pioneer influence is 
debatable – it could be due to the fact that Soviet fortunes in the war were 
gradually improving, allowing children the opportunity to contribute – but this 
was immaterial for the purposes of the Pioneer organization.  If the aktiv became 
active, the Pioneers could take credit. 
Official reports provided one means of judging the success of Young 
Pioneer initiatives.  Another measure involved individual accounts from Pioneers 
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 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 94, ll. 53-54. 
13
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 7, d. 103, ll. 14-19. 
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themselves.  In 1942, the radio program “Pioneer Dawn” made a concerted effort 
to encourage children to write in and share the ways in which they were helping 
the Soviet war effort.  Appropriate testimonials could then be reproduced in 
various forms of Pioneer media and utilized in composing official reports of 
children‟s activities.  Most letters are fairly short and relay basic information such 
as the child‟s name, age, location, contribution or story, and greeting.  Fifth-
grader Rita Portiuk of School No. 54 in Alma-Ata informed Moscow that her 
fellow students had collected more than sixteen tons of scrap metal, donated 777 
pieces of clothing for evacuated children, and promised to study well to earn only 
high marks.
14
  Writing from a children‟s home, Nina Korobova explained the 
efforts of her fellow evacuees to be self-reliant – cleaning, mending, chopping 
firewood, doing repairs – in order to reduce the need for state resources.  She 
concludes, “Now we consider it the most severe punishment if they don‟t allow us 
all to go to work.  No one wants to sit here without work during time of war . . . 
.”15  Fifth-grader Tolya Komlev wrote in to boast about the prodigious amount of 
workdays recorded in his workbook after summer vacation.
16
  Misha Vasiliev and 
Vova Rodin confided that they were studying topography and guns, practicing 
                                                 
14
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 14, ll. 10a-11a. 
15
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 9, l. 507-508. 
16
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 43, l. 16. 
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auto repair, learning German, and rubbing snow on their bodies to prepare for 
future combat against “the hated enemy.”17 
The wording of such correspondence is significant.  Another sign that the 
Young Pioneers might well have pointed to as an indication of the organization‟s 
revival among children was the increasing use of Pioneer-connected language by 
children themselves.  Even if disingenuous or ignorantly chosen, the 
internalization and repetition of particular phrases and concepts common to Soviet 
propaganda was useful to the Young Pioneers.  It allowed the organization to 
claim ownership of the letter, its author, and its contents – of anything, in short, 
which could be valuable to the Pioneers.   
Certainly, children appear to have mastered the nationalist war rhetoric 
encouraged by the state;  numerous letters from Young Pioneers use phrases such 
as “kill the fascist dogs,” “the Soviet Pioneers will not be traitors!” and “avenge 
us, defenders of our Soviet Motherland!”18  Other letters parrot the directives 
issued by the Pioneers.  In a telegram, fourth grade students from School No. 14 
in Makhach-Kala wrote, “We applaud the initiative of Pioneer Aplodova who 
donated her savings to the building of a new tank named „Young Pioneer.‟  In our 
class, we collected five hundred rubles.  We will donate this money to the tank-
                                                 
17
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 9, ll. 4-5. 
18
 See, for example, TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 32, d. 95, l. 235; TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 32, d. 95, 
ll. 249-255; TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 14, l. 25. 
206 
 
building fund.  We call upon all Pioneers to follow our example.”19  These 
students were probably nine or ten years old – this formal, stilted speech echoes 
the Pioneer organization rather than reflecting the genuine language of children.  
Geras‟kin, the welder-student described above, began his letter with the slightly 
condescending statement, “You are wrong, children, if you think that it is 
impossible to study and to work at the same time.”20   
It is reasonable to assume that some of these dispatches were 
manufactured by the Young Pioneers to illustrate certain values or to encourage 
particular activities.  There is evidence, however, outside the Pioneer organization 
of the resonance of Pioneer-sponsored themes and language amongst children.  
Readers of Pioner and Murzilka sent in drawings, some of which were published 
in the magazines.  The children‟s artwork all reflects the war‟s influence.  
Whereas illustrations in early 1941 depict folk characters such as the Golden 
Cockerel or rural landscapes of homes, trees, horses, and wagons, later reader-
submitted artwork features tanks, explosions, enemy aircraft, or historic Russian 
warriors.
21
  Writer Vera Inber served as a judge in a children‟s literary 
competition in May of 1943 and recorded the subjects of the winners in her 
Leningrad Diary.  The winning entry among fourth graders depicted the German 
                                                 
19
 GA RF f. R-6903, op., 16, d. 3, l. 16.18.4. 
20
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 18, l. 1.  
21
 See, for examples of prewar artwork, Murzilka 3 (March 1941), 12, 18;  for examples 
during the war, see Murzilka 3-4 (March-April 1942), 15; Murzilka 2-3 (February-March 1943), 
13; Pioner 10 (October 1942), 50. 
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invasion in this way:  “They were marching into towns/ Looting shops without 
distinction/ Drinking vodka, taking fat/ Smashing tins and gulping quickly.”22  A 
Pioneer submitted a story, “The First Bomb,” about the experiences of a girl who 
carries casualties to the hospital and tends to wounded people after an air raid.  
The winning entry among ninth graders was entitled “What Work on a State Farm 
has Given Me.”23  In another instance of state-speak, a letter sent to Viacheslav 
Molotov from an orphanage in the Crimea begins,  
 
The enemy brought much destruction to our country and left us parentless.  
Our fathers died in battle and our mothers were killed in bombing raids or 
tortured to death by the German monsters.  Our mother is now our beloved 
Motherland, and our first and most loved father is you and also Comrade 
Stalin.  Therefore, let us begin our letter with our greetings and thanks to 
you and to Comrade Stalin for your gentle care, which you give to us even 
when you are working on nationwide issues, when you are directing the 
course of battles against the enemy.
24
 
 
The Komsomol leadership‟s hunch that children would respond to war-related 
rhetoric seems to have been correct.  Whether intentionally or unintentionally, 
                                                 
22
 Inber, Leningrad Diary, 147. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 GA RF f. P-5446, op. 70, d. 15, l. 80, in Livshin and Orlov, Sovetskaia povsednevnost‟, 
147. 
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they borrowed the language the state transmitted via the Pioneer organization to 
express themselves.   
Summer camps held special significance for the Young Pioneers and 
served as many children‟s fondest memories of their membership in the 
organization, so their reopening was critical to the Pioneers‟ resurgence.  Despite 
the fact that the war continued, Pioneer camps began reopening in 1943.  In many 
places, such as Moscow, Tula, Kalinin, Leningrad, Rostov, Smolensk, Murmansk, 
Kursk, and Orlov oblasts, camps had closed due to wartime conditions and lack of 
resources.
25
  Though some camps never closed during the war years, those that 
remained open were tremendously scaled back in resources and number of 
campers.  Budgets for camps were slashed from 270 million rubles in 1940 to 40 
million rubles in 1942.
26
  Because of the budget cuts, camps were cost-prohibitive 
for many Pioneers.  Though Profsoiuz arranged for some children of wounded or 
killed soldiers to attend camp for free, most parents were expected to pay half of 
the four hundred ruble cost for twenty-one days of camp, a sum that would be 
roughly equivalent to a year‟s tuition in secondary school.27  Even so, 
                                                 
25
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 67, ll. 170-171. 
26
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 22, ll. 4-5.  A variant figure of 105 million rubles for 1942 is 
reported in TsA VLKSM f. 1, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 15-16, in V. I. Nikolaev, Pionerskaia organizatsiia 
v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.) 11 i 12 lektsii spetskursa “Istoriia 
Vsesoiuznoi pionerskoi organizatsii imeni V. I. Lenina” vysshaia Komsomolskaia shkola pri TsK 
VLKSM – kafedra pionerskoi raboty (Moskva: 1973), 46. 
27
 PP, 19 May 1943 No. 26 (2741), p. 4, indicates that ten percent of campers were 
attending free compliments of Profsoiuz.  Profsoiuz, the Trade Union organization, for reasons 
that are not entirely clear, was responsible for Pioneer camp oversight and funding.  TsKhDMO, f. 
1, op. 7, d. 22, l. 23, calculates the cost of one camper for a twenty-one day session at about four 
209 
 
approximately 382,000 children attended Pioneer camp in the summer of 1942 
and 465,000 in the following summer.
28
  By 1947, the situation returned to 
normal;  more than two million children, or about 25 percent of those eligible, 
spent the summer in Pioneer camp.  The budget for Pioneer camps received a 
boost of 1.11 trillion rubles, an amount appropriate to the accommodation of so 
many more campers.
29
  Often, war work occupied a significant part of the daily 
schedule of children at Pioneer camp.  While camps included crafts, concerts, 
games, and sports, they also contained time designated for war-preparedness 
training, physical education, and other tasks, even after the war was over. 
 
Pioneer Heroes 
 Another means of signaling the resurgence of the Pioneers involved 
publicizing selected hero-children closely associated with the organization.  
Depending on their stories, these Pioneer-heroes could serve as proof that the 
Young Pioneers had been playing an active role in the war since its inception.  
                                                                                                                                     
hundred rubles.  To make up for budget cuts, the Central Committee proposed that parents pay 
half the cost.  To put this in perspective, John Scott, in Behind the Urals: An American Worker in 
Russia‟s City of Steel, gives a figure of two hundred rubles for a year‟s tuition in 1940 for 
schooling above seventh grade.  His research indicates that an average worker earned about three 
hundred rubles a month.  Scott, Behind the Urals (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 
214, 242. 
28
 TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 22, ll. 9-17, for the 1942 stats; TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 7, d. 61, 
ll. 28-36, for the 1943 stats.  Nikolaev, Pionerskaia organizatsiia v gody, gives the following 
figures for campers:  1942: 300,000; 1943: 405,335; 1944: 730,000; 1945: 269,613, based on TsA 
VLKSM f. 1, op. 1, d. 264, ll. 15-16.  No camper statistics were found for 1941.  It would be 
particularly interesting to know how many children were at camp – and where – in the summer of 
‟41, considering the timing of the invasion of the Soviet Union.   
29
 RGASPI f. M-1, op. 7, d. 189, l. 28. 
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Individual or collective heroes were useful in a variety of ways.  The values 
demonstrated by heroes illustrated characteristics the Pioneer organization wished 
its members to adopt.  The heroes carried out missions or tasks endorsed by the 
organization.  And, these heroes were always Pioneers or former Pioneers.   
 The two former-Pioneer-heroes most often mentioned in the Pioneer press 
were Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya and Liza Chaikina.  These two teenage girls 
fought or aided partisans in the war and died at the hands of the Germans.  Both 
girls were canonized early in the war and their names and examples were invoked 
repeatedly in Pioneer media and in children‟s letters.  In 1943, sixth-grader Zoya 
Kirilova wrote in, “I learned to hate the enemy.  I often tell my mother: „Mother, 
if I were a grown-up and could fight in the war, I would follow the example of 
Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya.  I would do the same she did:  be tortured but not give 
up my Motherland, you, mother, my sisters and brothers.  I would rather die 
myself than let the Motherland die.”30  Other Pioneers list presentations on or 
poetry about Liza Chaikina as part of troop meetings.
31
  On the first day of the 
school year in 1944, “Pioneer Dawn” described Moscow School No. 210, 
Kosmodemyanskaya‟s former school: “Here is a big, well-lit room where she 
studied, here‟s the library where she was a frequent visitor.  Her most favorite 
books are arranged in the corner. . . . Zoya took care of some trees here [in the 
                                                 
30
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 18, l. 5. 
31
 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 18, l. 5. 
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school garden].”32  Kosmodemyanskaya‟s portrait hung on the wall of the school 
accompanied by a painting of Chaikina that “girls studied well.”33  They were the 
perfect combinations of warrior, student, and product of Young Pioneer 
upbringing.  The two could inspire children to appropriate emotions and actions 
as well as solidify the influence of the Pioneer organization.   
The other child-heroes who played an enormous role in Pioneer media 
during the war were the Karovski Union of Pioneers.  This group of twelve 
Pioneers, ages eleven to sixteen, was organized by fifteen-year-old Vasilii 
Nosakov in Pokrovskoe (village), Artemovskii region, Ukraine, in May 1942.
34
  
The self-styled Karovski Union was an underground Pioneer organization in 
occupied territory that supplied local partisans with small amounts of weapons 
and ammunition, wrote and distributed anti-German leaflets, cut enemy 
communication lines, hid some youth from the Germans, and took care of 
wounded soldiers.  In the stenographic account of an interview by obkom 
secretary L. G. Melnikov with all but one member of the Karovski Pioneers, the 
children sound alternately heroic and ridiculous.  Pioneer Lager, for example, 
alleged to have replaced a German officer‟s revolver with a wooden revolver 
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 GA RF f. R-6903, op. 16, d. 43, l. 5. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 TsKhDMO f. 1, op. 53, d. 306.  This entire delo is dedicated to the Karovski Pioneers 
and includes a descriptive, stenographic account of interviews, characteristika for each member of 
the group, and newspaper clippings about them.  The twelve members of the Karovski Union of 
Pioneers were Vasilii Nosakov, Boris Metelev, Anatolii Prokopenko, Vladimir Lager, Elena 
Nikylina, Nadezhda Gordienko, Olga and Anatolii Tzigankova, Varvara Kovaleva, Nina and 
Anatolii Pogrebniak, and Vladimir Maruzhenko.  Metelev and Prokopenko were old enough by 
1943 to join the army and did so. 
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while it hung, on a gun belt, on the rail of the officer‟s bed.  Possible, but not 
probable.  More realistically, he also claimed that he had stolen a revolver from a 
friend‟s house after the friend had bragged about owning it.  Nosakov maintained 
that he had dressed up like a gendarme in order to arrest a drunken policeman 
who had angered him by staying at his house too long.
35
  One Pionerka, in 
particular, risked her mother‟s physical abuse to remain active in the group.36  
This group remained active until September 1943, when the area was liberated by 
the Red Army.  The youth asserted that, aside from two that joined the Red Army, 
each of the members of the K.U.P. had gone on to perform excellently in school, 
work productively on the collective farm, and become members of the 
Komsomol. 
 The Young Pioneers publicly praised the actions of the Karovski Union on 
the radio and in the press.  Individual testimonies about their identities, families, 
deeds, and suitability as role models were collected from their hometown.
37
  Their 
photographs ran in a June 1944 issue of Pionerskaia Pravda, along with a 
reproduction of the secret code they had created and a sample leaflet they had 
penned.  The brief text portion that is quoted exclaims,  
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Get up and defend your dear Motherland!  We know that they [Red Army 
soldiers] can kill the enemy on the front only from one side, but we can 
kill him here from all sides.  So let‟s fight to help free those who have 
been taken into captivity by the Germans.  They are suffering there and 
they are there against their will.  Comrades, let‟s start helping our great 
Red Army.  Get up and fight the enemy!  Death to the Germans!  K. U. 
P.
38
 
 
Again, these are the hero-archetypes the Young Pioneers could exploit with 
enthusiasm.  They demonstrated initiative within boundaries, intense patriotism, 
military-like discipline, disdain for the enemy, partisan activities, and Party 
identification. 
 A decade after the war‟s end, in 1955, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party formally added eleven individuals and three groups of Pioneers 
to the Book of Honor of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization.  As Komsomoltsy, 
Kosmodemyanskaya and Chaikina were too old to be named Pioneer heroes, but 
all twelve of the Karovski Union of Pioneers were inducted, collectively, into the 
Book of Honor for their aid to partisans during the Great Patriotic War.  The other 
two groups – the Pioneer troop “Friend” from Kharkov and an underground 
Pioneer organization in Karpovtsi – and the other nine individuals associated with 
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the war – Lyonya Golikov, Volodya Dubinin, Valya Kotik, Vitya Korobkov, 
Marat Kazei, Kolya Zverev, Volodya Pavlov, Vitya Khomenko, and Shura Kober 
– are mysteries, as far as wartime Pioneer media and internal organizational 
documents are concerned.  Though several of these names are legendary Pioneer 
heroes of the war (Kazei, Kotik, and Golikov, in particular), they were apparently 
not lauded as heroes during the war.  Either their brave acts were discovered after 
the war had ended or their identities and deeds were manipulated in the wake of 
the war for specific purposes.  All of these individuals were being honored 
posthumously, having died or been executed during the war, so none lived on to 
contradict the state‟s interpretation of their alleged actions.  Though these 
particular children were not honored in Pioneer media during the war, the types of 
actions for which they were named heroes – aid to partisan troops by spying on or 
fighting the Germans – were common refrains in the organization‟s press.  
Partisan activity was the closest children could get to the frontlines;  it was 
romantic, it was adventurous.  Whatever the hero‟s name, whatever the deed, that 
child and his or her actions were useful to and could be coopted by the Pioneer 
organization.   
 
Obstacles to Pioneer Revival  
 Practical considerations provided a series of obstacles to the Pioneers‟ 
attempt to revive and reassert their organization‟s public persona.  Lack of 
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adequate facilities or equipment prevented Pioneer troops from meeting or doing 
activities.  Poor coordination between teachers and Pioneer leaders led to conflict 
or indifference about Pioneer meetings and events.  Hooliganism was reported in 
some Pioneer troops and detachments.   Limited resources even made the external 
trappings of Pioneer organization – badges, flags, banners, and red scarves – 
scarce commodities.  Pioneer leader shortages and deficiencies plagued the 
organization well beyond the end of the war.
39
  School absenteeism was so 
rampant during the war that new, tougher measures to combat children‟s crime 
were issued by the Sovnarkom beginning in June 1943 and the federal Public 
Prosecutor was granted unlimited authority to compel school attendance, in an 
effort to return children to the classroom.
40
  As the Pioneer organization was tied 
to the school, attendance was of utmost importance.  No students – no Young 
Pioneers.  Practically speaking, the war immensely complicated the efforts of the 
Pioneer organization to function with any sort of normalcy or routine.   
 Internally, debates continued over the methods by which the Young 
Pioneers operated.  Suggestions had been put forth at the fall 1942 meeting 
concerning the revision of or reimagining of the organizational structure within 
the Pioneers, but had not been adopted by Komsomol chief N. A. Mikhailov.  
Instead, Mikhailov recommended the reintroduction of existing infrastructure, 
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reeducation about the existing principles of work among children, and training 
based on existing ideas about what the Pioneer organization entailed.  Little had 
been done to effect institutional change.  The modifications, rather, had been in 
emphasis and in tone.  The 1942 reforms were cosmetic changes designed to 
bolster the popularity of a flagging organization among its target audience. 
A classified report to the secretaries of the Communist Party‟s Central 
Committee (including Mikhailov), authored by someone only identified as L. 
Voinova, vehemently attacked the structure, pedagogical philosophy, and 
activities of the Young Pioneers as a poorly-disguised plagiarism of the Boy 
Scouts organization.
41
  Referring to specific page numbers and section headings, 
she claimed that some parts of the Handbook of Pioneers‟ Leaders were lifted 
word-for-word from 1942 American Boy Scout manuals.  The same Pioneer 
handbook had even adopted various activities of the Boy Scouts in toto, making 
them “Soviet” by simply renaming them.  The “Scouts‟ Walk” became the 
“Pioneers‟ Walk;”  the “Scouts‟ stick” transformed into the “Pioneers‟ walking 
cane.”42  Modern Pioneer literature was “full of completely non-ideological, so-
called „military games,‟ with the propaganda of numerous Scout „badges‟ . . . with 
bothersome borrowing of „the Scouts techniques‟ to implement in the Pioneers‟ 
organization.”43  The ranking system of the Scouts, whereby boys progressed 
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from one level to the next after fulfilling requirements, had no place in the 
Pioneer organization, Voinova warned, as it smacked of bourgeois influence.  She 
criticized the lack of “deep theoretical and methodological work concerning 
questions of organization structure.” 44  Existing Pioneer literature did not discuss 
either the content, the role, or the meaning of “the collective” among children.  
The organization ignored the theories and practical applications of influential 
Soviet pedagogue Anton Makarenko‟s ideas on the communist upbringing of 
children.  Young Pioneer leadership refused to engage in self-criticism or to 
introspectively consider whether or not Boy Scout influence was present within 
the organization, preferring the ease of adoption to the difficulties of innovation.   
The threat of Scouting influence within the Young Pioneers was a serious 
accusation to raise, as the organization had been fighting the charge (and with 
good reason) since its inception two decades earlier.
45
  Thus, affairs within the 
Pioneer organization were troubled by lingering doubts about the efficiency of 
institutional practices and pedagogy.  Added to this were regular complaints from 
across the Soviet Union about the quality and quantity of Pioneer leadership at the 
local level.  Fortunately for the Pioneers, these concerns remained confined to the 
upper echelons of the organization and appear not to have affected the public 
perception of the organization. 
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Membership 
 Incomplete and inconsistent reporting, poor communication, and the 
German occupation make Young Pioneer membership figures during the war 
difficult to ascertain with precision.  Pre-war membership, assessed in 1939, stood 
at approximately thirteen million.
46
 Predictably, membership appears to have 
fallen off dramatically in the early years of the war.  (See Table 1)  The Pioneer 
leadership worried about the invisibility of the Young Pioneers in the early years 
of the war.  If membership figures are any indicator, they were correct to be 
concerned.  Only a fraction of eligible children were identified with the red-
scarfed Pioneers.  Even after the big push for revival in the Pioneer organization 
in the fall of 1942, growth was far from explosive.  By the end of the war, 
however, most of reporting entities claimed that a majority of eligible children 
were members of the Young Pioneers.   Several years after the war‟s conclusion, 
in 1948, the organization had still not yet recovered its prewar numbers, though 
this standard appeared within reach.  Official membership did, indeed, reach the 
pre-war benchmark by May of 1949 with a reported total membership of thirteen 
million children.
47
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After the initial, precipitous decline in membership, the organization‟s 
numbers rebounded steadily, although, it should be noted, so do the number of 
reports;  membership figures ought to have grown as more administrative units 
reported in.  Most likely, all of these totals are incomplete, either due to 
difficulties caused by a mobile wartime population, poor conditions for 
coordination of statistics, or fear of reprisals for low membership totals.  Even 
incomplete, however, they are far below what the Pioneer organization could be 
comfortable reporting during or after the war.  Such a dramatic decrease in 
membership would have made the Pioneer‟s internal crisis public knowledge, and 
that was hardly desirable.  
In fact, membership figures are conspicuously absent in all reports and 
draft-reports about the contributions of Pioneers and schoolchildren to the war.  
Aside from anecdotal uses of figures, such as something like “eight Pioneers from 
School No. 3 in Moscow cleaned the Pioneer room on their own initiative,” 
nowhere do Young Pioneer membership totals make an appearance in Soviet 
public documents or in Pioneer media.  The omission of precise figures did not 
hurt the organization‟s case as leader of Soviet children;  rather, the absence of 
figures allowed the Pioneers to imply a sort of universal membership (hence the 
ubiquitous phrase “Pioneers and schoolchildren”) as they recounted the role of 
children in the war. 
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Table 1: Pioneer Membership, 1942-1948 
Reporting Period Number of 
Reports (from 
republics, autonomous 
regions, oblasts, or 
cities) 
Total Number of 
Pioneers Reported 
Change from 
Previous Report 
 
1942
48
 28 2,231,329 - 10,768,671 
1943
49
 37 3,188,239 +956,910 
April 1, 1944
50
 
 
October 1, 1944
51
 
51 
63 
4,175,680 
5,103,757 
+987,441 
+928,077 
Oct. 1945-April 1946
52
 55 5,443,976 +340,219 
April 1946-Oct. 1946
53
 82 8,081,123 +2,637,147 
Oct. 1946-April 1947
54
 105 10,670,116 +2,588,993 
April 1947-Oct. 1947
55
 85 9,812,885 -857,231 
Oct. 1947-April 1948
56
 82 11,226,567 +1,413,682 
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Summative reports 
 As early as 1943, the Pioneer organization began drafting summative 
documents detailing the role of children in the war.  These comprehensive reports 
provided the framework for what would later become the official story of the 
Young Pioneers in the Great Patriotic War.   The statements follow a similar 
format – introduction and inspiration, a cataloging of tasks and accomplishments 
interspersed with moving anecdotes, and a brief conclusion which reiterates 
themes of the first section.  Extant notes and outlines list achievements of children 
to be included in formal written reports.   
 The introductions of various summative accounts attempted, briefly, to 
convey the significance of children to the Soviet war effort.  One report begins, 
“During the harsh days of war, Soviet children showed that they are growing up 
to be real patriots and that they are ready to overcome any obstacles for the sake 
of the motherland, willing to sacrifice even their own lives.”57  And another:   
 
The victorious glory of our people will shine on eternally through the 
centuries.  History knows no other examples of widespread heroism and 
utterly selfless dedication of the kind displayed by the Soviet people in the 
Patriotic War against the fascist invaders. . . .Adults are not the only ones 
inspired to do great deeds by their utter devotion and loyalty to the Soviet 
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Motherland; these feelings also kindle a fire in the hearts of children.  
Many beautiful pages in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War will be 
dedicated to children.
58
 
 
The introductions were intended to remind the reader that children belonged in the 
enormous collective category, the “Soviet people.”  In addition, the motivations 
for children‟s deeds were revealed up front.  Children were inspired by the same 
things adults were:  patriotism, love of the Motherland, civic duty, other heroic 
and selfless acts.  One report went on to credit, rather heavy-handedly, the Soviet 
school and the Pioneer organization for raising such hard-working, altruistic, 
young patriots.
59
 
 The body of the typical cumulative document was comprised of an 
exhaustive list and lengthy description of children‟s activities, accomplishments, 
and contributions to the war.  Reports painstakingly described every task from 
agricultural work to collections to partisan aid to timurite work to studying to 
factory work to gifts for soldiers to hospital work (and more), illustrating them 
with examples of overachieving Pioneer troops, schools, or individuals.  Over 
seventy different pursuits were listed as having been fulfilled in some capacity by 
children.  Though most achievements were described in terms of isolated figures 
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(i.e., “Georgian Pioneer Shura Sanaya harvested one hundred twenty kilograms of 
tea leaves in one day, fulfilling 1200 percent of the norm”60), there was an attempt 
to begin to assess and quantify how significant children‟s work was.  Over the 
course of three years, one report asserted, children collected 240,780 tons of wild 
plants useful to the war.  This collection effort represented 77.6 percent of the 
total collection throughout the Soviet Union.
61
  An outline noted totals of 
workdays – over 340 million –  accumulated by children over the course of two 
years of labor on collective and state farms, while a more formally written report 
added a third year of labor to that figure, bringing total number of workdays by 
children to more than 585 million.
62
   
 Written reports were lavishly padded with anecdotal evidence and 
children‟s own words to more fully prove good intentions and heroic acts.  
Kuibyshev oblast earned over ten thousand rubles for the Defense Fund.
63
  Masha 
Rubina was an outstanding tractor driver.
64
  Pavel Fedotov of Trade School No. 3 
in Sverdlovskaia oblast wrote, “When I imagine how the shells made from our 
steel fly toward the Germans, I am filled with pride for my difficult and honorable 
occupation, and I don‟t want to leave the plant when my shift is over.”65  
Lenochka Azarenkova, whose parents died at the front, donated one hundred ten 
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rubles, all her savings, which her grandmother had given to her as a New Year‟s 
gift.
66
  Some stories, such as the Kostya Kravchuk account and the Misha 
Davydov affair, appeared repeatedly.  Kravchuk, awarded the Order of the Red 
Banner in 1944, kept Red Army combat banners safe in occupied territory for two 
years.
67
  Davydov cut German communication lines with a knife.  When he was 
captured, he was tortured and questioned about his commander.  Davydov 
reportedly said, “All right, I‟ll tell you.  Stalin told me to do it.”68   
 Within a decade of the war‟s conclusion, these accounts of children‟s 
contributions began to coalesce around some definite themes.  Future narratives 
about children in the Great Patriotic War overwhelmingly emphasized two ideas:  
that education was a top priority among children during the war, and that Pioneers 
were intimately involved in all activities concerning the war, especially 
individually heroic acts.  Though the slogan had been issued that “the most 
important war task of children is to study well,” it was in the aftermath of the war 
that this task was most heavily stressed.  Not that this responsibility had been 
neglected during the war;  it had not.  Reports after late 1942 regularly included 
updates on students‟ grades, numbers of students held back, and the enthusiasm 
with which students were approaching certain subjects.  A 1944 summative 
document concluded, “The image of schoolchildren and their teacher, solving 
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math problems in a bomb shelter accompanied by the rumbling of shells, is one of 
the most sublime images in all of history.”69  But whereas in the 1944 report 
education was the last element of the document, in a report on the war written in 
1951 it is the first topic of discussion.  Students were credited with outrageously 
high attendance rates – 99 percent in Kazan in 1942-43! – and similarly 
astronomical passing rates.
70
  By the 1950s, academic success and discipline were 
touted as signs of “genuine Soviet patriotism.”71  This signaled the gradual 
demobilization of the Young Pioneers.  By the mid-1950s, major annual 
campaigns among the Pioneers focused on good manners, etiquette, and hygiene, 
an enormous shift away from the hyperactive, martial campaigns of the 1940s. 
 Upon reading postwar accounts of children and the Great Patriotic War, it 
seems evident that the Young Pioneers‟ campaign to restore their position as 
leaders among children was successful.  Pioneers regularly appeared (and 
continue to appear) in postwar narratives about the war, leading by example in the 
classroom, in agitational work, in agricultural work, in the collection of goods, in 
the timurite movement, and in physical-military training exercises.
72
  Pioneer-
heroes such as Marat Kazei, Lyonya Golikov, and Valya Kotik loom large in the 
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history of the children‟s war, even though their stories were unknown during the 
war itself.
73
   
By the 1960s, histories of the organization lauded the “mass heroism” of 
the Pioneers, noting the 15,000 children received medals “For the Defense of 
Leningrad” and 20,000 children were awarded medals “For the Defense of 
Moscow.”74  Pioneers of the 1960s were characterized as continuing the traditions 
of their predecessors, Pioneers who had led timur teams, supported the military, 
and organized work among children in the war era.  A series of lectures for 
Komsomoltsy on the acts of Pioneers during the Great Patriotic War from the 
1970s asserted that the Pioneers took charge of children “early in the war” and led 
them in agricultural duties and timurite activities.
75
  A regional work that itemized 
various contributions of local children to the war effort included a section entitled 
“The Archives Speak.”  After noting that newly-available archival documents 
concerning the Great Patriotic War affirmed children‟s significant participation in 
war work, the account listed several examples, all of which specifically 
mentioned Pioneer troop activity or individual Pioneer accomplishments.  Thus, 
the Pioneer organization led the mobilization of children from the war‟s 
beginning.
76
   Accounts from the 1980s emphasized that children, “following the 
instructions of the Communists and the underground Komsomol organizations,” 
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engaged in partisan activities and contributed to the people‟s victory through 
hospital work, participation in anti-fascist organizations, schoolwork and 
agricultural work.  Not only did Pioneer houses and palaces remain open and 
functional throughout the war, but new young naturalist stations, art schools, and 
technical stations were opened for Pioneer members.
77
  A two-volume collection 
of documents, published in the 1990s by the Center for the Preservation of 
Documents of Youth Organizations, focused solely on individual or collective 
contributions of children in a wide variety of active, positive roles, as reported in 
war-era newspaper articles, children‟s letters, or school reports.78  Most of the 
documents in the collection identify the children as Young Pioneers, and the vast 
majority date to the post-crisis period.  A 2004 Russian collection of accounts of 
children and the Great Patriotic War alleged that, “wherever children spent their 
wartime childhoods, they piously protected their red scarves,” promulgating the 
myth of universal Pioneer membership and leadership of children during the 
war.
79
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No hint of a crisis within the Young Pioneer organization, even in the 
most recent of works on children and war, exists in postwar literature.  The 
Komsomol leadership of the Young Pioneers did a sensational public relations job 
over the course of the war and beyond, concealing the fact that the ailing, 
irrelevant children‟s organization almost collapsed in the early years of the Great 
Patriotic War.  Drawing inspiration from children themselves, the Young Pioneers 
managed to reassert their right to prescribe behaviors and values to children, thus 
assuring themselves an irrevocable position in the history of the Soviet people‟s 
war effort.  Pioneer leadership became an assumption, a fact beyond questioning, 
in postwar works on children and the war.  All things considered, this was clearly 
a lasting victory for the Young Pioneer organization.  The role of vanguard among 
children, so critical to the Pioneers‟ legacy, had been restored.   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
. . . it is our duty to guide these activities . . . if we desire to be the „vanguard.‟ 
Vladimir Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?,” 19021 
 
 Around the turn of the last century, Vladimir Lenin penned the brief but 
momentous polemic entitled “What Is to Be Done?”  His vision of a small, 
secretive party of full-time, professional revolutionaries would shape the 
Bolshevik Party and forever divide the Russian socialist movement.  Workers, 
Lenin claimed, were limited in their scope and imagination. Simple trade union 
consciousness would not – could not – create the conditions needed to overthrow 
existing bourgeois society via a socialist revolution.  A small, dedicated band of 
revolutionaries, then, was needed to lead the working class to places it would 
never go of its own accord.  Lenin‟s Bolshevik Party proposed itself as the 
organization necessary to the ushering in of socialism.  As the vanguard of the 
working class, it claimed the right to instruct, represent, and speak for the 
proletariat.   
 After the revolution of 1917, Lenin and the Bolsheviks continued to act 
“on behalf of” the working class, but it became increasingly clear that the workers 
                                                 
1
 Vladimir Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?” (International Publishers Company, Inc., 
1929), in V. I. Lenin, Essential Works of Lenin: “What Is to Be Done?” and Other Writings, ed., 
Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987), 117. 
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needed to be taught a Soviet social, economic, and political system.  Nothing 
inherently suited them to lead an international workers‟ revolution, to run 
factories themselves, or to build a new nation.  The Party took the leading role in 
dictating what a workers‟ state ought to be and what the new Soviet man ought to 
look and act like.  Among children, the Young Pioneer organization was to fulfill 
this same function as vanguard – as educator, trainer, tutor, and coach in the 
nascent Soviet socialist society.   
 For two decades after its inception, the Young Pioneers attempted to direct 
and shape the lives of increasing numbers of Soviet children through meetings, 
activities, play, and ritual.  As the membership grew, so did the reach of the 
organization.  The Pioneers introduced children, at a young age, to political 
rhetoric, the socialist struggle, and basic Party ideology.  The Young Pioneers 
encouraged generations of children to venerate Lenin, to eschew the Church, to 
delight in spectacle, and to value education.  For some children, ideas such as 
these contradicted centuries of family and community tradition.  As the arm of the 
Party charged with indoctrinating children, the Young Pioneers prescribed a new 
set of values, loyalties, and behaviors, using a variety of means.  The point of 
Pavlik Morozov‟s canonization was to persuade children to regard allegiance to 
the state as more important than devotion to family.  Joseph Stalin‟s elevation and 
ubiquity was designed to advance his position as the provider of happy childhood 
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for all youngsters.  The Young Pioneer organization‟s primary role was to dictate 
state expectations and priorities to the youngest of Soviet citizens. 
 As far as the Young Pioneers and children were concerned, the conflict in 
Europe, Africa, and Asia which began in 1937 was a distant fight barely relevant 
to and receiving scant attention in Pioneer media.  When the war came home, so 
to speak, the organization was ill-prepared.  The abstract militarization of the 
previous decades was not up to the task of practical application in 1941.  Once the 
war began, the organization foundered:  its local leadership evaporated, children 
were swept up in the chaos of war, and the center remained mute.   
Recognizing the gravity of the Pioneers‟ situation, in the fall of 1942 the 
Komsomol leadership of the Young Pioneers proposed immediate steps to revive 
the ailing organization‟s reputation and visibility.  The subsequent frenzy of 
drives, fronts, campaigns, and propaganda resulted in reports of increased activity, 
expressed in the newly-reinvented, belligerent, patriotic language promoted by the 
Pioneers.  All children‟s activities, from manual labor to studying, were 
legitimized by the Pioneer organization as war work.  By mid-1943, the 
organization was already crafting its post-war historical legacy, glossing over any 
mention of internal crisis and highlighting the contributions of its members to the 
victorious Soviet effort.  The role as vanguard restored, however superficially, the 
Young Pioneers successfully positioned themselves to receive credit for any acts 
of heroism or devotion performed by children.  Thus, the postwar narrative in the 
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Soviet Union (and in post-Soviet Russia) regarding children‟s contributions to the 
war, though typically brief, assumes Pioneer leadership.   
  The means by which the Pioneer organization saved itself provides a 
unique opportunity to understand “the people‟s war” from another angle – that of 
children.  The Komsomol leadership of the Young Pioneers recognized that the 
organization had to become responsive to its target audience;  therefore, the 
language and activities of the Pioneer organization were updated to convey 
relevance to and an urgency concerning the national context.  With the exception 
of the Red Pathfinder initiative, the charge to Pioneers to memorialize and 
caretake the graves of war dead, the Pioneers suggested no original 
responsibilities for its members to undertake.  Children were already performing 
tasks such as agricultural work, collection of various items, and creation of gifts 
for soldiers.  That the Pioneers were able to tap into a preexisting resource – 
popular childhood emotions, experiences, desires – and coopt them for their own 
purposes in part explains the success of the Pioneers‟ efforts.   
 Further, it is important to understand that Soviet children participated in 
the war effort in significant, unique, and creative ways.  A major contribution of 
this dissertation is the revelation of the ways in which and extent to which 
children provided labor, boosted morale, collected needed items, and generally 
supported the Soviet war effort.  The contribution of Soviet children to the 
homefront heretofore has not been fully described or appreciated.  Though the 
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efforts of children may not have been a decisive factor in the Soviet Union‟s 
victory, this contribution is nonetheless significant, if for no other reason than the 
impact of that sense of ownership of the Soviet victory felt by children who took 
part.  That feeling of inclusion and consequence may have influenced the future 
attitudes and actions of these children, a group which, of all the Soviet population, 
claimed the largest survival rate in the nation.  The impact of “owning the 
victory” on this particular generation, on their support for the regime, on their 
views of the West, and on their memories of the war, deserves further exploration.   
The Young Pioneers‟ use of children‟s practices, acts, and responsibilities 
for their own purposes of self-preservation does not diminish their role or the 
importance of that role.  In fact, the Pioneers‟ validation of multi-faceted, 
purposeful acts and expressions of children, by way of their comeback campaign 
and subsequent reporting of it, greatly complicated the simple image of the child 
conveyed by the state to the rest of the Soviet population.  In visual propaganda 
for the adult audience, children are overwhelmingly – almost exclusively – 
portrayed as victims of enemy abuse or the horrors of war.  Rejecting the one-
dimensional depiction of the child-as-victim, the Pioneer organization opted 
instead for a multi-dimensional representation of the ideal child.  They had to:  the 
organization needed every positive role that children played to count towards the 
Pioneers‟ revival in the public sphere and legacy in the postwar era.   And by 
adopting and endorsing said activities and attitudes, the Pioneers‟ actions confirm 
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that children enjoyed agency far greater than previously assumed.  If children 
were not solely victims, passive and preyed upon, then they must have been 
actors, albeit in a variety of ways.  And if, especially in the early years of the war, 
the Pioneers were not directing children‟s acts from Moscow, then this direction 
was emanating from other sources, including the children themselves.  Children, 
then, initiated and engaged in a variety of active roles based on many motivations.  
It was this very multiplicity that benefitted the Young Pioneers in their drive to 
assert leadership of Soviet children.    
Not only could the Pioneers “claim” all children via one activity or 
another, but the diversity of inspirations and emotions among children meant that 
the values of heroism advanced by the organization had multiple opportunities to 
resonate with its audience.  This, despite the fact that the heroic ideals thrust upon 
Soviet children required attitudes beyond their years.  The canonization of labor, 
self-sacrifice, hatred for the enemy, and Party loyalty were meticulously 
illustrated and described for children by the Pioneer organization using mature 
images and stories.  No effort was made to shield children from the horrors of 
war;  in fact, the war‟s brutality was repeatedly emphasized as the reason for 
children to act or think in the ways the Pioneers suggested.  This dissertation 
makes clear that in spite of the state‟s longtime claim to protect children and their 
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childhood,
2
 the Pioneer organization did little to soften the reality of war or to 
safeguard the innocence of Soviet children.  In order to advance their own agenda, 
the organization expected attitudes of children that were more appropriate to 
adults.  To be sure, the Komsomol leadership of the Pioneers believed that this 
type of adult-like belligerence would attract children to the organization.  Based 
on observation, children yearned for action and responsibility.  This 
responsiveness to the population, even if necessitated by internal crisis, presents 
one more in the long line of challenges to the traditional totalitarian 
characterization of the Soviet state.   
The Young Pioneers‟ actions during the war mark it as unique among 
Soviet institutions.  Temporally, the revival of the Pioneer organization appears to 
mirror the dramatic post-Stalingrad upsurge in praise of Stalin and the Party 
leadership.  There are, however, significant differences in the experience of the 
Pioneers.  Though the war and its immediate misfortunes created an anxiety of 
sorts for the Party‟s leadership in the Soviet Union, no other organization 
encountered the sort of near-death experience that the Young Pioneers faced.  Nor 
                                                 
2
 Consider the “Thank You, Comrade Stalin, for Our Happy Childhood!” campaign of the 
1930s.  A wealth of fellow-traveler accounts attest to the state‟s alleged sheltering and nurturing of 
Soviet children.  See, for example, Ethel Mannin, “Playtime of the Child in Modern Russia,” in 
Hubert Freeling Griffith, ed., Playtime in Russia (London: Methuen Press, 1935), 136.  Mannin 
writes, “It is safe to assert without qualification that in no country in the world today is the child 
so intelligently cared for as in the U.S.S.R.  During a recent visit to Moscow I was frequently 
astonished at the amount of trouble taken to secure the child‟s well-being, to protect not merely its 
health but its happiness.”  
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did any other Soviet institution so evidently follow the lead of its own 
constituents in advocating specific types of war work, attitudes, and language. 
The adoption of Pioneer language, as seen in reports submitted by children 
to Moscow and contemporary oral histories,
3
 suggests that the organization 
achieved a degree of success in internalizing Pioneer rhetoric, primarily by 
correctly identifying and tapping into children‟s desires.  This conclusion follows 
other studies which note a long tradition of Party efforts to educate the population 
in “state-speech.”4  Though this dissertation is not about reception of the state‟s 
expectations, an obvious complement would be such a companion study.  Now 
that this project has presented the view from the center, a companion study which 
evaluates these measures from the provincial or local level would be invaluable.  
Such a future study could reveal the extent to which the Young Pioneers were 
successful in internalizing speech, motives, and activities among children, and 
more interestingly, reveal the extent to which the state‟s messages were adopted, 
manipulated, reinterpreted, and modified by local officials, teachers, and children, 
for tantalizing snatches of this sort of appropriation exist in memoirs.
5
  (Any 
                                                 
3
 Larry E. Holmes, Stalin‟s School. 
4
 See, for example, Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), and Lisa Kirschenbaum, Small Comrades. 
5
 Children could use war work for their own purposes.  Vera Inber recalls that one small 
boy in Leningrad explained to her that he had made an unsatisfactory grade in math “because of an 
incendiary bomb.”  And, it seems clear that despite the intense hostility for the enemy advocated 
by the state, children were capable of distinguishing between “the enemy” and the German people.  
Svetlana Magayeva recounts a conversation amongst children about the proper response towards 
the enemy after a friend is killed in the war.  The children decided that all German children in 
Berlin should be rescued and moved to a Young Pioneer camp in the Soviet Union, and then 
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defiance of the Pioneer message would take on added interest in that those 
spontaneous subcultures would not only be construed as anti-Party, but 
treasonous.)  For children, especially, were allowed plenty of room to maneuver 
within the broad definition of acceptable activities and motivations presented by 
the Young Pioneers. 
A broader question raised by this project is of a comparative nature.  The 
mobilization of youth, made possible by modern technology and nurtured by 
various ideologies, is considered a characteristic common to modern totalitarian 
states and societies.
6
  The context of World War II, specifically, provides fodder 
for a productive comparison of youth and children‟s state organizations.  The 
Hitler Youth, for example, attempted “total mobilization of youth” as “bearers of 
the future world” in Germany. 7  Numerous scholarly (and non-scholarly) studies 
of the Nazi organization exist. This dissertation offers, for the first time, a starting 
point for a comparative study of the Hitler Youth (or any other totalitarian 
children‟s organization) and the Young Pioneers, in terms of an institutional 
history, the relationship between state and child in war, and the influence of 
ideology on state expectations in time of war.  Such studies promise to more fully 
illuminate the role of the child in modern war, the state-child relationship in 
authoritarian nations, and the layered meanings of state-sponsored youth culture. 
                                                                                                                                     
Berlin could be bombed in retaliation.  Inber, Leningrad Diary, 129;  Magayeva, Surviving the 
Blockade, 43-44. 
6
 See, for example, Peter Stearns, Growing Up. 
7
 Wallace and Alt, “Youth Cultures Under Authoritarian Regimes,” 278-279. 
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A final set of questions suggested by this dissertation involves memory of 
the war.  The study of children and war cannot be separated from the state‟s 
efforts to influence memory of the war.  The postwar narratives created and 
popularized by the Young Pioneers suggest early efforts by the organization to 
shape the memories of those who were children during the war.  These narratives 
offered children a version of the war that was almost entirely laudatory of 
children‟s actions, with the only major amendment being the leadership role of 
the Pioneers during the war.  They certainly attempted to help those who were 
children during the war to identify with the “victorious Soviet people” so often 
praised in the postwar era.  Limited evidence, presented here, intimates that 
children recalled their contributions as part of a larger whole, as part of society‟s 
contribution to the homefront, as part of the Stalinist, socialist nation, but the 
Pioneers themselves are not a major part of memoirs of those who were children 
during the war.
8
  To what degree was Pioneer leadership “remembered” by those 
who were children during the war, after the war was over?  If little recognition 
                                                 
8
 Janka Goldberger is the only of the memoirists who specifically discusses her entrance 
into the Pioneer organization.  Her remembrance of the fall of 1943: “That year we were officially 
enrolled into the Pioneers, and each one of us was given a red scarf to wear round our necks.  
Nobody was asked it they wanted to join.  Everybody had to.  It was something like compulsory 
scouts, except that we had to listen to speeches telling us how Father Stalin had looked, does look, 
and will look after us, and how we all owe him a debt of eternal gratitude.”  Goldberger‟s 
experience fits with the resurrection of the Pioneers described in this dissertation considering the 
sudden interest in increasing membership and the revival of the red scarf.  Interestingly, 
Goldberger was a Polish deportee living in exile in Central Asia – not exactly the target audience 
of the Pioneer organization.  Other memoirists refer to the Pioneer organization in more oblique 
terms.  Shavrova, for example, recalls going to a Pioneer Palace in Leningrad in the summer of 
1942 to join a needlework group.  Goldberger, Stalin‟s Little Guest, 140;  Shavrova, “A 
Schoolgirl‟s Diary,” in Simmons and Perlina, Writing the Siege, 43. 
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exists, then the effects of the disparity between the Pioneer war narrative and 
reality on memories of the Great Patriotic War deserve further exploration.   
The emphasis on military preparedness training and belligerency during 
the war, described in this study, must have had future implications for children.  
One wonders at the effects of these actions and attitudes:  how does it affect 
Pioneer members?  how does it affect the ways in which these children 
remembered or regarded the Young Pioneer organization?  how does it affect this 
generation‟s attitudes towards future wars?  The legacy of militarization within 
the Pioneer organization extended beyond the 1940s, though considerably 
softened by demobilization efforts.   Paul Thorez noted that the shot put event at 
the famous Young Pioneer camp, Artek, in the early 1950s used a weight shaped 
like a hand grenade.
9
  More broadly, one wonders how the expectation that 
children should engage in adult behaviors and attitudes carried over into post-war 
era.  Did the Pioneer organization ever attempt to reinstate traditional ideas about 
childhood for its members?  By what means and for what reasons?  The question 
of memory is a significant part of understanding the total war experience for the 
former Soviet Union, and this dissertation provides many of the themes by which 
the issues may be productively framed.   
For our perception of the Soviet experience in the Great Patriotic War to 
be complete, children must be written into the story of the war.  Very few 
                                                 
9
 Thorez, Model Children, 57. 
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interactions between state and society during war did not involve them in some 
manner.  The crisis in the Young Pioneer organization provides us with a unique 
opportunity to reveal the actions and attitudes of this significant subpopulation, 
the state‟s expectations of children during the war, and the institutional 
machinations required to restore the Pioneers to their rightful place as leader of 
Soviet children.  In the end, the crisis was averted.  Fortunately for the Party, 
wartime campaigns reinstated the Young Pioneers as vanguard among children 
and secured the organization‟s place in the history of the glorious Soviet war 
effort. 
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